fix(m190): r1 复审——0x01 修成 \1 + YAML 门禁、被调方声明 secret、拆两个超限测试文件、验签换 ed25519-dalek
四条 P1 + 四条 P2 一并处置(不变的是判据,变的是「谁在承重」)。
P1-1 `.github/workflows/release-build.yml` 的 sed 替换串是裸 0x01(本意 `\1`):GitHub 解析该文件会
失败 ⇒ 整个 run 起不来;即便容忍,版本号也会被求值成单字节,PE 判据报「与 Cargo.toml 不同源?」把
排障引向错方向。修成字面 `\1`,并新增 `packaging/check_workflows_yaml.py`(真 YAML 解析器 parse
全部 workflow + 裸 C0 控制字符字节判据;带 --self-test 注入 0x01/坏结构断言必红),接进
`release-guard.yml` 两步。文本扫描型守卫看不见这类字节,这道门禁专门挡它。
P1-2 `release-publish.yml` 没在 `on.workflow_call.secrets` 里声明 `ULL_MANIFEST_SIGNING_KEY`,调用方
却传了:可复用工作流只拿得到自己声明过的 secret ⇒ 用户配好钥也会在签名步红,而错误文案反过来指控
Secret 没配。补声明(required: false,fail-closed 由步内 ::error:: + exit 1 承担,同
ULL_MSA_CLIENT_ID 的模式)。
P1-3 两个测试支撑文件越过 400 行守卫:签名夹具拆到 `tests/support_sign.rs`(support.rs 458→392),
CLI e2e 的签名部分拆到 `support/update_e2e_sign.rs`(update_e2e.rs 406→348)。纯搬家。
P2-2 「唯一收口点」改成结构事实:从 `UpdateSource` 删掉 `fetch_manifest` 默认实现,调用方只能拿
`verified_manifest(&source, channel)`(源只交原文,想绕过验签就得自己重写解析与渠道判据)。
P2-3 文档写的第 ④ 条命令补进流水线:`sign_manifest.py --verify-pinned` 用 trust.rs 里钉住的公钥
回验刚落盘的 .sig(不碰私钥),发布侧因此验证的是「客户端的判据」而不是「签名脚本的自我声明」。
P2-4 随自写实现一起删除(`Fe` 的错误 PartialEq 不再存在)。
P2-5 app-iced/build.rs 注释里那个 windows_subsystem 属性本分支不存在(M196 才有),改为说明
「本文件只写版本资源,子系统由 rustc 属性决定,check_pe_version.py 会把 subsystem 打出来」。
P2-6 坏清单不再带 error.path 是有意降级(来源 id 在 message 里),保持。
裁定项:自写 Ed25519 换成 `ed25519-dalek::verify_strict`(信任锚不许自写密码学;此刻信任表还是空表,
零兼容负担)。删除 `update/ed25519/{field,group,mod}.rs`(含只服务它们的单测),新 `update/ed25519.rs`
只剩一个薄封装;拒绝类用例(可锻 S+L / 小阶公钥 / 非规范 R / 空签名 / 未知 key)**一条没删**,
改成钉 dalek 的 strict 语义——实测 dalek 对全部五类的结论与旧实现一致(非规范 R 的拒绝理由不同:
dalek 走「小阶点」而非「编码非规范」,用例注释里写明)。签名侧留在 `packaging/ed25519_ref.py`
(纯 Python、零 pip 依赖),`--self-test` 用 RFC 8032 同一组向量钉两边。
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@@ -13,10 +13,9 @@ Key discipline: the **private key** lives only in the repository Secret
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is not pinned (a release signed with a key clients do not trust is worse than no release).
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Manual: `packaging/docs/signing.md`.
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Usage:
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python3 packaging/sign_manifest.py --generate-key --key-id ull-release-2026a
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ULL_MANIFEST_SIGNING_KEY='{"key_id":"…","seed_hex":"…"}' python3 packaging/sign_manifest.py --sign dist/manifest.json
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python3 packaging/sign_manifest.py --check-pinned-keyring | --self-test
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Usage: `--generate-key [--key-id K]` / `--sign dist/manifest.json`(钥从环境变量
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`ULL_MANIFEST_SIGNING_KEY` 取)/ `--check-pinned-keyring`(钥必须已钉住)/ `--verify-pinned
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dist/manifest.json`(用 trust.rs 里钉的公钥回验产出,复现客户端判据)/ `--self-test`。
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"""
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from __future__ import annotations
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@@ -41,125 +40,12 @@ KID_RE = re.compile(r'key_id:\s*"([^"]+)"\s*,\s*public_key_hex:\s*"([0-9a-fA-F]{
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# `crates/core/src/update/ed25519/*`). Validated against the RFC 8032 §7.1 vectors in
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# `--self-test`; the Rust verifier is validated against the *same* vectors, so the two
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# implementations cross-check each other. No third-party dependency: CI needs no pip install.
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Q = 2**255 - 19
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L = 2**252 + 27742317777372353535851937790883648493
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def _inv(x: int) -> int:
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return pow(x, Q - 2, Q)
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D = -121665 * _inv(121666) % Q
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_D2 = 2 * D % Q
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_SQRT_M1 = pow(2, (Q - 1) // 4, Q)
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def _recover_x(y: int, sign: int) -> int | None:
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u = (y * y - 1) % Q
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v = (D * y * y + 1) % Q
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v3 = pow(v, 3, Q)
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v7 = pow(v, 7, Q)
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x = u * v3 % Q * pow(u * v7 % Q, (Q - 5) // 8, Q) % Q
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if (v * x * x - u) % Q != 0:
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x = x * _SQRT_M1 % Q
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if (v * x * x - u) % Q != 0:
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return None
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if x % 2 != sign:
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x = (Q - x) % Q
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return x
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def _decompress(data: bytes) -> tuple[int, int, int, int] | None:
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if len(data) != 32:
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return None
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y = int.from_bytes(data, "little")
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sign = (y >> 255) & 1
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y &= (1 << 255) - 1
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if y >= Q:
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return None
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x = _recover_x(y, sign)
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if x is None:
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return None
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return (x, y, 1, x * y % Q)
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def _add(p: tuple[int, int, int, int], r: tuple[int, int, int, int]):
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x1, y1, z1, t1 = p
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x2, y2, z2, t2 = r
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a = (y1 - x1) * (y2 - x2) % Q
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b = (y1 + x1) * (y2 + x2) % Q
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c = t1 * _D2 * t2 % Q
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d = 2 * z1 * z2 % Q
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e, f, g, h = (b - a) % Q, (d - c) % Q, (d + c) % Q, (b + a) % Q
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return (e * f % Q, g * h % Q, f * g % Q, e * h % Q)
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def _double(p: tuple[int, int, int, int]):
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x1, y1, z1, _ = p
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a = x1 * x1 % Q
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b = y1 * y1 % Q
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c = 2 * z1 * z1 % Q
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d = -a % Q
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e = ((x1 + y1) * (x1 + y1) - a - b) % Q
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g = (d + b) % Q
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f = (g - c) % Q
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h = (d - b) % Q
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return (e * f % Q, g * h % Q, f * g % Q, e * h % Q)
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def _scalarmult(p, e: int):
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acc = (0, 1, 1, 0)
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for bit in bin(e)[2:] if e else "":
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acc = _double(acc)
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if bit == "1":
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acc = _add(acc, p)
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return acc
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def _encode(p) -> bytes:
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x, y, z, _ = p
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zi = _inv(z)
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x, y = x * zi % Q, y * zi % Q
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return (y | ((x & 1) << 255)).to_bytes(32, "little")
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def _base():
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encoded = (4 * _inv(5) % Q).to_bytes(32, "little")
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return _decompress(encoded)
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def _hint(data: bytes) -> int:
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return int.from_bytes(hashlib.sha512(data).digest(), "little") % L
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def public_key(seed: bytes) -> bytes:
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h = hashlib.sha512(seed).digest()
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a = int.from_bytes(_clamp(bytearray(h[:32])), "little")
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return _encode(_scalarmult(_base(), a))
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def _clamp(scalar: bytearray) -> bytes:
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scalar[0] &= 248
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scalar[31] &= 127
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scalar[31] |= 64
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return bytes(scalar)
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def sign(seed: bytes, message: bytes) -> bytes:
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if len(seed) != 32:
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raise SystemExit("error: Ed25519 种子必须 32 字节")
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h = hashlib.sha512(seed).digest()
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a = int.from_bytes(_clamp(bytearray(h[:32])), "little")
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prefix = h[32:]
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r = _hint(prefix + message)
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r_encoded = _encode(_scalarmult(_base(), r))
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pk = _encode(_scalarmult(_base(), a))
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k = _hint(r_encoded + pk + message)
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s = (r + k * a) % L
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return r_encoded + s.to_bytes(32, "little")
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def verify(pk: bytes, message: bytes, signature: bytes) -> bool:
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if len(pk) != 32 or len(signature) != 64:
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return False
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r_bytes, s_bytes = signature[:32], signature[32:]
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if int.from_bytes(s_bytes, "little") >= L:
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return False
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a = _decompress(pk)
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r_point = _decompress(r_bytes)
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if a is None or r_point is None:
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return False
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k = _hint(r_bytes + pk + message)
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left = _scalarmult(_base(), int.from_bytes(s_bytes, "little"))
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return _encode(left) == _encode(_add(r_point, _scalarmult(a, k)))
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# Ed25519 的参考实现搬到了 `packaging/ed25519_ref.py`(M190 r1:本文件贴着 400 行红线)。
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# 目的与路径都写在那边的文件头:发布侧签名必须零第三方依赖,而仓里验签用的是 ed25519-dalek ——
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# 两套实现互相独立,`--self-test` 用 RFC 8032 的同一组向量把两边各自钉住。
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sys.path.insert(0, str(Path(__file__).resolve().parent))
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from ed25519_ref import ALG, sign, verify, public_key # noqa: E402
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def load_key(text: str) -> tuple[str, bytes]:
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"""Parse the secret JSON (`{"key_id":…,"seed_hex":…}`) or a bare 64-char hex seed."""
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@@ -313,6 +199,36 @@ def do_check_pinned(key_path: str | None) -> int:
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print("error: 手册:packaging/docs/signing.md §3/§5", file=sys.stderr)
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return 1
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def do_verify_pinned(manifest: Path) -> int:
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"""用 trust.rs 里钉住的公钥回验 `<manifest>.sig` —— 复现「客户端会怎么判」,不需要私钥。"""
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keys = pinned_keys(TRUST_RS.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
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if not keys:
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print("error: 信任表是空的,无从回验(先钉公钥,见 --check-pinned-keyring)", file=sys.stderr)
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return 1
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sig_path = manifest.with_name(manifest.name + SIG_SUFFIX)
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if not sig_path.is_file():
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print(f"error: 没有签名文件 {sig_path}", file=sys.stderr)
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return 1
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raw = manifest.read_bytes()
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envelope = json.loads(sig_path.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
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for item in envelope.get("signatures", []):
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if item.get("alg") != ALG:
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continue
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try:
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signature = bytes.fromhex(item.get("sig", ""))
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except ValueError:
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continue
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for pinned_id, pinned_hex in keys:
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if verify(bytes.fromhex(pinned_hex), raw, signature):
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print(f"ok: {sig_path.name} 用钉住的公钥 {pinned_id} 能验过(客户端会接受)")
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return 0
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print(
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"error: 拿 trust.rs 里钉住的公钥回验不过 —— 这份 Release 的用户会全部拒装。别发版",
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file=sys.stderr,
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)
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return 1
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def do_self_test() -> int:
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vectors = [
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("9d61b19deffd5a60ba844af492ec2cc44449c5697b326919703bac031cae7f60", "d75a980182b10ab7d54bfed3c964073a0ee172f3daa62325af021a68f707511a", "",
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@@ -360,6 +276,7 @@ def main(argv: list[str] | None = None) -> int:
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parser.add_argument("--verify", nargs=2, metavar=("MANIFEST", "SIG"), help="手工验一份签名")
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parser.add_argument("--public-key", metavar="HEX", help="--verify 用的公钥")
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parser.add_argument("--check-pinned-keyring", action="store_true", help="检查密钥是否已被钉进 trust.rs")
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parser.add_argument("--verify-pinned", metavar="MANIFEST", type=Path, help="用 trust.rs 里钉的公钥回验产出")
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parser.add_argument("--self-test", action="store_true", help="跑 RFC 8032 向量与解析器自检")
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args = parser.parse_args(argv)
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@@ -376,6 +293,8 @@ def main(argv: list[str] | None = None) -> int:
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return do_verify(Path(args.verify[0]), Path(args.verify[1]), args.public_key)
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if args.check_pinned_keyring:
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return do_check_pinned(args.key)
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if args.verify_pinned:
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return do_verify_pinned(args.verify_pinned)
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parser.print_help()
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return 2
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