Files
Unlucky-Launcher/packaging/sign_manifest.py
T
AskaEth 918d826645 fix(m190): r1 复审——0x01 修成 \1 + YAML 门禁、被调方声明 secret、拆两个超限测试文件、验签换 ed25519-dalek
四条 P1 + 四条 P2 一并处置(不变的是判据,变的是「谁在承重」)。

P1-1 `.github/workflows/release-build.yml` 的 sed 替换串是裸 0x01(本意 `\1`):GitHub 解析该文件会
失败 ⇒ 整个 run 起不来;即便容忍,版本号也会被求值成单字节,PE 判据报「与 Cargo.toml 不同源?」把
排障引向错方向。修成字面 `\1`,并新增 `packaging/check_workflows_yaml.py`(真 YAML 解析器 parse
全部 workflow + 裸 C0 控制字符字节判据;带 --self-test 注入 0x01/坏结构断言必红),接进
`release-guard.yml` 两步。文本扫描型守卫看不见这类字节,这道门禁专门挡它。

P1-2 `release-publish.yml` 没在 `on.workflow_call.secrets` 里声明 `ULL_MANIFEST_SIGNING_KEY`,调用方
却传了:可复用工作流只拿得到自己声明过的 secret ⇒ 用户配好钥也会在签名步红,而错误文案反过来指控
Secret 没配。补声明(required: false,fail-closed 由步内 ::error:: + exit 1 承担,同
ULL_MSA_CLIENT_ID 的模式)。

P1-3 两个测试支撑文件越过 400 行守卫:签名夹具拆到 `tests/support_sign.rs`(support.rs 458→392),
CLI e2e 的签名部分拆到 `support/update_e2e_sign.rs`(update_e2e.rs 406→348)。纯搬家。

P2-2 「唯一收口点」改成结构事实:从 `UpdateSource` 删掉 `fetch_manifest` 默认实现,调用方只能拿
`verified_manifest(&source, channel)`(源只交原文,想绕过验签就得自己重写解析与渠道判据)。
P2-3 文档写的第 ④ 条命令补进流水线:`sign_manifest.py --verify-pinned` 用 trust.rs 里钉住的公钥
回验刚落盘的 .sig(不碰私钥),发布侧因此验证的是「客户端的判据」而不是「签名脚本的自我声明」。
P2-4 随自写实现一起删除(`Fe` 的错误 PartialEq 不再存在)。
P2-5 app-iced/build.rs 注释里那个 windows_subsystem 属性本分支不存在(M196 才有),改为说明
「本文件只写版本资源,子系统由 rustc 属性决定,check_pe_version.py 会把 subsystem 打出来」。
P2-6 坏清单不再带 error.path 是有意降级(来源 id 在 message 里),保持。

裁定项:自写 Ed25519 换成 `ed25519-dalek::verify_strict`(信任锚不许自写密码学;此刻信任表还是空表,
零兼容负担)。删除 `update/ed25519/{field,group,mod}.rs`(含只服务它们的单测),新 `update/ed25519.rs`
只剩一个薄封装;拒绝类用例(可锻 S+L / 小阶公钥 / 非规范 R / 空签名 / 未知 key)**一条没删**,
改成钉 dalek 的 strict 语义——实测 dalek 对全部五类的结论与旧实现一致(非规范 R 的拒绝理由不同:
dalek 走「小阶点」而非「编码非规范」,用例注释里写明)。签名侧留在 `packaging/ed25519_ref.py`
(纯 Python、零 pip 依赖),`--self-test` 用 RFC 8032 同一组向量钉两边。
2026-11-09 02:14:32 +08:00

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#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""Sign / verify the update manifest, and check the pinned keyring (M190).
Why Ed25519 + a **detached** `.sig`: the manifest's `sha256` only says "the package matches the
manifest"; it says nothing about who wrote the manifest. A signature over the manifest's *exact
bytes* answers that, and a separate file avoids JSON canonicalisation games (any byte change
breaks the signature).
Key discipline: the **private key** lives only in the repository Secret
`ULL_MANIFEST_SIGNING_KEY` (never in git, logs or artifacts); the **public key** is pinned
*inside the binary* — `crates/core/src/update/trust.rs`, between the `>>> PINNED-KEYS >>>` /
`<<< PINNED-KEYS <<<` markers. `--check-pinned-keyring` fails the release when the secret's key
is not pinned (a release signed with a key clients do not trust is worse than no release).
Manual: `packaging/docs/signing.md`.
Usage: `--generate-key [--key-id K]` / `--sign dist/manifest.json`(钥从环境变量
`ULL_MANIFEST_SIGNING_KEY` 取)/ `--check-pinned-keyring`(钥必须已钉住)/ `--verify-pinned
dist/manifest.json`(用 trust.rs 里钉的公钥回验产出,复现客户端判据)/ `--self-test`。
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import argparse
import hashlib
import json
import os
import re
import sys
from pathlib import Path
FORMAT = 1
ALG = "ed25519"
KEY_ENV = "ULL_MANIFEST_SIGNING_KEY"
SIG_SUFFIX = ".sig"
TRUST_RS = Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent / "crates/core/src/update/trust.rs"
PIN_BEGIN = ">>> PINNED-KEYS >>>"
PIN_END = "<<< PINNED-KEYS <<<"
KID_RE = re.compile(r'key_id:\s*"([^"]+)"\s*,\s*public_key_hex:\s*"([0-9a-fA-F]{64})"')
# Ed25519 (RFC 8032), reference-shaped implementation (same formulas as
# `crates/core/src/update/ed25519/*`). Validated against the RFC 8032 §7.1 vectors in
# `--self-test`; the Rust verifier is validated against the *same* vectors, so the two
# implementations cross-check each other. No third-party dependency: CI needs no pip install.
# Ed25519 的参考实现搬到了 `packaging/ed25519_ref.py`(M190 r1:本文件贴着 400 行红线)。
# 目的与路径都写在那边的文件头:发布侧签名必须零第三方依赖,而仓里验签用的是 ed25519-dalek ——
# 两套实现互相独立,`--self-test` 用 RFC 8032 的同一组向量把两边各自钉住。
sys.path.insert(0, str(Path(__file__).resolve().parent))
from ed25519_ref import ALG, sign, verify, public_key # noqa: E402
def load_key(text: str) -> tuple[str, bytes]:
"""Parse the secret JSON (`{"key_id":…,"seed_hex":…}`) or a bare 64-char hex seed."""
text = text.strip()
try:
payload = json.loads(text)
except json.JSONDecodeError:
payload = None
if isinstance(payload, dict):
key_id = str(payload.get("key_id", "")).strip()
seed_hex = str(payload.get("seed_hex", "")).strip()
else:
key_id, seed_hex = "", text
if not key_id:
raise SystemExit("error: 密钥缺少 `key_id`(清单签名要靠它查信任表)")
try:
seed = bytes.fromhex(seed_hex)
except ValueError as error:
raise SystemExit(f"error: `seed_hex` 不是十六进制({error})") from error
if len(seed) != 32:
raise SystemExit(f"error: `seed_hex` 必须 32 字节(实际 {len(seed)})")
return key_id, seed
def key_from_env_or_arg(path: str | None) -> tuple[str, bytes]:
if path:
secret = Path(path).read_text(encoding="utf-8")
else:
secret = os.environ.get(KEY_ENV, "")
if not secret.strip():
raise SystemExit(
f"error: 没有签名密钥:设环境变量 {KEY_ENV}(内容 = --generate-key 打出来的那一行 JSON),"
"或显式给 --key <文件>。**绝不**把私钥写进仓库/日志/产物。"
)
return load_key(secret)
def pinned_keys(trust_text: str) -> list[tuple[str, str]]:
"""Extract `(key_id, public_key_hex)` pairs between the PINNED-KEYS markers."""
begin = trust_text.find(PIN_BEGIN)
end = trust_text.find(PIN_END)
if begin < 0 or end < 0 or end < begin:
raise SystemExit(f"error: {TRUST_RS} 里找不到 {PIN_BEGIN} / {PIN_END} 标记")
return KID_RE.findall(trust_text[begin:end])
def do_generate_key(key_id: str) -> int:
seed = os.urandom(32)
pk = public_key(seed)
pk_hex = pk.hex()
if not verify(pk, b"self-check", sign(seed, b"self-check")):
print("error: 自己签自己验不过——不要用这把钥", file=sys.stderr)
return 1
secret = json.dumps({"key_id": key_id, "seed_hex": seed.hex()}, ensure_ascii=False)
print("# ① 私钥(**只**贴进仓库 Secret " + KEY_ENV + ",别写进任何文件/日志/提交):")
print(secret)
print("# ② 公钥(贴进 crates/core/src/update/trust.rs 的 PINNED-KEYS 标记之间):")
print(f' PinnedKey {{ key_id: "{key_id}", public_key_hex: "{pk_hex}" }},')
print(f"# 公钥十六进制:{pk_hex}")
return 0
def do_sign(manifest: Path, key_path: str | None, out: Path | None, key_id_override: str | None) -> int:
if not manifest.is_file():
print(f"error: 没有清单文件 {manifest}", file=sys.stderr)
return 1
raw = manifest.read_bytes()
# 签的必须是**能解析**的清单:签一串垃圾只会把事故推迟到用户机器上。
try:
parsed = json.loads(raw.decode("utf-8"))
except (UnicodeDecodeError, json.JSONDecodeError) as error:
print(f"error: {manifest} 不是合法 JSON({error})", file=sys.stderr)
return 1
if not isinstance(parsed, dict) or "channel" not in parsed or "releases" not in parsed:
print(f"error: {manifest} 不像发布清单(缺 channel/releases)", file=sys.stderr)
return 1
key_id, seed = key_from_env_or_arg(key_path)
if key_id_override:
key_id = key_id_override
signature = sign(seed, raw)
if not verify(public_key(seed), raw, signature):
print("error: 签出来的签名自己验不过(实现有问题),拒绝落盘", file=sys.stderr)
return 1
envelope = {
"format": FORMAT,
"signatures": [
{
"alg": ALG,
"key_id": key_id,
"sig": signature.hex(),
"manifest_sha256": hashlib.sha256(raw).hexdigest(),
}
],
}
out = out or manifest.with_name(manifest.name + SIG_SUFFIX)
out.write_text(json.dumps(envelope, ensure_ascii=False, indent=2) + "\n", encoding="utf-8", newline="\n")
print(f"signed: {manifest} → {out}")
print(f" key_id = {key_id}")
print(f" public_key = {public_key(seed).hex()}")
print(f" manifest_sha256 = {envelope['signatures'][0]['manifest_sha256']}")
return 0
def do_verify(manifest: Path, sig: Path, public_key_hex: str) -> int:
raw = manifest.read_bytes()
envelope = json.loads(sig.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
pk = bytes.fromhex(public_key_hex)
for item in envelope.get("signatures", []):
if item.get("alg") != ALG:
continue
if verify(pk, raw, bytes.fromhex(item.get("sig", ""))):
print(f"ok: {sig} 里的签名(key_id={item.get('key_id')})通过")
return 0
print("error: 没有任何一条签名能验过", file=sys.stderr)
return 1
def do_check_pinned(key_path: str | None) -> int:
key_id, seed = key_from_env_or_arg(key_path)
pk_hex = public_key(seed).hex()
keys = pinned_keys(TRUST_RS.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
if not keys:
# 「说人话的红」:因为什么、缺什么、怎么补,一行一行写清楚(不涉密,只回显公钥)。
print("error: 信任表是空的(fail-closed):客户端一把公钥都没有,任何清单都验不过,所以拒绝发布。", file=sys.stderr)
print(f"error: 本次签名钥 = key_id {key_id} / 公钥 {pk_hex}", file=sys.stderr)
print("error: 补法:把这行贴进 crates/core/src/update/trust.rs 的 PINNED-KEYS 标记之间 ——", file=sys.stderr)
print(f'error: PinnedKey {{ key_id: "{key_id}", public_key_hex: "{pk_hex}" }},', file=sys.stderr)
print("error: 手册:packaging/docs/signing.md §3", file=sys.stderr)
return 1
for pinned_id, pinned_hex in keys:
if pinned_hex.lower() == pk_hex:
print(f"ok: 签名钥 {key_id} 已被钉住(trust.rs 里叫 {pinned_id})")
if pinned_id != key_id:
print(
f"warning: 同一个公钥在 trust.rs 里叫 {pinned_id}、密钥文件里叫 {key_id};"
"清单会带后者,客户端按**公钥字节**验签,所以两种写法都能过(但建议改名对齐)",
file=sys.stderr,
)
return 0
pinned_ids = [k[0] for k in keys]
print(
f"error: 签名钥(key_id={key_id} / 公钥={pk_hex})不在信任表里 —— 签出来的清单没有任何客户端会认,所以拒绝发布。",
file=sys.stderr,
)
print(f"error: trust.rs 现在钉的是:{pinned_ids}", file=sys.stderr)
for pinned_id, pinned_hex in keys:
print(f"error: {pinned_id} = {pinned_hex}", file=sys.stderr)
print("error: 二选一:", file=sys.stderr)
print("error: ① 用已钉住的那把钥签(换回对应的 Secret);或", file=sys.stderr)
print(
"error: ② 换钥:把上面的公钥按「旧钥签新钥」贴进 crates/core/src/update/trust.rs 的 PINNED-KEYS 之间,"
"并让本次清单同时带旧钥签名",
file=sys.stderr,
)
print("error: 手册:packaging/docs/signing.md §3/§5", file=sys.stderr)
return 1
def do_verify_pinned(manifest: Path) -> int:
"""用 trust.rs 里钉住的公钥回验 `<manifest>.sig` —— 复现「客户端会怎么判」,不需要私钥。"""
keys = pinned_keys(TRUST_RS.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
if not keys:
print("error: 信任表是空的,无从回验(先钉公钥,见 --check-pinned-keyring)", file=sys.stderr)
return 1
sig_path = manifest.with_name(manifest.name + SIG_SUFFIX)
if not sig_path.is_file():
print(f"error: 没有签名文件 {sig_path}", file=sys.stderr)
return 1
raw = manifest.read_bytes()
envelope = json.loads(sig_path.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
for item in envelope.get("signatures", []):
if item.get("alg") != ALG:
continue
try:
signature = bytes.fromhex(item.get("sig", ""))
except ValueError:
continue
for pinned_id, pinned_hex in keys:
if verify(bytes.fromhex(pinned_hex), raw, signature):
print(f"ok: {sig_path.name} 用钉住的公钥 {pinned_id} 能验过(客户端会接受)")
return 0
print(
"error: 拿 trust.rs 里钉住的公钥回验不过 —— 这份 Release 的用户会全部拒装。别发版",
file=sys.stderr,
)
return 1
def do_self_test() -> int:
vectors = [
("9d61b19deffd5a60ba844af492ec2cc44449c5697b326919703bac031cae7f60", "d75a980182b10ab7d54bfed3c964073a0ee172f3daa62325af021a68f707511a", "",
"e5564300c360ac729086e2cc806e828a84877f1eb8e5d974d873e065224901555fb8821590a33bacc61e39701cf9b46bd25bf5f0595bbe24655141438e7a100b"),
("4ccd089b28ff96da9db6c346ec114e0f5b8a319f35aba624da8cf6ed4fb8a6fb", "3d4017c3e843895a92b70aa74d1b7ebc9c982ccf2ec4968cc0cd55f12af4660c", "72",
"92a009a9f0d4cab8720e820b5f642540a2b27b5416503f8fb3762223ebdb69da085ac1e43e15996e458f3613d0f11d8c387b2eaeb4302aeeb00d291612bb0c00"),
("c5aa8df43f9f837bedb7442f31dcb7b166d38535076f094b85ce3a2e0b4458f7", "fc51cd8e6218a1a38da47ed00230f0580816ed13ba3303ac5deb911548908025", "af82",
"6291d657deec24024827e69c3abe01a30ce548a284743a445e3680d7db5ac3ac18ff9b538d16f290ae67f760984dc6594a7c15e9716ed28dc027beceea1ec40a"),
]
failures = 0
for index, (seed_hex, pk_hex, message_hex, sig_hex) in enumerate(vectors, 1):
seed, pk, message = bytes.fromhex(seed_hex), bytes.fromhex(pk_hex), bytes.fromhex(message_hex)
if public_key(seed).hex() != pk_hex:
print(f"FAIL vector {index}: public key mismatch", file=sys.stderr)
failures += 1
if sign(seed, message).hex() != sig_hex:
print(f"FAIL vector {index}: signature mismatch", file=sys.stderr)
failures += 1
if not verify(pk, message, bytes.fromhex(sig_hex)):
print(f"FAIL vector {index}: verify rejected", file=sys.stderr)
failures += 1
tampered = bytearray(message)
tampered.append(0)
if verify(pk, bytes(tampered), bytes.fromhex(sig_hex)):
print(f"FAIL vector {index}: tampered message still verifies", file=sys.stderr)
failures += 1
# 标记解析:信任表解析器必须在示例上命中一对,且在空表上返回空。
sample = f'{PIN_BEGIN}\n PinnedKey {{ key_id: "k1", public_key_hex: "{"ab" * 32}" }},\n{PIN_END}'
if pinned_keys(sample) != [("k1", "ab" * 32)]:
print("FAIL: pinned_keys() 没解析出示例条目", file=sys.stderr)
failures += 1
if pinned_keys(f"{PIN_BEGIN}\n{PIN_END}") != []:
print("FAIL: pinned_keys() 在空表上应返回空", file=sys.stderr)
failures += 1
print("self-test:", "ok" if failures == 0 else f"{failures} 处失败")
return 0 if failures == 0 else 1
def main(argv: list[str] | None = None) -> int:
parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description="更新清单的 Ed25519 签名/验签与信任表检查(M190)")
parser.add_argument("--generate-key", action="store_true", help="生成一把新钥(打印 Secret 与 PinnedKey 片段)")
parser.add_argument("--key-id", default="ull-release", help="生成/签名时用的 key_id")
parser.add_argument("--sign", metavar="MANIFEST", type=Path, help="签这份清单(产出 <清单>.sig)")
parser.add_argument("--out", metavar="SIG", type=Path, help="签名输出路径(默认 <清单>.sig)")
parser.add_argument("--key", metavar="FILE", help=f"密钥文件(不给则读环境变量 {KEY_ENV})")
parser.add_argument("--verify", nargs=2, metavar=("MANIFEST", "SIG"), help="手工验一份签名")
parser.add_argument("--public-key", metavar="HEX", help="--verify 用的公钥")
parser.add_argument("--check-pinned-keyring", action="store_true", help="检查密钥是否已被钉进 trust.rs")
parser.add_argument("--verify-pinned", metavar="MANIFEST", type=Path, help="用 trust.rs 里钉的公钥回验产出")
parser.add_argument("--self-test", action="store_true", help="跑 RFC 8032 向量与解析器自检")
args = parser.parse_args(argv)
if args.self_test:
return do_self_test()
if args.generate_key:
return do_generate_key(args.key_id)
if args.sign:
return do_sign(args.sign, args.key, args.out, args.key_id if args.key_id != "ull-release" else None)
if args.verify:
if not args.public_key:
print("error: --verify 需要 --public-key", file=sys.stderr)
return 1
return do_verify(Path(args.verify[0]), Path(args.verify[1]), args.public_key)
if args.check_pinned_keyring:
return do_check_pinned(args.key)
if args.verify_pinned:
return do_verify_pinned(args.verify_pinned)
parser.print_help()
return 2
if __name__ == "__main__":
raise SystemExit(main())