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Cyrene_v2/internal/runtime/loop/request.go
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AskaEth 0624d9ee36
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feat(session,runtime): 多角色并存—按会话选角(迁移0011 + 按回合解析 + agent池 + 提取器修正)
按 DevDocs/design/22 批次 1 后端(§2/§3/§4.1-4.5/§4.7/§5 验收 1-6)。
- 迁移 0011:chat_sessions.persona_id + chat_messages.persona_id(均 DEFAULT '',无回填 → 升级零风险);同步包内幂等 DDL;**真实库升级验证**(拷贝 data/cyrene.db 到临时目录跑 MigrateUp:既有 1 会话/109 消息 persona 仍为 '',原库未被触碰)
- history:SessionMeta/Message 加 PersonaID + SetSessionPersona;ListSessions/List/scan/Append 带上
- runtime:SessionEnv.PersonaID + loop.personaFor(ctx) 替换固定 l.personaID(memory/request/turn)+ **agent 池**(Options.Agents,按角色取 instructions,未命中回落)+ **提取器不再把 persona 烤死在构造期**(多角色下记忆不再永远记在 cyrene 名下)+ **thinking 旋钮改为按会话角色解析**(否则角色 Y 会用角色 X 的预算/展示)
- gateway:会话 DTO/POST/PATCH 支持 personaId;ws/rest/voice 的 OwnerEnv 硬编改为**按会话解析角色**(actor 元数据语义不变);admin memories 搜索去掉硬编 cyrene
- Docs/api-client v0.42;**两处有意的行为收紧**已写明:POST /sessions body 非法 JSON → 400(原先完全忽略 body;空/null/{} 仍 201);POST /admin/memories/search 省略 personaId 且无默认角色 → 400(原先默认查 cyrene)
- 测试:design/22 §5 验收 1-6(记忆隔离/提示词首条 system/情绪按角色/提取 persona 归属/迁移兼容)+ 进程内 e2e(断言 adapter 收到的 model.Request.Messages[0] 即该角色的 systemPrompt)
- **已知未做(留批次 2 / 待确认)**:① IM 与渠道级未做 → **§7-3「owner 私聊镜像随主会话角色」尚未生效**;② 请求级覆盖未实现(本批只做会话级);③ **§7-5 的「上下文发送角色标记」只完成存储+DTO 半边**——消息 persona 已落库且 DTO 已带,但模型上下文不从 chat_messages 重建,「第 N 条是谁说的」尚未进上下文(需确认是否属批次 2);④「切角色重建摘要」当前是空操作(压缩未接线);⑤ thinking 旋钮仅在流式路径生效(非流式 agent.RunStep 不带,A 批次既有性质)
- 验收:go build/vet/test 全绿 + linux/amd64 与 darwin/arm64 交叉编译(既有 flake 本轮未触发;同批 session_orchestrator.go 一度 501 行 → 抽出 session_tail.go)
2026-10-03 20:12:29 +08:00

179 lines
6.3 KiB
Go

package loop
import (
"context"
"git.yeij.top/AskaEth/Cyrene_v2/internal/runtime/agent"
"git.yeij.top/AskaEth/Cyrene_v2/internal/runtime/capacity"
"git.yeij.top/AskaEth/Cyrene_v2/internal/runtime/model"
)
// buildRequest assembles a model.Request from the turn's agent's public surface,
// mirroring agent.buildRequest so the streaming path behaves identically to
// RunStep (leading instruction message, tool schemas, model routing). The agent
// and the reasoning knobs are resolved from ctx, so a session that switched roles
// gets the new role's prompt and budget on its very next step (design/22 §4.2).
func (l *Loop) buildRequest(ctx context.Context, messages []model.Message, ag *agent.Agent, knobs LoopKnobs) model.Request {
req := model.Request{
Model: ag.Model(),
Messages: assembleMessages(ag, messages),
Temperature: temperatureOf(ag),
MaxTokens: ag.MaxTokens(),
Purpose: ag.Purpose(),
Tools: l.toolSchemas(ctx, messages),
Thinking: knobs.Thinking,
ReasoningEffort: knobs.ReasoningEffort,
}
if ag.Router() != nil {
if m, _ := ag.Router().RouteRequest(req); m != "" {
req.Model = m
}
}
return req
}
// assembleMessages prepends the agent's instructions as a leading system message
// when they are non-empty, otherwise returns the input slice unchanged.
func assembleMessages(ag *agent.Agent, messages []model.Message) []model.Message {
instr := ag.Instructions()
if instr == "" {
return messages
}
out := make([]model.Message, 0, len(messages)+1)
out = append(out, model.TextMessage(model.RoleSystem, instr))
out = append(out, messages...)
return out
}
// temperatureOf returns a pointer to the agent's configured temperature, mapping
// zero to nil so the provider default applies (matching the agent package).
func temperatureOf(ag *agent.Agent) *float64 {
t := ag.Temperature()
if t == 0 {
return nil
}
return &t
}
// toolSchemas advertises the registered tool schemas to the model, or nil when no
// dispatcher is configured. When a capacity decider is wired and enabled, it
// classifies the current round and returns only the allowed set for that state
// (a view over the dispatcher, per design/14 §4): the model sees/invokes only
// the allowed tools, while Invoke itself stays unblocked. A nil or disabled
// decider keeps the pre-existing behavior (every tool advertised).
//
// The design/11 §3 security gate runs last over whatever the capacity view left:
// in a group/stranger environment only tools whose editable marker allows that
// environment are advertised (default closed), and the owner environment keeps
// the full set. Security is a hard red line, not a convenience hint, so it can
// only shrink the surface — it never re-admits a tool capacity excluded.
func (l *Loop) toolSchemas(ctx context.Context, messages []model.Message) []model.ToolSpec {
d := l.dispatcher()
if d == nil {
return nil
}
schemas := d.ToolSchemas()
if l.capacity == nil || !l.capacity.Enabled() {
return l.restrictSchemas(ctx, d, schemas)
}
names := make([]string, 0, len(schemas))
for _, s := range schemas {
names = append(names, s.Name)
}
acc := capState(ctx)
dec := l.capacity.Decide(ctx, capacity.Input{
Messages: capacityTexts(messages),
CurrentState: acc.state,
AllToolNames: names,
Recall: l.capacityRecall(ctx, messages),
})
acc.state = dec.State
if l.onCapacity != nil && !isMutedBroadcast(ctx) {
sessionID := loopSession(ctx)
for _, ev := range dec.Events {
ev.SessionID = sessionID
l.onCapacity(ev)
}
}
allowed := make(map[string]bool, len(dec.AllowedTools))
for _, n := range dec.AllowedTools {
allowed[n] = true
}
out := make([]model.ToolSpec, 0, len(dec.AllowedTools))
for _, s := range schemas {
if allowed[s.Name] {
out = append(out, s)
}
}
return l.restrictSchemas(ctx, d, out)
}
// capacityTexts extracts the recent conversation text for the capacity decider:
// the last few non-system/non-tool turns, in chronological order (oldest first),
// so the decider's current-turn window sees the latest user message last.
func capacityTexts(messages []model.Message) []string {
texts := make([]string, 0, 6)
for i := len(messages) - 1; i >= 0 && len(texts) < 6; i-- {
m := messages[i]
if m.Role == model.RoleSystem || m.Role == model.RoleTool {
continue
}
if t := messageText(m); t != "" {
texts = append(texts, t)
}
}
for i, j := 0, len(texts)-1; i < j; i, j = i+1, j-1 {
texts[i], texts[j] = texts[j], texts[i]
}
return texts
}
// capacityRecallTopK bounds how many recalled habit memories the capacity L4 layer
// considers per round.
const capacityRecallTopK = 5
// capacityRecall retrieves the owner's relevant long-term memories for the capacity
// L4 habit-alignment layer (design §2.2 L4), the memory feed that lets the decider
// learn the user's task-expression habits. It returns nil (keeping L4 silent) when
// no retriever/persona is configured — backward compatible — or in a restricted
// (group chat / stranger) context, per the isolation red line: L4 learns the owner's
// habits and must never read owner-sensitive memory into a group or stranger intent
// decision (design §2.2 红线: 不读陌生人敏感).
func (l *Loop) capacityRecall(ctx context.Context, messages []model.Message) []capacity.RecallItem {
personaID := l.personaFor(ctx)
if l.retriever == nil || personaID == "" {
return nil
}
env := sessionEnvFrom(ctx)
if env.Restricted() {
return nil
}
results, err := l.retriever.Retrieve(ctx, personaID, queryFromMessages(messages), capacityRecallTopK)
if err != nil {
l.log.Warn("capacity recall", "error", err, "env", env.ActorEnv)
return nil
}
items := make([]capacity.RecallItem, 0, len(results))
for _, r := range results {
items = append(items, capacity.RecallItem{
Content: r.Item.Content,
Scope: string(r.Item.Scope),
Kind: string(r.Item.Kind),
Tags: r.Item.Tags,
Score: r.Score,
})
}
return items
}
// decodeToolCalls decodes tool calls from a model.Response via the agent's shared
// decoder, so the streaming and non-streaming paths agree on the provider-native
// tool calls the adapters emit (Anthropic tool_use / OpenAI tool_calls) as well
// as the legacy JSON-envelope convention. It reports ok=true (with a non-empty
// slice) when a call is decoded.
func decodeToolCalls(resp model.Response) ([]agent.ToolCall, bool) {
return agent.ExtractToolCalls(resp)
}