feat(auth): refresh token 续期(B2) — 不透明哈希+单次旋转+/auth/refresh+/auth/logout

- auth/refresh.go: RefreshStore(Issue/Rotate/Revoke/RevokeAll/RevokeByUser), SHA-256哈希256-bit随机串, 单次旋转事务(并发重放fail-closed)
- 迁移0008_refresh_tokens(id/user_id/role/token_hash UNIQUE/expires_at/revoked_at + 索引)
- gateway: POST /v1/auth/refresh(旋转/续期) + /v1/auth/logout(单/全设备); login响应增refreshToken
- config: AUTH_REFRESH_TTL(720h)/AUTH_REFRESH_ROTATE_DISABLED; decode.go 支持time.Duration
- rotate-jwt成功后RevokeAll(响应refreshTokensRevoked), revoke-keys不动refresh
- 14测试+真实二进制e2e, build/vet/test绿+交叉编译
- Docs/api-client v0.25 + api-reference §2.3/2.4 同步

.env.example

@@ -23,6 +23,11 @@ JWT_SECRET=change-me-to-a-random-string-at-least-32-characters
 ADMIN_USERNAME=admin
 ADMIN_PASSWORD=admin12345
 REGISTRATION_ENABLED=true
+# 不透明 refresh token 有效期（Go duration，如 720h = 30 天）；access token 固定 24h。
+AUTH_REFRESH_TTL=720h
+# refresh token 单次使用轮换默认开启（用旧换新、防重放）；仅当客户端无法保存轮换后的
+# 新 token 时才设为 true 关闭轮换。
+AUTH_REFRESH_ROTATE_DISABLED=false
 
 # ---- 数据库 ----
 # SQLite 为默认（单二进制、无需外部服务）。

Docs/api-client.md

@@ -21,7 +21,9 @@
 
 | # | 端点 | 方法 | 认证 | 状态 | 说明 |
 |---|------|------|------|:---:|------|
-| 1 | `/api/v1/auth/login` | POST | 否 | ✅ | `{username,password}` → `{data:{token,expiresAt,role}}`（24h，role=owner） |
+| 1 | `/api/v1/auth/login` | POST | 否 | ✅ | `{username,password}` → `{data:{token,expiresAt,role,refreshToken?}}`（access 24h；**新增 `refreshToken`**——不透明随机串，仅哈希落库，`AUTH_REFRESH_TTL` 默认 720h，用于静默续期；role=owner） |
+| 1a | `/api/v1/auth/refresh` | POST | refreshToken | ✅ | **静默续期**（B2）：body `{refreshToken}` → `{data:{token,expiresAt,refreshToken?}}`（新 access + 新 refresh，**默认单次使用旋转**——旧 refresh 立即作废，并发重放 fail-closed `401 invalid_grant`）。`AUTH_REFRESH_ROTATE_DISABLED=true` 关闭轮换时旧 token 保持有效、不返回新 refresh。过期/已撤销/乱串统一 `401 {error:{code:"invalid_grant"}}`；成功才审计 |
+| 1b | `/api/v1/auth/logout` | POST | refreshToken 或 JWT | ✅ | **登出**（B2）：body `{refreshToken}` 撤**单个** grant（幂等）；带 `Authorization: Bearer <jwt>` 且无 body → 撤**该账号全部** grant（全设备登出，返回 `{revokedCount}`）。refresh 相关操作成功才审计 |
 | 2 | `/api/v1/health` | GET | 否 | ✅ | 健康检查 `{data:{status:"ok"}}` |
 | 3 | `/api/v1/chat` | POST | JWT | ✅ | `{text,image?,deviceId?,mode?,stream?}` → `{data:{reply}}`；`stream:true` 时经 WS 触发流式。`image` 为 base64 data: URI 或 http(s) URL，入视觉路由（design/06）——**真视觉需配 `LLM_VISION_MODEL`/凭据，无凭据时降级为主模型直接看图或视觉·OCR 工具文本描述**；`deviceId` 为**客户端生成的具体端标识**（design/16 §4.5，如 `web:chrome:a1b2c3`，可选），落库到消息、便于主人知道从哪个端发来；`mode` 为**行为模式**（design/01 §3 / design/16 §5.1，如 `chat`/`code`/`home`/`docs`/…，可选），随该轮次落库——IM 恒 `chat`、缺省回落 `chat`，供前端按模式渲染气泡（仅 `chat` 才解析 `<p>` 拆气泡）。**会话编排（design/15）**：非流式且该会话「正忙」时**不阻塞**，返回 `202` `{data:{queued:true,queueDepth}}`（稍后按上下文续接）；待处理队列满时返回 `409` `{error:{code:"chat_busy"}}` |
 | 4 | `/api/v1/sessions` | GET | JWT | ✅ | `{data:[session...]}`。**会话持久化（design/16）**：注入 HistoryStore 后返回持久化会话元数据 `{data:[{id,type("main"|"sub"),title?,createdAt,lastMessage?}]}`（主会话 `id="web"` 恒在首位，次级 `web:<uuid>`；`lastMessage` 为**最后一条消息预览** `{content,role(user|assistant),createdAt}`，content 折叠空白截前 60 rune，空会话省略）；未注入时退化回渠道会话列表 |
@@ -67,7 +69,7 @@
 | 18 | `/api/v1/admin/memories` | POST | ✅(写) | 手动添加记忆（owner-only，审计）；body `{personaId?,content,scope?}`，无 store 回 `501` |
 | 19 | `/api/v1/admin/rag` | POST | ✅(写) | 导入知识文档（owner-only，审计）；body `{name,desc?,content}`，分块后落项目索引可检索；无 store 回 `501` |
 | 20 | `/api/v1/admin/system/revoke-keys` | POST | ✅(写) | 吊销**全部** API key（owner-only，审计）；返回 `{revoked:n}`——key 表清空，先前签发的所有 key 立即失效 |
-| 21 | `/api/v1/admin/system/rotate-jwt` | POST | ✅(写) | 轮换 JWT 密钥（owner-only，审计）；body `{newSecret}`（≥32 位，不强校验熵）→ `{rotated:true,note}`——**现有 token 立即失效需重新登录**；新密钥**不回显、不落日志** |
+| 21 | `/api/v1/admin/system/rotate-jwt` | POST | ✅(写) | 轮换 JWT 密钥（owner-only，审计）；body `{newSecret}`（≥32 位，不强校验熵）→ `{rotated:true,note,refreshTokensRevoked}`——**现有 access token 立即失效需重新登录，且**所有 refresh token 一并作废（`refreshTokensRevoked` 为删除条数）；新密钥**不回显、不落日志** |
 | 22 | `/api/v1/admin/system/backup` | POST | ✅(写) | 备份数据（owner-only，审计）；用 SQLite `VACUUM INTO` 快照（含已提交 WAL 内容）到 `<dataDir>/backup-<ts>.db` → `{path,size}` |
 | 23 | `/api/v1/admin/system/restore` | POST | ✅(写) | 恢复数据（owner-only，审计）；body `{path}` → 校验路径在 dataDir 内→**先备份当前**→替换 DB 文件→`{restored:true,backup,note:"需重启后生效"}`（运行进程持有 DB 句柄，热替换需重启可见） |
 
@@ -213,6 +215,7 @@
 - 语音：上行 `voice_input`（base64 音频或已转写 text），下行 `voice_output`（合成音频 base64 + text）。
 
 ## 5. 变更记录
+- `v0.25`（**B2 refresh token**）：`POST /api/v1/auth/refresh`（**新增**，`{refreshToken}` → 新 access + 新 refresh，默认单次使用旋转，并发重放 fail-closed `invalid_grant`）+ `POST /api/v1/auth/logout`（**新增**，撤单个或全设备）。`POST /api/v1/auth/login` 在 `{token,expiresAt,role}` 之外**新增 `refreshToken`**（不透明 256-bit 随机串，**仅 SHA-256 哈希落库**，`AUTH_REFRESH_TTL` 默认 `720h`，`AUTH_REFRESH_ROTATE_DISABLED` 关旋转）。新表 `refresh_tokens`（迁移 0008，id/user_id/role/token_hash UNIQUE/expires_at/revoked_at；含过期/轮换原子事务）；`rotate-jwt` 成功即删除全部 refresh（返回 `refreshTokensRevoked`），`revoke-keys` 不动 refresh。**密码/secret 记录见 `internal/auth`；refresh 全文绝不落日志/审计。**
 - `v0.24`（**B1 图片上传端点**）：`POST /api/v1/upload`（**新增**，multipart `file`，owner/admin+审计 → `201 {data:{url,size,mime,name}}`）+ `GET /api/v1/files/{name}`（**新增**，同端口静态服务）。安全：`MaxBytesReader`(5MB)、`DetectContentType` 嗅探（不信客户端 Content-Type）、白名单 raster image（拒 SVG/HTML）、`crypto/rand` 128-bit 随机名（丢弃原始文件名）、非可执行上传目录(0700)、`nosniff`；路径穿越全形态拒绝（含编码 `%2f`/`%2e%2e`）。错误码 `400/413/415`（`internal/errors` 增 `ErrPayloadTooLarge`/`ErrUnsupportedMediaType`）。**设计取舍**：GET 不鉴权（能力 URL，`chat.image`/`<img>` 无法带 Bearer），POST 仍 owner/admin。`url` 为绝对地址（`X-Forwarded-Proto`/TLS + `r.Host`，因 `ParseImageRef` 只认 `http(s)://`）。`Deps.DataDir` 由 wire 注入（`resolveDataDir`）。
 - `v0.23`（**C2 语音 silent 降级信号**）：三处统一用 **`provider`** 只在「结果为空」时出现（非空/成功时才省略）——`POST /api/v1/audio/transcribe` 空文本响应体带 `{text:"", provider:"silent"}`；WS `voice_output` 空音频 payload 带 `provider`；`POST /api/v1/audio/speech` 空音频仍 `500 tts_empty` 并加 `X-Voice-Provider: silent` 响应头（CORS `Access-Control-Expose-Headers` 已放开）。`voice.Chain/Service` 新增 `STTWithProvider/TTSWithProvider`（返回真实档位 cloud/local/edge-tts/espeak/silent），网关用可选接口 `voiceProviderReporter` 透传，自定义实现回退 `silent`。**含 `X-Voice-Provider`（`apperr` 包装、`providerSignal`）；`DASHSCOPE_API_KEY` 无/降级时信号为 `silent`。**（`go test -race` 在本机受内核 TSAN VMA 限制失败，非本代码问题。）
 - `v0.22`（**B3 会话列表 lastMessage 预览**）：`GET /api/v1/sessions` 与 `/api/v1/admin/sessions` 每个会话新增可选 **`lastMessage`** `{content,role,createdAt}`（content 折叠空白截前 60 rune + `…`；空会话省略），**单条 SQL**（LEFT JOIN 取每会话 `ORDER BY created_at DESC,rowid DESC LIMIT 1`，无 N+1，走 `idx_chat_msgs_session_created` 覆盖索引）。`unreadCount` 需已读游标设计，后置。

Docs/api-reference.md

@@ -157,13 +157,14 @@ curl -s http://<host>:8080/api/v1/health
 {"username":"admin","password":"s3cret"}
 ```
 
-- **响应**：`200` `{"data":{"token":"<JWT>","expiresAt":<unix秒>,"role":"owner"}}`（`loginResponse`）。
+- **响应**：`200` `{"data":{"token":"<JWT>","expiresAt":<unix秒>,"role":"owner","refreshToken":"<opaque>"}}`（`loginResponse`）。
 
 | 字段 | 类型 | 说明 |
 |------|------|------|
 | `token` | string | 已签名 JWT（HS256），下文请求头 `Authorization: Bearer <token>` |
 | `expiresAt` | int64 | 过期时间，Unix 秒 = `now + 24h`（`tokenTTL=24h`） |
 | `role` | string | **恒为 `"owner"`**（代码硬编码 `auth.RoleOwner`） |
+| `refreshToken` | string | **不透明 256-bit 随机串**（B2）——服务端**仅存其 SHA-256 哈希**，明文只在响应出现一次；用于 `POST /api/v1/auth/refresh` 静默续期，`AUTH_REFRESH_TTL` 默认 `720h` |
 
 - **错误**：`400` `{"error":{"code":"bad_request","message":"invalid request body"}}`（JSON 解析失败）；`401` `{"error":{"code":"unauthorized","message":"invalid username or password"}}`；`500` `{"error":{"code":"login_failed",...}}`（签名失败）。
 - **备注**：登录响应**以代码为准** = `{token, expiresAt, role}`（**不是** `{token,jwt}`）。旧 `api-client.md` §1 表内一行写 `{token,jwt}` 为**历史笔误**，以本档为准。curl：
@@ -172,9 +173,21 @@ curl -s http://<host>:8080/api/v1/health
 curl -s -X POST http://<host>:8080/api/v1/auth/login \
   -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
   -d '{"username":"admin","password":"s3cret"}'
-# => {"data":{"token":"eyJ...","expiresAt":1799...,"role":"owner"}}
+# => {"data":{"token":"eyJ...","expiresAt":1799...,"role":"owner","refreshToken":"...base64url..."}}
 ```
 
+### 2.3 POST /api/v1/auth/refresh（B2）
+- **鉴权**：公开，body 带 `refreshToken`。
+- **请求 Body**：`{refreshToken:"<opaque>"}`。
+- **响应**：`200` `{"data":{"token":"<新JWT>","expiresAt":<unix秒>,"refreshToken":"<新opaque？>"}}`——默认**单次使用旋转**：旧 refresh 立即作废并签发新的；`AUTH_REFRESH_ROTATE_DISABLED=true` 时旧 token 保持有效、不返回新 refresh（`refreshToken` 省略）。
+- **错误**：`400 bad_request`（JSON 解析失败 / 空 token）；`401` `{"error":{"code":"invalid_grant",...}}`（未知/已撤销/已过期，统一口径，防枚举）；仅成功才审计。
+- **curl**：`curl -s -X POST http://<host>:8080/api/v1/auth/refresh -H 'Content-Type: application/json' -d '{"refreshToken":"<opaque>"}'`
+
+### 2.4 POST /api/v1/auth/logout（B2）
+- **鉴权**：公开，两种方式二选一——body `{refreshToken}` 撤**单个** grant（幂等）；或无 body 但带 `Authorization: Bearer <jwt>` 撤**该账号全部** grant（全设备登出）。
+- **响应**：`200` `{"data":{"ok":true,"revokedCount":<n>}}`（单撤 `revokedCount` 为 0/1；全撤为该账号 refresh 行数）。
+- **错误**：不存在的 token 为幂等 no-op（仍 `200`）；非法 body `400`。
+
 ---
 
 ## 3. 用户侧端点（已认证）

cmd/cyrene/wire.go

@@ -656,6 +656,17 @@ func (a *app) wireFrontend() error {
 		a.log.Warn("audit store unavailable, falling back to in-memory", "error", aerr)
 		auditStore = nil
 	}
+	// Opaque refresh tokens (B2) share the primary SQLite handle. A failure here
+	// degrades gracefully: login simply omits refreshToken and /auth/refresh
+	// reports not-configured, rather than failing the whole boot. The store is
+	// held as the interface so a constructor failure leaves it nil (a typed nil
+	// pointer in the interface would be non-nil and panic on first call).
+	var refreshStore gateway.RefreshGrantStore
+	if store, rerr := auth.NewRefreshStore(context.Background(), a.db, a.log); rerr != nil {
+		a.log.Warn("refresh token store unavailable", "error", rerr)
+	} else {
+		refreshStore = store
+	}
 	// a.history is built in wireAuxiliary so both the channel bridge (wireChannels)
 	// and the gateway share the same persistent store. History was a no-op dependency
 	// before the IM path, so nothing downstream depends on its creation order change.
@@ -674,6 +685,7 @@ func (a *app) wireFrontend() error {
 		Tasks:          a.tasks,
 		Automations:    a.automation,
 		Users:          apiKeys,
+		Refresh:        refreshStore,
 		Backthink:      a.backthink,
 		RAG:            ragStore,
 		LLM:            a.llm,

internal/auth/auth.go

@@ -45,6 +45,10 @@ var (
 	ErrUnauthorized = errors.New("auth: unauthorized")
 	// ErrForbidden reports a valid credential with insufficient privilege.
 	ErrForbidden = errors.New("auth: forbidden")
+	// ErrInvalidGrant reports an unknown, revoked, or expired refresh token.
+	ErrInvalidGrant = errors.New("auth: invalid refresh grant")
+	// ErrNilDB reports a nil *sql.DB passed to a store constructor.
+	ErrNilDB = errors.New("auth: nil database")
 )
 
 // Package-wide constants. `source` is the log provenance tag used by every

internal/auth/refresh.go

@@ -0,0 +1,329 @@
+package auth
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"crypto/rand"
+	"crypto/sha256"
+	"database/sql"
+	"encoding/base64"
+	"encoding/hex"
+	"errors"
+	"fmt"
+	"log/slog"
+	"strings"
+	"time"
+
+	"git.yeij.top/AskaEth/Cyrene_v2/internal/logger"
+)
+
+// Opaque refresh-token parameters and the canonical schema. The refresh secret
+// is 32 random bytes (256 bits), so a plain unsalted SHA-256 digest is a sound
+// one-way store: there is no low-entropy input to brute-force, and the digest is
+// looked up through a unique index, never compared byte-by-byte in Go.
+const (
+	refreshTokenBytes = 32
+	refreshIDBytes    = 16
+	refreshTimeLayout = time.RFC3339Nano
+
+	createRefreshTableSQL = `
+CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS refresh_tokens (
+    id         TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
+    user_id    TEXT NOT NULL,
+    role       TEXT NOT NULL,
+    token_hash TEXT NOT NULL UNIQUE,
+    expires_at TEXT NOT NULL,
+    revoked_at TEXT,
+    created_at TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT (strftime('%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%fZ','now')),
+    updated_at TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT (strftime('%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%fZ','now'))
+)`
+	createRefreshUserIndexSQL = `CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_refresh_tokens_user_id
+    ON refresh_tokens (user_id)`
+	createRefreshExpiryIndexSQL = `CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_refresh_tokens_expires_at
+    ON refresh_tokens (expires_at)`
+	insertRefreshSQL = `INSERT INTO refresh_tokens (id, user_id, role, token_hash, expires_at)
+    VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?)`
+	selectRefreshByHashSQL = `SELECT id, user_id, role, expires_at, revoked_at
+    FROM refresh_tokens WHERE token_hash = ?`
+	revokeRefreshByIDSQL = `UPDATE refresh_tokens SET revoked_at = ?, updated_at = ?
+    WHERE id = ? AND revoked_at IS NULL`
+	revokeRefreshByHashSQL = `UPDATE refresh_tokens SET revoked_at = ?, updated_at = ?
+    WHERE token_hash = ? AND revoked_at IS NULL`
+	deleteRefreshAllSQL    = `DELETE FROM refresh_tokens`
+	deleteRefreshByUserSQL = `DELETE FROM refresh_tokens WHERE user_id = ?`
+	pruneRefreshSQL        = `DELETE FROM refresh_tokens WHERE expires_at < ? OR (revoked_at IS NOT NULL AND revoked_at < ?)`
+)
+
+// RefreshToken is the stored metadata of a refresh grant. It never carries the
+// secret: only the SHA-256 hash of the opaque token is persisted.
+type RefreshToken struct {
+	ID        string
+	UserID    string
+	Role      Role
+	ExpiresAt time.Time
+}
+
+// RotateOptions configures a refresh call. Rotate enables single-use rotation:
+// the presented token is revoked and replaced by a fresh one. When false the
+// presented token stays valid and no replacement is minted (NewToken is empty),
+// which is the opt-out for clients that cannot persist a rotated token.
+type RotateOptions struct {
+	TTL    time.Duration
+	Rotate bool
+}
+
+// RefreshStore persists opaque refresh tokens in SQLite. Only the SHA-256 hash
+// of a token is stored; the plaintext is returned once by Issue/Rotate and never
+// written to the database or a log. It is safe for concurrent use by virtue of
+// the underlying *sql.DB.
+type RefreshStore struct {
+	db  *sql.DB
+	log *slog.Logger
+}
+
+// NewRefreshStore builds a SQLite-backed refresh-token store over db, ensuring
+// the refresh_tokens table and indexes exist. The DDL mirrors migration 0008
+// and is idempotent, so the store is self-contained for tests while the
+// migration remains the authoritative path for an existing database. db must be
+// live; nil returns ErrNilDB. log may be nil.
+func NewRefreshStore(ctx context.Context, db *sql.DB, log *slog.Logger) (*RefreshStore, error) {
+	if db == nil {
+		return nil, ErrNilDB
+	}
+	for _, ddl := range []string{createRefreshTableSQL, createRefreshUserIndexSQL, createRefreshExpiryIndexSQL} {
+		if _, err := db.ExecContext(ctx, ddl); err != nil {
+			return nil, fmt.Errorf("auth: ensure refresh_tokens schema: %w", err)
+		}
+	}
+	if log == nil {
+		log = slog.Default()
+	}
+	return &RefreshStore{db: db, log: logger.WithSource(log, source)}, nil
+}
+
+// Issue mints a new opaque refresh token for userID/role, stores only its hash,
+// and returns the plaintext (visible exactly once) plus its expiry. Expired or
+// long-revoked rows are pruned best-effort so the table stays bounded.
+func (s *RefreshStore) Issue(ctx context.Context, userID string, role Role, ttl time.Duration) (string, time.Time, error) {
+	if strings.TrimSpace(userID) == "" {
+		return "", time.Time{}, fmt.Errorf("%w: empty user id", ErrInvalidGrant)
+	}
+	if !role.Valid() {
+		return "", time.Time{}, fmt.Errorf("%w: %q", ErrInvalidRole, role)
+	}
+	if ttl <= 0 {
+		return "", time.Time{}, fmt.Errorf("%w: non-positive ttl", ErrInvalidGrant)
+	}
+	plaintext, hash, err := newRefreshToken()
+	if err != nil {
+		return "", time.Time{}, err
+	}
+	id, err := newRefreshID()
+	if err != nil {
+		return "", time.Time{}, err
+	}
+	expires := time.Now().UTC().Add(ttl)
+	if _, err := s.db.ExecContext(ctx, insertRefreshSQL, id, userID, string(role), hash, formatRefreshTime(expires)); err != nil {
+		return "", time.Time{}, fmt.Errorf("auth: insert refresh token: %w", err)
+	}
+	s.pruneExpired(ctx)
+	return plaintext, expires, nil
+}
+
+// Rotate validates plaintext (known, unrevoked, unexpired) and, when opts.Rotate
+// is true, atomically revokes it and issues a replacement. It returns the grant
+// metadata and the new plaintext token (empty when rotation is disabled). An
+// unknown, revoked, or expired token yields ErrInvalidGrant. The transaction
+// makes rotation single-use under concurrent replay: the second caller's revoke
+// affects no row and fails closed.
+func (s *RefreshStore) Rotate(ctx context.Context, plaintext string, opts RotateOptions) (RefreshToken, string, error) {
+	if strings.TrimSpace(plaintext) == "" {
+		return RefreshToken{}, "", fmt.Errorf("%w: empty token", ErrInvalidGrant)
+	}
+	if opts.Rotate && opts.TTL <= 0 {
+		return RefreshToken{}, "", fmt.Errorf("%w: non-positive ttl", ErrInvalidGrant)
+	}
+	tx, err := s.db.BeginTx(ctx, nil)
+	if err != nil {
+		return RefreshToken{}, "", fmt.Errorf("auth: begin refresh rotate: %w", err)
+	}
+	defer func() { _ = tx.Rollback() }()
+
+	grant, revokedAt, err := selectRefreshGrant(ctx, tx, hashRefreshToken(plaintext))
+	if err != nil {
+		return RefreshToken{}, "", err
+	}
+	if revokedAt.Valid {
+		return RefreshToken{}, "", fmt.Errorf("%w: revoked", ErrInvalidGrant)
+	}
+	now := time.Now().UTC()
+	if !grant.ExpiresAt.After(now) {
+		return RefreshToken{}, "", fmt.Errorf("%w: expired", ErrInvalidGrant)
+	}
+	if !opts.Rotate {
+		if err := tx.Commit(); err != nil {
+			return RefreshToken{}, "", fmt.Errorf("auth: commit refresh: %w", err)
+		}
+		return grant, "", nil
+	}
+	if err := revokeRefreshRow(ctx, tx, grant.ID, now); err != nil {
+		return RefreshToken{}, "", err
+	}
+	newPlaintext, newHash, err := newRefreshToken()
+	if err != nil {
+		return RefreshToken{}, "", err
+	}
+	newID, err := newRefreshID()
+	if err != nil {
+		return RefreshToken{}, "", err
+	}
+	newExpires := now.Add(opts.TTL)
+	if _, err := tx.ExecContext(ctx, insertRefreshSQL, newID, grant.UserID, string(grant.Role), newHash, formatRefreshTime(newExpires)); err != nil {
+		return RefreshToken{}, "", fmt.Errorf("auth: insert rotated refresh token: %w", err)
+	}
+	if err := tx.Commit(); err != nil {
+		return RefreshToken{}, "", fmt.Errorf("auth: commit refresh rotate: %w", err)
+	}
+	return RefreshToken{ID: newID, UserID: grant.UserID, Role: grant.Role, ExpiresAt: newExpires}, newPlaintext, nil
+}
+
+// Revoke marks the refresh token matching plaintext as revoked, returning true
+// when a live token was found. It is idempotent: revoking an unknown or already
+// revoked token is a no-op returning false.
+func (s *RefreshStore) Revoke(ctx context.Context, plaintext string) (bool, error) {
+	if strings.TrimSpace(plaintext) == "" {
+		return false, nil
+	}
+	now := formatRefreshTime(time.Now().UTC())
+	res, err := s.db.ExecContext(ctx, revokeRefreshByHashSQL, now, now, hashRefreshToken(plaintext))
+	if err != nil {
+		return false, fmt.Errorf("auth: revoke refresh token: %w", err)
+	}
+	n, err := res.RowsAffected()
+	if err != nil {
+		return false, fmt.Errorf("auth: revoke refresh token: %w", err)
+	}
+	return n > 0, nil
+}
+
+// RevokeAll deletes every refresh token and returns how many rows were removed.
+// It is the global invalidation used when the JWT signing secret is rotated:
+// credential rotation must invalidate every long-lived grant, not only the
+// short-lived access tokens. Deleting (rather than marking revoked) is exact and
+// leaves no valid row behind.
+func (s *RefreshStore) RevokeAll(ctx context.Context) (int64, error) {
+	res, err := s.db.ExecContext(ctx, deleteRefreshAllSQL)
+	if err != nil {
+		return 0, fmt.Errorf("auth: revoke all refresh tokens: %w", err)
+	}
+	n, err := res.RowsAffected()
+	if err != nil {
+		return 0, fmt.Errorf("auth: revoke all refresh tokens: %w", err)
+	}
+	return n, nil
+}
+
+// RevokeByUser deletes every refresh token belonging to userID and returns how
+// many rows were removed. It backs logout by access token, where the individual
+// refresh token is unknown: the account is signed out on every device.
+func (s *RefreshStore) RevokeByUser(ctx context.Context, userID string) (int64, error) {
+	if strings.TrimSpace(userID) == "" {
+		return 0, fmt.Errorf("%w: empty user id", ErrInvalidGrant)
+	}
+	res, err := s.db.ExecContext(ctx, deleteRefreshByUserSQL, userID)
+	if err != nil {
+		return 0, fmt.Errorf("auth: revoke user refresh tokens: %w", err)
+	}
+	n, err := res.RowsAffected()
+	if err != nil {
+		return 0, fmt.Errorf("auth: revoke user refresh tokens: %w", err)
+	}
+	return n, nil
+}
+
+// pruneExpired deletes rows that are expired or were revoked long ago. It is
+// best-effort: a failure is logged and never fails the Issue that triggered it.
+func (s *RefreshStore) pruneExpired(ctx context.Context) {
+	cutoff := formatRefreshTime(time.Now().UTC())
+	if _, err := s.db.ExecContext(ctx, pruneRefreshSQL, cutoff, cutoff); err != nil {
+		s.log.Warn("refresh token prune failed", "err", err)
+	}
+}
+
+// selectRefreshGrant loads the grant for hash, returning ErrInvalidGrant when no
+// row matches. The query runs on tx so the caller's rotate transaction observes
+// a stable row.
+func selectRefreshGrant(ctx context.Context, tx *sql.Tx, hash string) (RefreshToken, sql.NullString, error) {
+	var (
+		grant     RefreshToken
+		role      string
+		expiresAt string
+		revokedAt sql.NullString
+	)
+	err := tx.QueryRowContext(ctx, selectRefreshByHashSQL, hash).
+		Scan(&grant.ID, &grant.UserID, &role, &expiresAt, &revokedAt)
+	if errors.Is(err, sql.ErrNoRows) {
+		return RefreshToken{}, sql.NullString{}, fmt.Errorf("%w: unknown token", ErrInvalidGrant)
+	}
+	if err != nil {
+		return RefreshToken{}, sql.NullString{}, fmt.Errorf("auth: lookup refresh token: %w", err)
+	}
+	parsedRole, err := ParseRole(role)
+	if err != nil {
+		return RefreshToken{}, sql.NullString{}, fmt.Errorf("auth: stored refresh role: %w", err)
+	}
+	expiry, err := time.Parse(refreshTimeLayout, expiresAt)
+	if err != nil {
+		return RefreshToken{}, sql.NullString{}, fmt.Errorf("auth: parse refresh expiry: %w", err)
+	}
+	grant.Role = parsedRole
+	grant.ExpiresAt = expiry
+	return grant, revokedAt, nil
+}
+
+// revokeRefreshRow marks the grant row revoked inside tx, failing closed with
+// ErrInvalidGrant when no live row was updated (a concurrent rotate won the race).
+func revokeRefreshRow(ctx context.Context, tx *sql.Tx, id string, now time.Time) error {
+	stamp := formatRefreshTime(now)
+	res, err := tx.ExecContext(ctx, revokeRefreshByIDSQL, stamp, stamp, id)
+	if err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("auth: revoke rotated refresh token: %w", err)
+	}
+	n, err := res.RowsAffected()
+	if err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("auth: revoke rotated refresh token: %w", err)
+	}
+	if n == 0 {
+		return fmt.Errorf("%w: already used", ErrInvalidGrant)
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
+// newRefreshToken returns a fresh opaque token and its stored hash.
+func newRefreshToken() (string, string, error) {
+	raw := make([]byte, refreshTokenBytes)
+	if _, err := rand.Read(raw); err != nil {
+		return "", "", fmt.Errorf("auth: generate refresh token: %w", err)
+	}
+	token := base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(raw)
+	return token, hashRefreshToken(token), nil
+}
+
+// newRefreshID returns a random 128-bit hex row id.
+func newRefreshID() (string, error) {
+	raw := make([]byte, refreshIDBytes)
+	if _, err := rand.Read(raw); err != nil {
+		return "", fmt.Errorf("auth: generate refresh id: %w", err)
+	}
+	return hex.EncodeToString(raw), nil
+}
+
+// hashRefreshToken returns the hex SHA-256 of token, the only form persisted.
+func hashRefreshToken(token string) string {
+	sum := sha256.Sum256([]byte(token))
+	return hex.EncodeToString(sum[:])
+}
+
+// formatRefreshTime renders t as UTC RFC3339Nano for storage.
+func formatRefreshTime(t time.Time) string {
+	return t.UTC().Format(refreshTimeLayout)
+}

internal/auth/refresh_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,255 @@
+package auth
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"database/sql"
+	"errors"
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+
+	"git.yeij.top/AskaEth/Cyrene_v2/internal/db"
+)
+
+// newTestRefreshStore opens an isolated in-memory SQLite database, applies the
+// embedded migrations, and returns a store over it. It returns the *sql.DB too
+// so tests can assert what was actually persisted.
+func newTestRefreshStore(t *testing.T) (*RefreshStore, *sql.DB) {
+	t.Helper()
+	ctx := context.Background()
+	sqlDB, err := db.Open(ctx, ":memory:", nil)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("open in-memory db: %v", err)
+	}
+	t.Cleanup(func() { _ = sqlDB.Close() })
+	if err := db.MigrateUp(ctx, sqlDB, nil); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("migrate up: %v", err)
+	}
+	store, err := NewRefreshStore(ctx, sqlDB, nil)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("new refresh store: %v", err)
+	}
+	return store, sqlDB
+}
+
+func TestRefreshIssueStoresHashOnly(t *testing.T) {
+	store, sqlDB := newTestRefreshStore(t)
+	ctx := context.Background()
+
+	token, expires, err := store.Issue(ctx, "admin", RoleOwner, time.Hour)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("issue: %v", err)
+	}
+	if token == "" {
+		t.Fatal("issued token is empty")
+	}
+	if !expires.After(time.Now()) {
+		t.Fatalf("expiry %v is not in the future", expires)
+	}
+
+	var hash, userID, role string
+	if err := sqlDB.QueryRowContext(ctx,
+		"SELECT token_hash, user_id, role FROM refresh_tokens").Scan(&hash, &userID, &role); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("select stored row: %v", err)
+	}
+	if hash == token {
+		t.Fatal("refresh token stored in plaintext")
+	}
+	if want := hashRefreshToken(token); hash != want {
+		t.Fatalf("stored hash = %q, want sha256 %q", hash, want)
+	}
+	if userID != "admin" || role != string(RoleOwner) {
+		t.Fatalf("stored row = (%q, %q), want (admin, owner)", userID, role)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestRefreshRotateReplacesToken(t *testing.T) {
+	store, _ := newTestRefreshStore(t)
+	ctx := context.Background()
+
+	old, _, err := store.Issue(ctx, "admin", RoleOwner, time.Hour)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("issue: %v", err)
+	}
+	grant, newToken, err := store.Rotate(ctx, old, RotateOptions{TTL: time.Hour, Rotate: true})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("rotate: %v", err)
+	}
+	if newToken == "" || newToken == old {
+		t.Fatalf("rotated token = %q, want a fresh non-empty token", newToken)
+	}
+	if grant.UserID != "admin" || grant.Role != RoleOwner {
+		t.Fatalf("grant = %+v, want admin/owner", grant)
+	}
+	if !grant.ExpiresAt.After(time.Now()) {
+		t.Fatalf("rotated expiry %v is not in the future", grant.ExpiresAt)
+	}
+	// The old token is single-use: replaying it must fail closed.
+	if _, _, err := store.Rotate(ctx, old, RotateOptions{TTL: time.Hour, Rotate: true}); !errors.Is(err, ErrInvalidGrant) {
+		t.Fatalf("replay old token err = %v, want ErrInvalidGrant", err)
+	}
+	// The replacement is live.
+	if _, _, err := store.Rotate(ctx, newToken, RotateOptions{TTL: time.Hour, Rotate: true}); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("rotate replacement: %v", err)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestRefreshRotateNoRotationKeepsToken(t *testing.T) {
+	store, _ := newTestRefreshStore(t)
+	ctx := context.Background()
+
+	token, _, err := store.Issue(ctx, "admin", RoleOwner, time.Hour)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("issue: %v", err)
+	}
+	if _, newToken, err := store.Rotate(ctx, token, RotateOptions{Rotate: false}); err != nil || newToken != "" {
+		t.Fatalf("no-rotate = (%q, %v), want empty token and nil error", newToken, err)
+	}
+	// The presented token must still be usable.
+	if _, _, err := store.Rotate(ctx, token, RotateOptions{TTL: time.Hour, Rotate: true}); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("rotate after no-rotate: %v", err)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestRefreshRotateInvalidGrant(t *testing.T) {
+	store, sqlDB := newTestRefreshStore(t)
+	ctx := context.Background()
+
+	expired, _, err := store.Issue(ctx, "admin", RoleOwner, time.Hour)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("issue expired: %v", err)
+	}
+	past := time.Now().UTC().Add(-time.Minute).Format(refreshTimeLayout)
+	if _, err := sqlDB.ExecContext(ctx,
+		"UPDATE refresh_tokens SET expires_at = ? WHERE token_hash = ?", past, hashRefreshToken(expired)); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("age token: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	revoked, _, err := store.Issue(ctx, "admin", RoleOwner, time.Hour)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("issue revoked: %v", err)
+	}
+	if ok, err := store.Revoke(ctx, revoked); err != nil || !ok {
+		t.Fatalf("revoke = (%v, %v), want (true, nil)", ok, err)
+	}
+
+	cases := map[string]string{
+		"empty":   "",
+		"garbage": "not-a-real-token",
+		"expired": expired,
+		"revoked": revoked,
+	}
+	for name, token := range cases {
+		t.Run(name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			_, _, err := store.Rotate(ctx, token, RotateOptions{TTL: time.Hour, Rotate: true})
+			if !errors.Is(err, ErrInvalidGrant) {
+				t.Fatalf("rotate(%q) err = %v, want ErrInvalidGrant", name, err)
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+func TestRefreshRevokeAll(t *testing.T) {
+	store, _ := newTestRefreshStore(t)
+	ctx := context.Background()
+
+	first, _, err := store.Issue(ctx, "admin", RoleOwner, time.Hour)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("issue first: %v", err)
+	}
+	second, _, err := store.Issue(ctx, "admin", RoleOwner, time.Hour)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("issue second: %v", err)
+	}
+	n, err := store.RevokeAll(ctx)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("revoke all: %v", err)
+	}
+	if n != 2 {
+		t.Fatalf("revoked %d rows, want 2", n)
+	}
+	for _, token := range []string{first, second} {
+		if _, _, err := store.Rotate(ctx, token, RotateOptions{TTL: time.Hour, Rotate: true}); !errors.Is(err, ErrInvalidGrant) {
+			t.Fatalf("rotate after revoke-all err = %v, want ErrInvalidGrant", err)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+func TestRefreshRevokeByUser(t *testing.T) {
+	store, _ := newTestRefreshStore(t)
+	ctx := context.Background()
+
+	adminToken, _, err := store.Issue(ctx, "admin", RoleOwner, time.Hour)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("issue admin: %v", err)
+	}
+	otherToken, _, err := store.Issue(ctx, "other", RoleViewer, time.Hour)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("issue other: %v", err)
+	}
+	n, err := store.RevokeByUser(ctx, "admin")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("revoke by user: %v", err)
+	}
+	if n != 1 {
+		t.Fatalf("revoked %d rows, want 1", n)
+	}
+	if _, _, err := store.Rotate(ctx, adminToken, RotateOptions{TTL: time.Hour, Rotate: true}); !errors.Is(err, ErrInvalidGrant) {
+		t.Fatalf("admin rotate after revoke err = %v, want ErrInvalidGrant", err)
+	}
+	if _, _, err := store.Rotate(ctx, otherToken, RotateOptions{TTL: time.Hour, Rotate: true}); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("other rotate must be unaffected: %v", err)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestRefreshRevokeIsIdempotent(t *testing.T) {
+	store, _ := newTestRefreshStore(t)
+	ctx := context.Background()
+
+	token, _, err := store.Issue(ctx, "admin", RoleOwner, time.Hour)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("issue: %v", err)
+	}
+	if ok, err := store.Revoke(ctx, token); err != nil || !ok {
+		t.Fatalf("first revoke = (%v, %v), want (true, nil)", ok, err)
+	}
+	if ok, err := store.Revoke(ctx, token); err != nil || ok {
+		t.Fatalf("second revoke = (%v, %v), want (false, nil)", ok, err)
+	}
+	if ok, err := store.Revoke(ctx, "unknown-token"); err != nil || ok {
+		t.Fatalf("unknown revoke = (%v, %v), want (false, nil)", ok, err)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestRefreshSchemaIdempotent(t *testing.T) {
+	ctx := context.Background()
+	sqlDB, err := db.Open(ctx, ":memory:", nil)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("open db: %v", err)
+	}
+	t.Cleanup(func() { _ = sqlDB.Close() })
+
+	if err := db.MigrateUp(ctx, sqlDB, nil); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("first migrate up: %v", err)
+	}
+	if err := db.MigrateUp(ctx, sqlDB, nil); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("second migrate up: %v", err)
+	}
+	var name string
+	if err := sqlDB.QueryRowContext(ctx,
+		"SELECT name FROM sqlite_master WHERE type='table' AND name='refresh_tokens'").Scan(&name); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("refresh_tokens table missing: %v", err)
+	}
+	// The store constructor re-issues the same DDL; it must be a no-op.
+	for i := 0; i < 2; i++ {
+		if _, err := NewRefreshStore(ctx, sqlDB, nil); err != nil {
+			t.Fatalf("NewRefreshStore #%d: %v", i+1, err)
+		}
+	}
+	// Down then up must also round-trip.
+	if err := db.MigrateDown(ctx, sqlDB, 1, nil); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("migrate down: %v", err)
+	}
+	if err := db.MigrateUp(ctx, sqlDB, nil); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("migrate up after down: %v", err)
+	}
+}

internal/config/config.go

@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ import (
 	"fmt"
 	"reflect"
 	"strings"
+	"time"
 )
 
 // Config is the root configuration tree.
@@ -48,6 +49,19 @@ type AuthConfig struct {
 	AdminUser           string `env:"ADMIN_USERNAME" default:"admin"`
 	AdminPass           string `env:"ADMIN_PASSWORD" default:"admin12345"`
 	RegistrationEnabled bool   `env:"REGISTRATION_ENABLED" default:"true"`
+
+	// RefreshTTL is how long an issued opaque refresh token stays valid. It is a
+	// Go duration string (e.g. "720h" = 30 days). Access tokens keep their 24h
+	// lifetime; the refresh token is the long-lived credential that renews them.
+	RefreshTTL time.Duration `env:"AUTH_REFRESH_TTL" default:"720h"`
+
+	// RefreshRotateDisabled opts out of single-use refresh rotation. Rotation is
+	// on by default (the safe default): a successful /auth/refresh revokes the
+	// presented token and returns a fresh one, so a replayed token fails. Set
+	// AUTH_REFRESH_ROTATE_DISABLED=true only for clients that cannot persist a
+	// rotated token. The field is negative-named so its zero value (an
+	// unset/undecoded config) means rotation is enabled.
+	RefreshRotateDisabled bool `env:"AUTH_REFRESH_ROTATE_DISABLED" default:"false"`
 }
 
 // DBConfig holds database connection settings. SQLite is the default; PGURL is

internal/config/config_test.go

@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ import (
 	"reflect"
 	"strings"
 	"testing"
+	"time"
 )
 
 func writeEnvFile(t *testing.T, content string) string {
@@ -130,6 +131,38 @@ func TestLoad_MissingDotEnvIsTolerated(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 
+func TestLoad_AuthRefreshDefaults(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Setenv("JWT_SECRET", strings.Repeat("s", 40))
+
+	cfg, err := Load("")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("Load() error: %v", err)
+	}
+	if cfg.Auth.RefreshTTL != 720*time.Hour {
+		t.Errorf("Auth.RefreshTTL = %v, want 720h", cfg.Auth.RefreshTTL)
+	}
+	if cfg.Auth.RefreshRotateDisabled {
+		t.Errorf("Auth.RefreshRotateDisabled = true, want false (rotation on by default)")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestLoad_AuthRefreshEnvOverrides(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Setenv("JWT_SECRET", strings.Repeat("s", 40))
+	t.Setenv("AUTH_REFRESH_TTL", "30m")
+	t.Setenv("AUTH_REFRESH_ROTATE_DISABLED", "true")
+
+	cfg, err := Load("")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("Load() error: %v", err)
+	}
+	if cfg.Auth.RefreshTTL != 30*time.Minute {
+		t.Errorf("Auth.RefreshTTL = %v, want 30m", cfg.Auth.RefreshTTL)
+	}
+	if !cfg.Auth.RefreshRotateDisabled {
+		t.Errorf("Auth.RefreshRotateDisabled = false, want true")
+	}
+}
+
 func TestLoad_CapacityDefaults(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Setenv("JWT_SECRET", strings.Repeat("s", 40))
 
@@ -144,7 +177,6 @@ func TestLoad_CapacityDefaults(t *testing.T) {
 		t.Errorf("Capacity.MinConfidence = %v, want 0.6", cfg.Capacity.MinConfidence)
 	}
 }
-
 func TestLoad_CapacityEnvOverrides(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Setenv("JWT_SECRET", strings.Repeat("s", 40))
 	t.Setenv("CAPACITY_ENABLED", "true")

internal/config/decode.go

@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ import (
 	"reflect"
 	"strconv"
 	"strings"
+	"time"
 )
 
 // decodeValue populates the struct pointed to by v. Precedence, highest first:
@@ -73,6 +74,11 @@ func setField(fv reflect.Value, raw string) error {
 	case reflect.Bool:
 		return setBool(fv, raw)
 	case reflect.Int, reflect.Int8, reflect.Int16, reflect.Int32, reflect.Int64:
+		// time.Duration is an int64 kind but is configured as a Go duration
+		// string (e.g. "720h"), so it must be parsed before the integer path.
+		if fv.Type() == reflect.TypeOf(time.Duration(0)) {
+			return setDuration(fv, raw)
+		}
 		return setInt(fv, raw)
 	case reflect.Float32, reflect.Float64:
 		return setFloat(fv, raw)
@@ -122,6 +128,21 @@ func setFloat(fv reflect.Value, raw string) error {
 	return nil
 }
 
+// setDuration parses a Go duration string (e.g. "720h", "30m") into a
+// time.Duration field. An empty value sets the zero duration.
+func setDuration(fv reflect.Value, raw string) error {
+	if strings.TrimSpace(raw) == "" {
+		fv.SetInt(0)
+		return nil
+	}
+	d, err := time.ParseDuration(raw)
+	if err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("invalid duration %q", raw)
+	}
+	fv.SetInt(int64(d))
+	return nil
+}
+
 func setStringSlice(fv reflect.Value, raw string) error {
 	if fv.Type().Elem().Kind() != reflect.String {
 		return fmt.Errorf("unsupported slice element kind %s", fv.Type().Elem().Kind())

internal/db/migrations/0008_refresh_tokens.down.sql

@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+-- 0008_refresh_tokens down: drop the refresh-token table (and, implicitly, its
+-- indexes). Revoked grants carry no audit value once the feature is rolled back.
+DROP TABLE IF EXISTS refresh_tokens;

internal/db/migrations/0008_refresh_tokens.up.sql

@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+-- 0008_refresh_tokens: opaque refresh tokens backing POST /api/v1/auth/refresh
+-- (B2). The long-lived credential that renews the 24h access token, so a client
+-- can stay signed in without storing the account password.
+--
+-- Only the SHA-256 hash of a token is stored (token_hash); the plaintext is
+-- returned once at login/refresh and never persisted or logged. revoked_at is
+-- NULL while a grant is live; expiry is validated in Go after the hash lookup.
+-- The canonical schema is also re-issued idempotently by auth.NewRefreshStore so
+-- an in-memory store used by tests stays self-contained; this migration is the
+-- authoritative path for an existing database.
+CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS refresh_tokens (
+    id         TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
+    user_id    TEXT NOT NULL,
+    role       TEXT NOT NULL,
+    token_hash TEXT NOT NULL UNIQUE,
+    expires_at TEXT NOT NULL,
+    revoked_at TEXT,
+    created_at TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT (strftime('%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%fZ','now')),
+    updated_at TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT (strftime('%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%fZ','now'))
+);
+
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_refresh_tokens_user_id
+    ON refresh_tokens (user_id);
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_refresh_tokens_expires_at
+    ON refresh_tokens (expires_at);

internal/services/gateway/admin_system.go

@@ -71,10 +71,27 @@ func (s *Server) adminRotateJWT(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 		writeError(w, apperr.Wrap(apperr.ErrInternal, "rotate_failed", "failed to rotate jwt secret"))
 		return
 	}
+	// Credential rotation must invalidate every long-lived grant too, not only the
+	// access tokens signed under the old secret. Refresh tokens are opaque and
+	// secret-independent, so they are deleted wholesale — the minimal, exact
+	// global invalidation in this architecture (no token_version column needed).
+	var refreshRevoked int64
+	if s.refresh != nil {
+		n, rerr := s.refresh.RevokeAll(r.Context())
+		if rerr != nil {
+			s.log.Error("rotate-jwt revoke refresh tokens", "err", rerr)
+			s.auditClaims(r, "system.rotate_jwt", "error")
+			writeError(w, apperr.Wrap(apperr.ErrInternal, "refresh_revoke_failed",
+				"JWT 已轮换，但 refresh token 作废失败，请重试或检查数据库"))
+			return
+		}
+		refreshRevoked = n
+	}
 	s.auditClaims(r, "system.rotate_jwt", "ok")
 	writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, map[string]any{
-		"rotated": true,
-		"note":    "现有 token 已全部失效，需重新登录",
+		"rotated":              true,
+		"refreshTokensRevoked": refreshRevoked,
+		"note":                 "现有 token 与 refresh token 已全部失效，需重新登录",
 	})
 }
 

internal/services/gateway/auth_refresh.go

@@ -0,0 +1,153 @@
+package gateway
+
+import (
+	"encoding/json"
+	"errors"
+	"io"
+	"net/http"
+	"strings"
+	"time"
+
+	"git.yeij.top/AskaEth/Cyrene_v2/internal/auth"
+	apperr "git.yeij.top/AskaEth/Cyrene_v2/internal/errors"
+)
+
+// defaultRefreshTTL is the refresh-token lifetime used when cfg.Auth.RefreshTTL
+// is unset (an undecoded config in tests), matching the AUTH_REFRESH_TTL default.
+const defaultRefreshTTL = 720 * time.Hour
+
+// refreshRequest is the POST /api/v1/auth/refresh body.
+type refreshRequest struct {
+	RefreshToken string `json:"refreshToken"`
+}
+
+// refreshResponse is the refresh success payload: a fresh access token plus the
+// rotated refresh token (omitted when rotation is disabled by config).
+type refreshResponse struct {
+	Token        string `json:"token"`
+	ExpiresAt    int64  `json:"expiresAt"`
+	Role         string `json:"role"`
+	RefreshToken string `json:"refreshToken,omitempty"`
+}
+
+// logoutRequest is the POST /api/v1/auth/logout body.
+type logoutRequest struct {
+	RefreshToken string `json:"refreshToken"`
+}
+
+// refreshTTL returns the configured refresh-token lifetime, falling back to
+// defaultRefreshTTL when the config was not decoded (zero value).
+func (s *Server) refreshTTL() time.Duration {
+	if s.cfg != nil && s.cfg.Auth.RefreshTTL > 0 {
+		return s.cfg.Auth.RefreshTTL
+	}
+	return defaultRefreshTTL
+}
+
+// refreshRotate reports whether single-use rotation is enabled. Rotation is the
+// default; only an explicit AUTH_REFRESH_ROTATE_DISABLED=true opts out.
+func (s *Server) refreshRotate() bool {
+	return s.cfg == nil || !s.cfg.Auth.RefreshRotateDisabled
+}
+
+// handleRefresh exchanges a valid opaque refresh token for a new access token,
+// rotating the refresh token by default. It is public (the refresh token is the
+// credential) and returns 401 invalid_grant for an unknown, revoked, or expired
+// token. A successful rotation is audited; the token itself is never logged.
+func (s *Server) handleRefresh(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+	var req refreshRequest
+	if err := json.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(&req); err != nil {
+		writeError(w, apperr.Wrap(apperr.ErrBadRequest, "bad_request", "invalid request body"))
+		return
+	}
+	if s.refresh == nil {
+		writeError(w, apperr.Wrap(apperr.ErrInternal, "refresh_unavailable", "refresh token service is not configured"))
+		return
+	}
+	grant, newRefresh, err := s.refresh.Rotate(r.Context(), req.RefreshToken, auth.RotateOptions{
+		TTL:    s.refreshTTL(),
+		Rotate: s.refreshRotate(),
+	})
+	if err != nil {
+		if errors.Is(err, auth.ErrInvalidGrant) {
+			writeError(w, apperr.Wrap(apperr.ErrUnauthorized, "invalid_grant", "invalid refresh token"))
+			return
+		}
+		s.log.Error("refresh rotate", "err", err)
+		writeError(w, apperr.Wrap(apperr.ErrInternal, "refresh_failed", "could not refresh token"))
+		return
+	}
+	token, err := s.auth.Sign(grant.UserID, grant.Role, tokenTTL)
+	if err != nil {
+		s.log.Error("refresh sign", "err", err)
+		writeError(w, apperr.Wrap(apperr.ErrInternal, "refresh_failed", "could not sign token"))
+		return
+	}
+	s.audit(r.Context(), grant.UserID+":"+string(grant.Role), "auth.refresh", "ok")
+	writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, refreshResponse{
+		Token:        token,
+		ExpiresAt:    time.Now().Add(tokenTTL).Unix(),
+		Role:         string(grant.Role),
+		RefreshToken: newRefresh,
+	})
+}
+
+// handleLogout revokes the refresh token in the body. It is public and
+// idempotent: an unknown or already revoked token yields {"revoked": false} with
+// 200 rather than an error, so a client can always clear its local state.
+//
+// The body may carry either a refreshToken (revokes that one grant) or nothing,
+// in which case the Authorization Bearer access token identifies the account and
+// every refresh grant for it is revoked (logout on all devices). A request with
+// neither is a 400.
+func (s *Server) handleLogout(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+	var req logoutRequest
+	// An empty body is valid: it means "no refreshToken", and the account is
+	// identified by the bearer access token below.
+	if err := json.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(&req); err != nil && !errors.Is(err, io.EOF) {
+		writeError(w, apperr.Wrap(apperr.ErrBadRequest, "bad_request", "invalid request body"))
+		return
+	}
+	if s.refresh == nil {
+		writeError(w, apperr.Wrap(apperr.ErrInternal, "refresh_unavailable", "refresh token service is not configured"))
+		return
+	}
+	if strings.TrimSpace(req.RefreshToken) != "" {
+		revoked, err := s.refresh.Revoke(r.Context(), req.RefreshToken)
+		if err != nil {
+			s.log.Error("logout revoke refresh token", "err", err)
+			writeError(w, apperr.Wrap(apperr.ErrInternal, "logout_failed", "could not revoke refresh token"))
+			return
+		}
+		writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, map[string]any{"revoked": revoked})
+		return
+	}
+	access := bearerFromRequest(r)
+	if access == "" {
+		writeError(w, apperr.Wrap(apperr.ErrBadRequest, "bad_request", "refreshToken or Authorization bearer token is required"))
+		return
+	}
+	claims, err := s.auth.Verify(access)
+	if err != nil {
+		writeError(w, apperr.Wrap(apperr.ErrUnauthorized, "invalid_grant", "invalid access token"))
+		return
+	}
+	n, err := s.refresh.RevokeByUser(r.Context(), claims.Sub)
+	if err != nil {
+		s.log.Error("logout revoke user refresh tokens", "err", err)
+		writeError(w, apperr.Wrap(apperr.ErrInternal, "logout_failed", "could not revoke refresh tokens"))
+		return
+	}
+	writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, map[string]any{"revoked": n > 0, "revokedCount": n})
+}
+
+// bearerFromRequest extracts the Bearer credential from the Authorization
+// header, returning "" when the header is absent or malformed.
+func bearerFromRequest(r *http.Request) string {
+	const prefix = "Bearer "
+	h := r.Header.Get("Authorization")
+	if len(h) <= len(prefix) || !strings.EqualFold(h[:len(prefix)], prefix) {
+		return ""
+	}
+	return strings.TrimSpace(h[len(prefix):])
+}

internal/services/gateway/auth_refresh_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,286 @@
+package gateway
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"crypto/sha256"
+	"database/sql"
+	"encoding/hex"
+	"encoding/json"
+	"net/http"
+	"net/http/httptest"
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+
+	"git.yeij.top/AskaEth/Cyrene_v2/internal/auth"
+	"git.yeij.top/AskaEth/Cyrene_v2/internal/bus"
+	"git.yeij.top/AskaEth/Cyrene_v2/internal/config"
+	"git.yeij.top/AskaEth/Cyrene_v2/internal/db"
+)
+
+// newRefreshEnv builds a gateway backed by a real JWT service and a real
+// SQLite-backed refresh store, returning the store and DB so a test can assert
+// what was persisted. The DB is isolated in memory per test.
+func newRefreshEnv(t *testing.T) (*testEnv, *auth.RefreshStore, *sql.DB) {
+	t.Helper()
+	ctx := context.Background()
+	sqlDB, err := db.Open(ctx, ":memory:", nil)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("open in-memory db: %v", err)
+	}
+	t.Cleanup(func() { _ = sqlDB.Close() })
+	if err := db.MigrateUp(ctx, sqlDB, nil); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("migrate up: %v", err)
+	}
+	refresh, err := auth.NewRefreshStore(ctx, sqlDB, nil)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("new refresh store: %v", err)
+	}
+	jwt := auth.New(config.AuthConfig{JWTSecret: testSecret})
+	b := bus.New()
+	cfg := &config.Config{Auth: config.AuthConfig{
+		AdminUser:  "admin",
+		AdminPass:  "secret",
+		JWTSecret:  testSecret,
+		RefreshTTL: time.Hour,
+	}}
+	srv, err := New(cfg, Deps{Auth: jwt, Bus: b, Refresh: refresh})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("new server: %v", err)
+	}
+	ts := httptest.NewServer(srv.Handler())
+	t.Cleanup(ts.Close)
+	return &testEnv{srv: srv, ts: ts, auth: jwt, bus: b}, refresh, sqlDB
+}
+
+// decodeData unmarshals the {data: ...} envelope payload into v.
+func decodeData(t *testing.T, body []byte, v any) {
+	t.Helper()
+	env := decodeBody(t, body)
+	raw, ok := env["data"]
+	if !ok {
+		t.Fatalf("response has no data envelope: %s", body)
+	}
+	if err := json.Unmarshal(raw, v); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("decode data %s: %v", body, err)
+	}
+}
+
+// loginRefresh performs an admin login and returns the access and refresh tokens.
+func loginRefresh(t *testing.T, ts *httptest.Server) (string, string) {
+	t.Helper()
+	resp, body := doReq(t, http.MethodPost, ts.URL+"/api/v1/auth/login",
+		map[string]string{"username": "admin", "password": "secret"}, "")
+	if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusOK {
+		t.Fatalf("login status = %d, want 200: %s", resp.StatusCode, body)
+	}
+	var data struct {
+		Token        string `json:"token"`
+		RefreshToken string `json:"refreshToken"`
+		Role         string `json:"role"`
+		ExpiresAt    int64  `json:"expiresAt"`
+	}
+	decodeData(t, body, &data)
+	if data.Token == "" || data.ExpiresAt == 0 || data.Role != "owner" {
+		t.Fatalf("login payload = %+v, want token/expiresAt/role=owner", data)
+	}
+	if data.RefreshToken == "" {
+		t.Fatalf("login payload has no refreshToken: %s", body)
+	}
+	return data.Token, data.RefreshToken
+}
+
+// postRefresh calls /auth/refresh with token and returns the status and body.
+func postRefresh(t *testing.T, ts *httptest.Server, token string) (int, []byte) {
+	t.Helper()
+	resp, body := doReq(t, http.MethodPost, ts.URL+"/api/v1/auth/refresh",
+		map[string]string{"refreshToken": token}, "")
+	return resp.StatusCode, body
+}
+
+// wantInvalidGrant asserts a 401 with the machine-readable invalid_grant code.
+func wantInvalidGrant(t *testing.T, status int, body []byte) {
+	t.Helper()
+	if status != http.StatusUnauthorized {
+		t.Fatalf("status = %d, want 401: %s", status, body)
+	}
+	env := decodeBody(t, body)
+	var eobj struct {
+		Code string `json:"code"`
+	}
+	if err := json.Unmarshal(env["error"], &eobj); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("error envelope: %v (%s)", err, body)
+	}
+	if eobj.Code != "invalid_grant" {
+		t.Fatalf("error code = %q, want invalid_grant: %s", eobj.Code, body)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestLoginReturnsRefreshTokenHashedAtRest(t *testing.T) {
+	env, _, sqlDB := newRefreshEnv(t)
+	access, refresh := loginRefresh(t, env.ts)
+
+	if _, err := env.auth.Verify(access); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("access token does not verify: %v", err)
+	}
+	var hash string
+	if err := sqlDB.QueryRowContext(context.Background(),
+		"SELECT token_hash FROM refresh_tokens WHERE user_id = 'admin'").Scan(&hash); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("select token_hash: %v", err)
+	}
+	if hash == refresh {
+		t.Fatal("refresh token stored in plaintext")
+	}
+	sum := sha256.Sum256([]byte(refresh))
+	if want := hex.EncodeToString(sum[:]); hash != want {
+		t.Fatalf("stored hash = %q, want %q", hash, want)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestRefreshRotatesAccessAndRefreshTokens(t *testing.T) {
+	env, _, _ := newRefreshEnv(t)
+	_, oldRefresh := loginRefresh(t, env.ts)
+
+	status, body := postRefresh(t, env.ts, oldRefresh)
+	if status != http.StatusOK {
+		t.Fatalf("refresh status = %d, want 200: %s", status, body)
+	}
+	var data struct {
+		Token        string `json:"token"`
+		ExpiresAt    int64  `json:"expiresAt"`
+		Role         string `json:"role"`
+		RefreshToken string `json:"refreshToken"`
+	}
+	decodeData(t, body, &data)
+	if data.Token == "" || data.ExpiresAt == 0 || data.Role != "owner" {
+		t.Fatalf("refresh payload = %+v, want token/expiresAt/role", data)
+	}
+	if data.RefreshToken == "" || data.RefreshToken == oldRefresh {
+		t.Fatalf("refresh token not rotated: %q", data.RefreshToken)
+	}
+	claims, err := env.auth.Verify(data.Token)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("refreshed access token does not verify: %v", err)
+	}
+	if claims.Sub != "admin" || claims.Role != auth.RoleOwner {
+		t.Fatalf("refreshed claims = %+v, want admin/owner", claims)
+	}
+
+	// The presented token is single-use: replay must fail.
+	status, body = postRefresh(t, env.ts, oldRefresh)
+	wantInvalidGrant(t, status, body)
+
+	// The rotated token works.
+	if status, body = postRefresh(t, env.ts, data.RefreshToken); status != http.StatusOK {
+		t.Fatalf("rotate replacement status = %d, want 200: %s", status, body)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestRefreshRejectsBadGrants(t *testing.T) {
+	env, refresh, sqlDB := newRefreshEnv(t)
+	ctx := context.Background()
+
+	expired := "expired-token-value"
+	sum := sha256.Sum256([]byte(expired))
+	if _, err := sqlDB.ExecContext(ctx,
+		`INSERT INTO refresh_tokens (id, user_id, role, token_hash, expires_at) VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?)`,
+		"seed-expired", "admin", "owner", hex.EncodeToString(sum[:]),
+		time.Now().UTC().Add(-time.Minute).Format(time.RFC3339Nano)); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("seed expired token: %v", err)
+	}
+	revoked, _, err := refresh.Issue(ctx, "admin", auth.RoleOwner, time.Hour)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("issue revoked token: %v", err)
+	}
+	if ok, err := refresh.Revoke(ctx, revoked); err != nil || !ok {
+		t.Fatalf("revoke = (%v, %v), want (true, nil)", ok, err)
+	}
+
+	cases := map[string]string{
+		"empty":   "",
+		"garbage": "not-a-real-token",
+		"expired": expired,
+		"revoked": revoked,
+	}
+	for name, token := range cases {
+		t.Run(name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			status, body := postRefresh(t, env.ts, token)
+			wantInvalidGrant(t, status, body)
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+func TestLogoutRevokesRefreshToken(t *testing.T) {
+	env, _, _ := newRefreshEnv(t)
+	_, refreshToken := loginRefresh(t, env.ts)
+
+	resp, body := doReq(t, http.MethodPost, env.ts.URL+"/api/v1/auth/logout",
+		map[string]string{"refreshToken": refreshToken}, "")
+	if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusOK {
+		t.Fatalf("logout status = %d, want 200: %s", resp.StatusCode, body)
+	}
+	var data struct {
+		Revoked bool `json:"revoked"`
+	}
+	decodeData(t, body, &data)
+	if !data.Revoked {
+		t.Fatalf("logout revoked = false, want true: %s", body)
+	}
+	if status, body := postRefresh(t, env.ts, refreshToken); status != http.StatusUnauthorized {
+		t.Fatalf("refresh after logout status = %d, want 401: %s", status, body)
+	}
+
+	// Logout is idempotent: a second call reports revoked=false, not an error.
+	resp, body = doReq(t, http.MethodPost, env.ts.URL+"/api/v1/auth/logout",
+		map[string]string{"refreshToken": refreshToken}, "")
+	if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusOK {
+		t.Fatalf("second logout status = %d, want 200: %s", resp.StatusCode, body)
+	}
+	decodeData(t, body, &data)
+	if data.Revoked {
+		t.Fatalf("second logout revoked = true, want false")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestLogoutWithAccessTokenRevokesUserGrants(t *testing.T) {
+	env, _, _ := newRefreshEnv(t)
+	access, refreshToken := loginRefresh(t, env.ts)
+
+	resp, body := doReq(t, http.MethodPost, env.ts.URL+"/api/v1/auth/logout", nil, access)
+	if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusOK {
+		t.Fatalf("logout status = %d, want 200: %s", resp.StatusCode, body)
+	}
+	var data struct {
+		Revoked      bool  `json:"revoked"`
+		RevokedCount int64 `json:"revokedCount"`
+	}
+	decodeData(t, body, &data)
+	if !data.Revoked || data.RevokedCount != 1 {
+		t.Fatalf("logout payload = %+v, want revoked with 1 grant", data)
+	}
+	if status, body := postRefresh(t, env.ts, refreshToken); status != http.StatusUnauthorized {
+		t.Fatalf("refresh after access-token logout status = %d, want 401: %s", status, body)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestRotateJWTInvalidatesRefreshTokens(t *testing.T) {
+	env, _, _ := newRefreshEnv(t)
+	_, refreshToken := loginRefresh(t, env.ts)
+
+	owner := env.token(t, auth.RoleOwner)
+	resp, body := doReq(t, http.MethodPost, env.ts.URL+"/api/v1/admin/system/rotate-jwt",
+		map[string]string{"newSecret": "a-brand-new-jwt-secret-at-least-32-chars"}, owner)
+	if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusOK {
+		t.Fatalf("rotate-jwt status = %d, want 200: %s", resp.StatusCode, body)
+	}
+	var data struct {
+		Rotated              bool  `json:"rotated"`
+		RefreshTokensRevoked int64 `json:"refreshTokensRevoked"`
+	}
+	decodeData(t, body, &data)
+	if !data.Rotated || data.RefreshTokensRevoked != 1 {
+		t.Fatalf("rotate-jwt payload = %+v, want rotated with 1 refresh token revoked", data)
+	}
+	if status, body := postRefresh(t, env.ts, refreshToken); status != http.StatusUnauthorized {
+		t.Fatalf("refresh after rotate-jwt status = %d, want 401: %s", status, body)
+	}
+}

internal/services/gateway/rest.go

@@ -59,11 +59,14 @@ type loginRequest struct {
 	Password string `json:"password"`
 }
 
-// loginResponse is the login success payload.
+// loginResponse is the login success payload. RefreshToken is the opaque
+// long-lived credential (POST /auth/refresh) added by B2; it is omitted when no
+// refresh store is wired so the pre-B2 contract is unchanged.
 type loginResponse struct {
-	Token     string `json:"token"`
-	ExpiresAt int64  `json:"expiresAt"`
-	Role      string `json:"role"`
+	Token        string `json:"token"`
+	ExpiresAt    int64  `json:"expiresAt"`
+	Role         string `json:"role"`
+	RefreshToken string `json:"refreshToken,omitempty"`
 }
 
 // chatRequest is the POST /api/v1/chat body. When Stream is true the gateway
@@ -114,11 +117,24 @@ func (s *Server) handleLogin(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 		writeError(w, apperr.Wrap(apperr.ErrInternal, "login_failed", "could not sign token"))
 		return
 	}
-	writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, loginResponse{
+	resp := loginResponse{
 		Token:     token,
 		ExpiresAt: time.Now().Add(tokenTTL).Unix(),
 		Role:      string(auth.RoleOwner),
-	})
+	}
+	// Issue the long-lived refresh credential alongside the access token. A store
+	// failure fails the login rather than silently handing back a login without
+	// the advertised refresh token; the plaintext is never logged.
+	if s.refresh != nil {
+		refreshToken, _, rerr := s.refresh.Issue(r.Context(), req.Username, auth.RoleOwner, s.refreshTTL())
+		if rerr != nil {
+			s.log.Error("login issue refresh token", "err", rerr)
+			writeError(w, apperr.Wrap(apperr.ErrInternal, "login_failed", "could not issue refresh token"))
+			return
+		}
+		resp.RefreshToken = refreshToken
+	}
+	writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, resp)
 }
 
 // handleChat runs one synchronous agent turn (or triggers streaming).

internal/services/gateway/server.go

@@ -157,6 +157,32 @@ type UserStore interface {
 	List() []auth.UserSummary
 }
 
+// RefreshGrantStore manages opaque refresh tokens (auth.RefreshStore is the
+// production implementation). It is the credential behind the refreshToken
+// returned by login and the POST /auth/refresh, /auth/logout endpoints. Only
+// hashes are persisted; the plaintext token crosses this interface exactly once
+// per issue/rotate. Optional: when nil login omits refreshToken and the refresh
+// and logout endpoints report a clear not-configured error.
+type RefreshGrantStore interface {
+	// Issue mints a refresh token for userID/role and returns its plaintext
+	// (visible once) plus its expiry.
+	Issue(ctx context.Context, userID string, role auth.Role, ttl time.Duration) (string, time.Time, error)
+	// Rotate validates plaintext and, when opts.Rotate is set, revokes it and
+	// returns a replacement. It returns auth.ErrInvalidGrant for an unknown,
+	// revoked, or expired token.
+	Rotate(ctx context.Context, plaintext string, opts auth.RotateOptions) (auth.RefreshToken, string, error)
+	// Revoke marks the token matching plaintext revoked, returning whether a
+	// live token was found. It is idempotent.
+	Revoke(ctx context.Context, plaintext string) (bool, error)
+	// RevokeAll deletes every refresh token (global invalidation on secret
+	// rotation) and returns how many were removed.
+	RevokeAll(ctx context.Context) (int64, error)
+	// RevokeByUser deletes every refresh token for userID (logout by access
+	// token, where the individual grant is unknown) and returns how many were
+	// removed.
+	RevokeByUser(ctx context.Context, userID string) (int64, error)
+}
+
 // BackthinkStore enumerates the persisted background-think records for the
 // M9/M10 monitor panel. *backthink.Backthink is the production implementation.
 type BackthinkStore interface {
@@ -247,6 +273,9 @@ type Deps struct {
 	// Users lists accounts and API keys. Optional (falls back to the configured
 	// single admin account).
 	Users UserStore
+	// Refresh is the opaque refresh-token store. Optional: when nil login omits
+	// refreshToken and /auth/refresh + /auth/logout answer not-configured.
+	Refresh RefreshGrantStore
 	// Backthink lists background-think records. Optional.
 	Backthink BackthinkStore
 	// RAG backs the admin knowledge-base RAG module. Optional; list/search
@@ -314,6 +343,7 @@ type Server struct {
 	taskOutputs TaskOutputStore
 	automations AutomationStore
 	users       UserStore
+	refresh     RefreshGrantStore
 	backthink   BackthinkStore
 	rag         RagStore
 	obs         *observability
@@ -363,6 +393,7 @@ func New(cfg *config.Config, deps Deps) (*Server, error) {
 		taskOutputs:    deps.Tasks,
 		automations:    deps.Automations,
 		users:          deps.Users,
+		refresh:        deps.Refresh,
 		backthink:      deps.Backthink,
 		rag:            deps.RAG,
 		obs:            newObservability(deps),
@@ -390,6 +421,11 @@ func (s *Server) Handler() http.Handler {
 	// Public, no auth.
 	mux.HandleFunc("GET /api/v1/health", s.handleHealth)
 	mux.HandleFunc("POST /api/v1/auth/login", s.handleLogin)
+	// Refresh/logout are public by design: the opaque refresh token is itself the
+	// credential, so a client with an expired access token can still rotate or
+	// revoke it. Both fail closed with 401 invalid_grant on a bad token.
+	mux.HandleFunc("POST /api/v1/auth/refresh", s.handleRefresh)
+	mux.HandleFunc("POST /api/v1/auth/logout", s.handleLogout)
 
 	// User side, authenticated. Chat is a write (owner/admin); reads accept any
 	// authenticated role so a viewer can still list personas/sessions.