#!/usr/bin/env python3 """Sign / verify the update manifest, and check the pinned keyring (M190). Why Ed25519 + a **detached** `.sig`: the manifest's `sha256` only says "the package matches the manifest"; it says nothing about who wrote the manifest. A signature over the manifest's *exact bytes* answers that, and a separate file avoids JSON canonicalisation games (any byte change breaks the signature). Key discipline: the **private key** lives only in the repository Secret `ULL_MANIFEST_SIGNING_KEY` (never in git, logs or artifacts); the **public key** is pinned *inside the binary* — `crates/core/src/update/trust.rs`, between the `>>> PINNED-KEYS >>>` / `<<< PINNED-KEYS <<<` markers. `--check-pinned-keyring` fails the release when the secret's key is not pinned (a release signed with a key clients do not trust is worse than no release). Manual: `packaging/docs/signing.md`. Usage: python3 packaging/sign_manifest.py --generate-key --key-id ull-release-2026a ULL_MANIFEST_SIGNING_KEY='{"key_id":"…","seed_hex":"…"}' python3 packaging/sign_manifest.py --sign dist/manifest.json python3 packaging/sign_manifest.py --check-pinned-keyring | --self-test """ from __future__ import annotations import argparse import hashlib import json import os import re import sys from pathlib import Path FORMAT = 1 ALG = "ed25519" KEY_ENV = "ULL_MANIFEST_SIGNING_KEY" SIG_SUFFIX = ".sig" TRUST_RS = Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent / "crates/core/src/update/trust.rs" PIN_BEGIN = ">>> PINNED-KEYS >>>" PIN_END = "<<< PINNED-KEYS <<<" KID_RE = re.compile(r'key_id:\s*"([^"]+)"\s*,\s*public_key_hex:\s*"([0-9a-fA-F]{64})"') # Ed25519 (RFC 8032), reference-shaped implementation (same formulas as # `crates/core/src/update/ed25519/*`). Validated against the RFC 8032 §7.1 vectors in # `--self-test`; the Rust verifier is validated against the *same* vectors, so the two # implementations cross-check each other. No third-party dependency: CI needs no pip install. Q = 2**255 - 19 L = 2**252 + 27742317777372353535851937790883648493 def _inv(x: int) -> int: return pow(x, Q - 2, Q) D = -121665 * _inv(121666) % Q _D2 = 2 * D % Q _SQRT_M1 = pow(2, (Q - 1) // 4, Q) def _recover_x(y: int, sign: int) -> int | None: u = (y * y - 1) % Q v = (D * y * y + 1) % Q v3 = pow(v, 3, Q) v7 = pow(v, 7, Q) x = u * v3 % Q * pow(u * v7 % Q, (Q - 5) // 8, Q) % Q if (v * x * x - u) % Q != 0: x = x * _SQRT_M1 % Q if (v * x * x - u) % Q != 0: return None if x % 2 != sign: x = (Q - x) % Q return x def _decompress(data: bytes) -> tuple[int, int, int, int] | None: if len(data) != 32: return None y = int.from_bytes(data, "little") sign = (y >> 255) & 1 y &= (1 << 255) - 1 if y >= Q: return None x = _recover_x(y, sign) if x is None: return None return (x, y, 1, x * y % Q) def _add(p: tuple[int, int, int, int], r: tuple[int, int, int, int]): x1, y1, z1, t1 = p x2, y2, z2, t2 = r a = (y1 - x1) * (y2 - x2) % Q b = (y1 + x1) * (y2 + x2) % Q c = t1 * _D2 * t2 % Q d = 2 * z1 * z2 % Q e, f, g, h = (b - a) % Q, (d - c) % Q, (d + c) % Q, (b + a) % Q return (e * f % Q, g * h % Q, f * g % Q, e * h % Q) def _double(p: tuple[int, int, int, int]): x1, y1, z1, _ = p a = x1 * x1 % Q b = y1 * y1 % Q c = 2 * z1 * z1 % Q d = -a % Q e = ((x1 + y1) * (x1 + y1) - a - b) % Q g = (d + b) % Q f = (g - c) % Q h = (d - b) % Q return (e * f % Q, g * h % Q, f * g % Q, e * h % Q) def _scalarmult(p, e: int): acc = (0, 1, 1, 0) for bit in bin(e)[2:] if e else "": acc = _double(acc) if bit == "1": acc = _add(acc, p) return acc def _encode(p) -> bytes: x, y, z, _ = p zi = _inv(z) x, y = x * zi % Q, y * zi % Q return (y | ((x & 1) << 255)).to_bytes(32, "little") def _base(): encoded = (4 * _inv(5) % Q).to_bytes(32, "little") return _decompress(encoded) def _hint(data: bytes) -> int: return int.from_bytes(hashlib.sha512(data).digest(), "little") % L def public_key(seed: bytes) -> bytes: h = hashlib.sha512(seed).digest() a = int.from_bytes(_clamp(bytearray(h[:32])), "little") return _encode(_scalarmult(_base(), a)) def _clamp(scalar: bytearray) -> bytes: scalar[0] &= 248 scalar[31] &= 127 scalar[31] |= 64 return bytes(scalar) def sign(seed: bytes, message: bytes) -> bytes: if len(seed) != 32: raise SystemExit("error: Ed25519 种子必须 32 字节") h = hashlib.sha512(seed).digest() a = int.from_bytes(_clamp(bytearray(h[:32])), "little") prefix = h[32:] r = _hint(prefix + message) r_encoded = _encode(_scalarmult(_base(), r)) pk = _encode(_scalarmult(_base(), a)) k = _hint(r_encoded + pk + message) s = (r + k * a) % L return r_encoded + s.to_bytes(32, "little") def verify(pk: bytes, message: bytes, signature: bytes) -> bool: if len(pk) != 32 or len(signature) != 64: return False r_bytes, s_bytes = signature[:32], signature[32:] if int.from_bytes(s_bytes, "little") >= L: return False a = _decompress(pk) r_point = _decompress(r_bytes) if a is None or r_point is None: return False k = _hint(r_bytes + pk + message) left = _scalarmult(_base(), int.from_bytes(s_bytes, "little")) return _encode(left) == _encode(_add(r_point, _scalarmult(a, k))) def load_key(text: str) -> tuple[str, bytes]: """Parse the secret JSON (`{"key_id":…,"seed_hex":…}`) or a bare 64-char hex seed.""" text = text.strip() try: payload = json.loads(text) except json.JSONDecodeError: payload = None if isinstance(payload, dict): key_id = str(payload.get("key_id", "")).strip() seed_hex = str(payload.get("seed_hex", "")).strip() else: key_id, seed_hex = "", text if not key_id: raise SystemExit("error: 密钥缺少 `key_id`（清单签名要靠它查信任表）") try: seed = bytes.fromhex(seed_hex) except ValueError as error: raise SystemExit(f"error: `seed_hex` 不是十六进制（{error}）") from error if len(seed) != 32: raise SystemExit(f"error: `seed_hex` 必须 32 字节（实际 {len(seed)}）") return key_id, seed def key_from_env_or_arg(path: str | None) -> tuple[str, bytes]: if path: secret = Path(path).read_text(encoding="utf-8") else: secret = os.environ.get(KEY_ENV, "") if not secret.strip(): raise SystemExit( f"error: 没有签名密钥：设环境变量 {KEY_ENV}（内容 = --generate-key 打出来的那一行 JSON），" "或显式给 --key <文件>。**绝不**把私钥写进仓库/日志/产物。" ) return load_key(secret) def pinned_keys(trust_text: str) -> list[tuple[str, str]]: """Extract `(key_id, public_key_hex)` pairs between the PINNED-KEYS markers.""" begin = trust_text.find(PIN_BEGIN) end = trust_text.find(PIN_END) if begin < 0 or end < 0 or end < begin: raise SystemExit(f"error: {TRUST_RS} 里找不到 {PIN_BEGIN} / {PIN_END} 标记") return KID_RE.findall(trust_text[begin:end]) def do_generate_key(key_id: str) -> int: seed = os.urandom(32) pk = public_key(seed) pk_hex = pk.hex() if not verify(pk, b"self-check", sign(seed, b"self-check")): print("error: 自己签自己验不过——不要用这把钥", file=sys.stderr) return 1 secret = json.dumps({"key_id": key_id, "seed_hex": seed.hex()}, ensure_ascii=False) print("# ① 私钥（**只**贴进仓库 Secret " + KEY_ENV + "，别写进任何文件/日志/提交）：") print(secret) print("# ② 公钥（贴进 crates/core/src/update/trust.rs 的 PINNED-KEYS 标记之间）：") print(f' PinnedKey {{ key_id: "{key_id}", public_key_hex: "{pk_hex}" }},') print(f"# 公钥十六进制：{pk_hex}") return 0 def do_sign(manifest: Path, key_path: str | None, out: Path | None, key_id_override: str | None) -> int: if not manifest.is_file(): print(f"error: 没有清单文件 {manifest}", file=sys.stderr) return 1 raw = manifest.read_bytes() # 签的必须是**能解析**的清单：签一串垃圾只会把事故推迟到用户机器上。 try: parsed = json.loads(raw.decode("utf-8")) except (UnicodeDecodeError, json.JSONDecodeError) as error: print(f"error: {manifest} 不是合法 JSON（{error}）", file=sys.stderr) return 1 if not isinstance(parsed, dict) or "channel" not in parsed or "releases" not in parsed: print(f"error: {manifest} 不像发布清单（缺 channel/releases）", file=sys.stderr) return 1 key_id, seed = key_from_env_or_arg(key_path) if key_id_override: key_id = key_id_override signature = sign(seed, raw) if not verify(public_key(seed), raw, signature): print("error: 签出来的签名自己验不过（实现有问题），拒绝落盘", file=sys.stderr) return 1 envelope = { "format": FORMAT, "signatures": [ { "alg": ALG, "key_id": key_id, "sig": signature.hex(), "manifest_sha256": hashlib.sha256(raw).hexdigest(), } ], } out = out or manifest.with_name(manifest.name + SIG_SUFFIX) out.write_text(json.dumps(envelope, ensure_ascii=False, indent=2) + "\n", encoding="utf-8", newline="\n") print(f"signed: {manifest} → {out}") print(f" key_id = {key_id}") print(f" public_key = {public_key(seed).hex()}") print(f" manifest_sha256 = {envelope['signatures'][0]['manifest_sha256']}") return 0 def do_verify(manifest: Path, sig: Path, public_key_hex: str) -> int: raw = manifest.read_bytes() envelope = json.loads(sig.read_text(encoding="utf-8")) pk = bytes.fromhex(public_key_hex) for item in envelope.get("signatures", []): if item.get("alg") != ALG: continue if verify(pk, raw, bytes.fromhex(item.get("sig", ""))): print(f"ok: {sig} 里的签名（key_id={item.get('key_id')}）通过") return 0 print("error: 没有任何一条签名能验过", file=sys.stderr) return 1 def do_check_pinned(key_path: str | None) -> int: key_id, seed = key_from_env_or_arg(key_path) pk_hex = public_key(seed).hex() keys = pinned_keys(TRUST_RS.read_text(encoding="utf-8")) if not keys: # 「说人话的红」：因为什么、缺什么、怎么补，一行一行写清楚（不涉密，只回显公钥）。 print("error: 信任表是空的（fail-closed）：客户端一把公钥都没有，任何清单都验不过，所以拒绝发布。", file=sys.stderr) print(f"error: 本次签名钥 = key_id {key_id} / 公钥 {pk_hex}", file=sys.stderr) print("error: 补法：把这行贴进 crates/core/src/update/trust.rs 的 PINNED-KEYS 标记之间 ——", file=sys.stderr) print(f'error: PinnedKey {{ key_id: "{key_id}", public_key_hex: "{pk_hex}" }},', file=sys.stderr) print("error: 手册：packaging/docs/signing.md §3", file=sys.stderr) return 1 for pinned_id, pinned_hex in keys: if pinned_hex.lower() == pk_hex: print(f"ok: 签名钥 {key_id} 已被钉住（trust.rs 里叫 {pinned_id}）") if pinned_id != key_id: print( f"warning: 同一个公钥在 trust.rs 里叫 {pinned_id}、密钥文件里叫 {key_id}；" "清单会带后者，客户端按**公钥字节**验签，所以两种写法都能过（但建议改名对齐）", file=sys.stderr, ) return 0 pinned_ids = [k[0] for k in keys] print( f"error: 签名钥（key_id={key_id} / 公钥={pk_hex}）不在信任表里 —— 签出来的清单没有任何客户端会认，所以拒绝发布。", file=sys.stderr, ) print(f"error: trust.rs 现在钉的是：{pinned_ids}", file=sys.stderr) for pinned_id, pinned_hex in keys: print(f"error: {pinned_id} = {pinned_hex}", file=sys.stderr) print("error: 二选一：", file=sys.stderr) print("error: ① 用已钉住的那把钥签（换回对应的 Secret）；或", file=sys.stderr) print( "error: ② 换钥：把上面的公钥按「旧钥签新钥」贴进 crates/core/src/update/trust.rs 的 PINNED-KEYS 之间，" "并让本次清单同时带旧钥签名", file=sys.stderr, ) print("error: 手册：packaging/docs/signing.md §3/§5", file=sys.stderr) return 1 def do_self_test() -> int: vectors = [ ("9d61b19deffd5a60ba844af492ec2cc44449c5697b326919703bac031cae7f60", "d75a980182b10ab7d54bfed3c964073a0ee172f3daa62325af021a68f707511a", "", "e5564300c360ac729086e2cc806e828a84877f1eb8e5d974d873e065224901555fb8821590a33bacc61e39701cf9b46bd25bf5f0595bbe24655141438e7a100b"), ("4ccd089b28ff96da9db6c346ec114e0f5b8a319f35aba624da8cf6ed4fb8a6fb", "3d4017c3e843895a92b70aa74d1b7ebc9c982ccf2ec4968cc0cd55f12af4660c", "72", "92a009a9f0d4cab8720e820b5f642540a2b27b5416503f8fb3762223ebdb69da085ac1e43e15996e458f3613d0f11d8c387b2eaeb4302aeeb00d291612bb0c00"), ("c5aa8df43f9f837bedb7442f31dcb7b166d38535076f094b85ce3a2e0b4458f7", "fc51cd8e6218a1a38da47ed00230f0580816ed13ba3303ac5deb911548908025", "af82", "6291d657deec24024827e69c3abe01a30ce548a284743a445e3680d7db5ac3ac18ff9b538d16f290ae67f760984dc6594a7c15e9716ed28dc027beceea1ec40a"), ] failures = 0 for index, (seed_hex, pk_hex, message_hex, sig_hex) in enumerate(vectors, 1): seed, pk, message = bytes.fromhex(seed_hex), bytes.fromhex(pk_hex), bytes.fromhex(message_hex) if public_key(seed).hex() != pk_hex: print(f"FAIL vector {index}: public key mismatch", file=sys.stderr) failures += 1 if sign(seed, message).hex() != sig_hex: print(f"FAIL vector {index}: signature mismatch", file=sys.stderr) failures += 1 if not verify(pk, message, bytes.fromhex(sig_hex)): print(f"FAIL vector {index}: verify rejected", file=sys.stderr) failures += 1 tampered = bytearray(message) tampered.append(0) if verify(pk, bytes(tampered), bytes.fromhex(sig_hex)): print(f"FAIL vector {index}: tampered message still verifies", file=sys.stderr) failures += 1 # 标记解析：信任表解析器必须在示例上命中一对，且在空表上返回空。 sample = f'{PIN_BEGIN}\n PinnedKey {{ key_id: "k1", public_key_hex: "{"ab" * 32}" }},\n{PIN_END}' if pinned_keys(sample) != [("k1", "ab" * 32)]: print("FAIL: pinned_keys() 没解析出示例条目", file=sys.stderr) failures += 1 if pinned_keys(f"{PIN_BEGIN}\n{PIN_END}") != []: print("FAIL: pinned_keys() 在空表上应返回空", file=sys.stderr) failures += 1 print("self-test:", "ok" if failures == 0 else f"{failures} 处失败") return 0 if failures == 0 else 1 def main(argv: list[str] | None = None) -> int: parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description="更新清单的 Ed25519 签名/验签与信任表检查（M190）") parser.add_argument("--generate-key", action="store_true", help="生成一把新钥（打印 Secret 与 PinnedKey 片段）") parser.add_argument("--key-id", default="ull-release", help="生成/签名时用的 key_id") parser.add_argument("--sign", metavar="MANIFEST", type=Path, help="签这份清单（产出 <清单>.sig）") parser.add_argument("--out", metavar="SIG", type=Path, help="签名输出路径（默认 <清单>.sig）") parser.add_argument("--key", metavar="FILE", help=f"密钥文件（不给则读环境变量 {KEY_ENV}）") parser.add_argument("--verify", nargs=2, metavar=("MANIFEST", "SIG"), help="手工验一份签名") parser.add_argument("--public-key", metavar="HEX", help="--verify 用的公钥") parser.add_argument("--check-pinned-keyring", action="store_true", help="检查密钥是否已被钉进 trust.rs") parser.add_argument("--self-test", action="store_true", help="跑 RFC 8032 向量与解析器自检") args = parser.parse_args(argv) if args.self_test: return do_self_test() if args.generate_key: return do_generate_key(args.key_id) if args.sign: return do_sign(args.sign, args.key, args.out, args.key_id if args.key_id != "ull-release" else None) if args.verify: if not args.public_key: print("error: --verify 需要 --public-key", file=sys.stderr) return 1 return do_verify(Path(args.verify[0]), Path(args.verify[1]), args.public_key) if args.check_pinned_keyring: return do_check_pinned(args.key) parser.print_help() return 2 if __name__ == "__main__": raise SystemExit(main())