feat(m190): 产物署名（PE VERSIONINFO）+ 清单 Ed25519 多签名与更新前验签
两件事：让「这是谁发的」在产物与清单上都留下可验证的痕迹。
① PE 版本资源（两个 bin）：`packaging/pe_version.rs` 是唯一口径（CompanyName
「Unlucky Launcher Project」/ ProductName、FileDescription「Unlucky Launcher」/
LegalCopyright「© 2026 … · Apache-2.0」/ 四段式版本号与 Cargo.toml 同源），被
`crates/{cli,app-iced}/build.rs` 各 include 一次；非 windows 目标整段不执行。
判据是读产物字节的 `packaging/check_pe_version.py`（CI 的 Windows 槽位）。
② 清单签名：`manifest.json` 旁边多一份 `manifest.json.sig`（分离签名，签的是清单**原始
字节**），信封是 `{format, signatures:[{alg,key_id,sig,manifest_sha256}]}` —— 多签名数组，
任意一条命中钉住的钥即放行（换钥窗口）。信任锚是 `crates/core/src/update/trust.rs`
里的编译期公钥表（正式表为空 = fail-closed，测试钥只在 cfg(test)/update-test-source 里）。
管线顺序改成「先验签、再解析」：`UpdateSource` 只交原文 + `.sig`，`verified_manifest`
是唯一收口点，`Job::apply` 因此在取包**之前**就拒。新增五类错误分类
（signature_missing / malformed / unknown_key / keyring_empty / invalid ），全部不可重试，
CLI 的 hint 单独说人话。
③ Ed25519 验签自带实现（`update/ed25519/*`，零新依赖）：scope 不含 core 的 Cargo.toml，
用 RFC 8032 §7.1 向量 + 可锻/小阶/非规范编码的拒绝用例钉住；签名侧是
`packaging/sign_manifest.py`（纯 Python 参考实现，零 pip 依赖，`--self-test` 同向量）。
④ 守门：`release-publish.yml` 加签名步（`set +x`，只回显公钥；没 Secret / 钥没钉 / 签不上
一律红 ⇒ 不出 Release）；`release-build.yml` 加 PE 资源读回；`release-guard.yml` 跑两个
脚本的 `--self-test`。密钥纪律与轮换（旧钥签新钥）写在 `packaging/docs/signing.md`。
Cargo.lock：新增 winresource（build-dependency）与 toml 系；toml_datetime 1.1.2→1.1.3 是
toml 1.2.1 的硬要求（`cargo update --precise 1.1.2` 已实测被拒）。
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#!/usr/bin/env python3
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"""Sign / verify the update manifest, and check the pinned keyring (M190).
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Why Ed25519 + a **detached** `.sig`: the manifest's `sha256` only says "the package matches the
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manifest"; it says nothing about who wrote the manifest. A signature over the manifest's *exact
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bytes* answers that, and a separate file avoids JSON canonicalisation games (any byte change
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breaks the signature).
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Key discipline: the **private key** lives only in the repository Secret
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`ULL_MANIFEST_SIGNING_KEY` (never in git, logs or artifacts); the **public key** is pinned
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*inside the binary* — `crates/core/src/update/trust.rs`, between the `>>> PINNED-KEYS >>>` /
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`<<< PINNED-KEYS <<<` markers. `--check-pinned-keyring` fails the release when the secret's key
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is not pinned (a release signed with a key clients do not trust is worse than no release).
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Manual: `packaging/docs/signing.md`.
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Usage:
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python3 packaging/sign_manifest.py --generate-key --key-id ull-release-2026a
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ULL_MANIFEST_SIGNING_KEY='{"key_id":"…","seed_hex":"…"}' python3 packaging/sign_manifest.py --sign dist/manifest.json
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python3 packaging/sign_manifest.py --check-pinned-keyring | --self-test
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"""
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from __future__ import annotations
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import argparse
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import hashlib
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import json
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import os
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import re
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import sys
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from pathlib import Path
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FORMAT = 1
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ALG = "ed25519"
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KEY_ENV = "ULL_MANIFEST_SIGNING_KEY"
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SIG_SUFFIX = ".sig"
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TRUST_RS = Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent / "crates/core/src/update/trust.rs"
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PIN_BEGIN = ">>> PINNED-KEYS >>>"
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PIN_END = "<<< PINNED-KEYS <<<"
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KID_RE = re.compile(r'key_id:\s*"([^"]+)"\s*,\s*public_key_hex:\s*"([0-9a-fA-F]{64})"')
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# Ed25519 (RFC 8032), reference-shaped implementation (same formulas as
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# `crates/core/src/update/ed25519/*`). Validated against the RFC 8032 §7.1 vectors in
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# `--self-test`; the Rust verifier is validated against the *same* vectors, so the two
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# implementations cross-check each other. No third-party dependency: CI needs no pip install.
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Q = 2**255 - 19
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L = 2**252 + 27742317777372353535851937790883648493
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def _inv(x: int) -> int:
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return pow(x, Q - 2, Q)
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D = -121665 * _inv(121666) % Q
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_D2 = 2 * D % Q
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_SQRT_M1 = pow(2, (Q - 1) // 4, Q)
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def _recover_x(y: int, sign: int) -> int | None:
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u = (y * y - 1) % Q
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v = (D * y * y + 1) % Q
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v3 = pow(v, 3, Q)
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v7 = pow(v, 7, Q)
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x = u * v3 % Q * pow(u * v7 % Q, (Q - 5) // 8, Q) % Q
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if (v * x * x - u) % Q != 0:
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x = x * _SQRT_M1 % Q
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if (v * x * x - u) % Q != 0:
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return None
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if x % 2 != sign:
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x = (Q - x) % Q
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return x
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def _decompress(data: bytes) -> tuple[int, int, int, int] | None:
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if len(data) != 32:
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return None
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y = int.from_bytes(data, "little")
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sign = (y >> 255) & 1
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y &= (1 << 255) - 1
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if y >= Q:
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return None
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x = _recover_x(y, sign)
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if x is None:
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return None
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return (x, y, 1, x * y % Q)
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def _add(p: tuple[int, int, int, int], r: tuple[int, int, int, int]):
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x1, y1, z1, t1 = p
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x2, y2, z2, t2 = r
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a = (y1 - x1) * (y2 - x2) % Q
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b = (y1 + x1) * (y2 + x2) % Q
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c = t1 * _D2 * t2 % Q
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d = 2 * z1 * z2 % Q
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e, f, g, h = (b - a) % Q, (d - c) % Q, (d + c) % Q, (b + a) % Q
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return (e * f % Q, g * h % Q, f * g % Q, e * h % Q)
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def _double(p: tuple[int, int, int, int]):
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x1, y1, z1, _ = p
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a = x1 * x1 % Q
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b = y1 * y1 % Q
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c = 2 * z1 * z1 % Q
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d = -a % Q
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e = ((x1 + y1) * (x1 + y1) - a - b) % Q
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g = (d + b) % Q
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f = (g - c) % Q
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h = (d - b) % Q
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return (e * f % Q, g * h % Q, f * g % Q, e * h % Q)
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def _scalarmult(p, e: int):
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acc = (0, 1, 1, 0)
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for bit in bin(e)[2:] if e else "":
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acc = _double(acc)
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if bit == "1":
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acc = _add(acc, p)
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return acc
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def _encode(p) -> bytes:
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x, y, z, _ = p
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zi = _inv(z)
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x, y = x * zi % Q, y * zi % Q
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return (y | ((x & 1) << 255)).to_bytes(32, "little")
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def _base():
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encoded = (4 * _inv(5) % Q).to_bytes(32, "little")
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return _decompress(encoded)
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def _hint(data: bytes) -> int:
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return int.from_bytes(hashlib.sha512(data).digest(), "little") % L
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def public_key(seed: bytes) -> bytes:
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h = hashlib.sha512(seed).digest()
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a = int.from_bytes(_clamp(bytearray(h[:32])), "little")
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return _encode(_scalarmult(_base(), a))
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def _clamp(scalar: bytearray) -> bytes:
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scalar[0] &= 248
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scalar[31] &= 127
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scalar[31] |= 64
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return bytes(scalar)
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def sign(seed: bytes, message: bytes) -> bytes:
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if len(seed) != 32:
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raise SystemExit("error: Ed25519 种子必须 32 字节")
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h = hashlib.sha512(seed).digest()
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a = int.from_bytes(_clamp(bytearray(h[:32])), "little")
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prefix = h[32:]
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r = _hint(prefix + message)
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r_encoded = _encode(_scalarmult(_base(), r))
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pk = _encode(_scalarmult(_base(), a))
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k = _hint(r_encoded + pk + message)
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s = (r + k * a) % L
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return r_encoded + s.to_bytes(32, "little")
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def verify(pk: bytes, message: bytes, signature: bytes) -> bool:
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if len(pk) != 32 or len(signature) != 64:
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return False
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r_bytes, s_bytes = signature[:32], signature[32:]
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if int.from_bytes(s_bytes, "little") >= L:
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return False
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a = _decompress(pk)
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r_point = _decompress(r_bytes)
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if a is None or r_point is None:
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return False
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k = _hint(r_bytes + pk + message)
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left = _scalarmult(_base(), int.from_bytes(s_bytes, "little"))
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return _encode(left) == _encode(_add(r_point, _scalarmult(a, k)))
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def load_key(text: str) -> tuple[str, bytes]:
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"""Parse the secret JSON (`{"key_id":…,"seed_hex":…}`) or a bare 64-char hex seed."""
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text = text.strip()
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try:
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payload = json.loads(text)
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except json.JSONDecodeError:
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payload = None
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if isinstance(payload, dict):
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key_id = str(payload.get("key_id", "")).strip()
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seed_hex = str(payload.get("seed_hex", "")).strip()
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else:
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key_id, seed_hex = "", text
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if not key_id:
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raise SystemExit("error: 密钥缺少 `key_id`（清单签名要靠它查信任表）")
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try:
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seed = bytes.fromhex(seed_hex)
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except ValueError as error:
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raise SystemExit(f"error: `seed_hex` 不是十六进制（{error}）") from error
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if len(seed) != 32:
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raise SystemExit(f"error: `seed_hex` 必须 32 字节（实际 {len(seed)}）")
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return key_id, seed
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def key_from_env_or_arg(path: str | None) -> tuple[str, bytes]:
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if path:
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secret = Path(path).read_text(encoding="utf-8")
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else:
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secret = os.environ.get(KEY_ENV, "")
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if not secret.strip():
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raise SystemExit(
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f"error: 没有签名密钥：设环境变量 {KEY_ENV}（内容 = --generate-key 打出来的那一行 JSON），"
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"或显式给 --key <文件>。**绝不**把私钥写进仓库/日志/产物。"
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)
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return load_key(secret)
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def pinned_keys(trust_text: str) -> list[tuple[str, str]]:
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"""Extract `(key_id, public_key_hex)` pairs between the PINNED-KEYS markers."""
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begin = trust_text.find(PIN_BEGIN)
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end = trust_text.find(PIN_END)
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if begin < 0 or end < 0 or end < begin:
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raise SystemExit(f"error: {TRUST_RS} 里找不到 {PIN_BEGIN} / {PIN_END} 标记")
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return KID_RE.findall(trust_text[begin:end])
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def do_generate_key(key_id: str) -> int:
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seed = os.urandom(32)
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pk = public_key(seed)
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pk_hex = pk.hex()
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if not verify(pk, b"self-check", sign(seed, b"self-check")):
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print("error: 自己签自己验不过——不要用这把钥", file=sys.stderr)
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return 1
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secret = json.dumps({"key_id": key_id, "seed_hex": seed.hex()}, ensure_ascii=False)
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print("# ① 私钥（**只**贴进仓库 Secret " + KEY_ENV + "，别写进任何文件/日志/提交）：")
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print(secret)
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print("# ② 公钥（贴进 crates/core/src/update/trust.rs 的 PINNED-KEYS 标记之间）：")
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print(f' PinnedKey {{ key_id: "{key_id}", public_key_hex: "{pk_hex}" }},')
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print(f"# 公钥十六进制：{pk_hex}")
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return 0
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def do_sign(manifest: Path, key_path: str | None, out: Path | None, key_id_override: str | None) -> int:
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if not manifest.is_file():
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print(f"error: 没有清单文件 {manifest}", file=sys.stderr)
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return 1
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raw = manifest.read_bytes()
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# 签的必须是**能解析**的清单：签一串垃圾只会把事故推迟到用户机器上。
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try:
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parsed = json.loads(raw.decode("utf-8"))
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except (UnicodeDecodeError, json.JSONDecodeError) as error:
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print(f"error: {manifest} 不是合法 JSON（{error}）", file=sys.stderr)
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return 1
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if not isinstance(parsed, dict) or "channel" not in parsed or "releases" not in parsed:
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print(f"error: {manifest} 不像发布清单（缺 channel/releases）", file=sys.stderr)
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return 1
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key_id, seed = key_from_env_or_arg(key_path)
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if key_id_override:
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key_id = key_id_override
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signature = sign(seed, raw)
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if not verify(public_key(seed), raw, signature):
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print("error: 签出来的签名自己验不过（实现有问题），拒绝落盘", file=sys.stderr)
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return 1
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envelope = {
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"format": FORMAT,
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"signatures": [
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{
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"alg": ALG,
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"key_id": key_id,
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"sig": signature.hex(),
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"manifest_sha256": hashlib.sha256(raw).hexdigest(),
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}
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],
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}
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out = out or manifest.with_name(manifest.name + SIG_SUFFIX)
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out.write_text(json.dumps(envelope, ensure_ascii=False, indent=2) + "\n", encoding="utf-8", newline="\n")
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print(f"signed: {manifest} → {out}")
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print(f" key_id = {key_id}")
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print(f" public_key = {public_key(seed).hex()}")
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print(f" manifest_sha256 = {envelope['signatures'][0]['manifest_sha256']}")
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return 0
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def do_verify(manifest: Path, sig: Path, public_key_hex: str) -> int:
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raw = manifest.read_bytes()
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envelope = json.loads(sig.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
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pk = bytes.fromhex(public_key_hex)
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for item in envelope.get("signatures", []):
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if item.get("alg") != ALG:
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continue
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if verify(pk, raw, bytes.fromhex(item.get("sig", ""))):
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print(f"ok: {sig} 里的签名（key_id={item.get('key_id')}）通过")
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return 0
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print("error: 没有任何一条签名能验过", file=sys.stderr)
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return 1
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def do_check_pinned(key_path: str | None) -> int:
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key_id, seed = key_from_env_or_arg(key_path)
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pk_hex = public_key(seed).hex()
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keys = pinned_keys(TRUST_RS.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
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if not keys:
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# 「说人话的红」：因为什么、缺什么、怎么补，一行一行写清楚（不涉密，只回显公钥）。
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print("error: 信任表是空的（fail-closed）：客户端一把公钥都没有，任何清单都验不过，所以拒绝发布。", file=sys.stderr)
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print(f"error: 本次签名钥 = key_id {key_id} / 公钥 {pk_hex}", file=sys.stderr)
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print("error: 补法：把这行贴进 crates/core/src/update/trust.rs 的 PINNED-KEYS 标记之间 ——", file=sys.stderr)
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print(f'error: PinnedKey {{ key_id: "{key_id}", public_key_hex: "{pk_hex}" }},', file=sys.stderr)
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print("error: 手册：packaging/docs/signing.md §3", file=sys.stderr)
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return 1
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for pinned_id, pinned_hex in keys:
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if pinned_hex.lower() == pk_hex:
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print(f"ok: 签名钥 {key_id} 已被钉住（trust.rs 里叫 {pinned_id}）")
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if pinned_id != key_id:
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print(
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f"warning: 同一个公钥在 trust.rs 里叫 {pinned_id}、密钥文件里叫 {key_id}；"
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"清单会带后者，客户端按**公钥字节**验签，所以两种写法都能过（但建议改名对齐）",
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file=sys.stderr,
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)
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return 0
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pinned_ids = [k[0] for k in keys]
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print(
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f"error: 签名钥（key_id={key_id} / 公钥={pk_hex}）不在信任表里 —— 签出来的清单没有任何客户端会认，所以拒绝发布。",
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file=sys.stderr,
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)
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print(f"error: trust.rs 现在钉的是：{pinned_ids}", file=sys.stderr)
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for pinned_id, pinned_hex in keys:
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print(f"error: {pinned_id} = {pinned_hex}", file=sys.stderr)
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print("error: 二选一：", file=sys.stderr)
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print("error: ① 用已钉住的那把钥签（换回对应的 Secret）；或", file=sys.stderr)
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print(
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"error: ② 换钥：把上面的公钥按「旧钥签新钥」贴进 crates/core/src/update/trust.rs 的 PINNED-KEYS 之间，"
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"并让本次清单同时带旧钥签名",
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file=sys.stderr,
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)
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print("error: 手册：packaging/docs/signing.md §3/§5", file=sys.stderr)
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return 1
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|
||||
def do_self_test() -> int:
|
||||
vectors = [
|
||||
("9d61b19deffd5a60ba844af492ec2cc44449c5697b326919703bac031cae7f60", "d75a980182b10ab7d54bfed3c964073a0ee172f3daa62325af021a68f707511a", "",
|
||||
"e5564300c360ac729086e2cc806e828a84877f1eb8e5d974d873e065224901555fb8821590a33bacc61e39701cf9b46bd25bf5f0595bbe24655141438e7a100b"),
|
||||
("4ccd089b28ff96da9db6c346ec114e0f5b8a319f35aba624da8cf6ed4fb8a6fb", "3d4017c3e843895a92b70aa74d1b7ebc9c982ccf2ec4968cc0cd55f12af4660c", "72",
|
||||
"92a009a9f0d4cab8720e820b5f642540a2b27b5416503f8fb3762223ebdb69da085ac1e43e15996e458f3613d0f11d8c387b2eaeb4302aeeb00d291612bb0c00"),
|
||||
("c5aa8df43f9f837bedb7442f31dcb7b166d38535076f094b85ce3a2e0b4458f7", "fc51cd8e6218a1a38da47ed00230f0580816ed13ba3303ac5deb911548908025", "af82",
|
||||
"6291d657deec24024827e69c3abe01a30ce548a284743a445e3680d7db5ac3ac18ff9b538d16f290ae67f760984dc6594a7c15e9716ed28dc027beceea1ec40a"),
|
||||
]
|
||||
failures = 0
|
||||
for index, (seed_hex, pk_hex, message_hex, sig_hex) in enumerate(vectors, 1):
|
||||
seed, pk, message = bytes.fromhex(seed_hex), bytes.fromhex(pk_hex), bytes.fromhex(message_hex)
|
||||
if public_key(seed).hex() != pk_hex:
|
||||
print(f"FAIL vector {index}: public key mismatch", file=sys.stderr)
|
||||
failures += 1
|
||||
if sign(seed, message).hex() != sig_hex:
|
||||
print(f"FAIL vector {index}: signature mismatch", file=sys.stderr)
|
||||
failures += 1
|
||||
if not verify(pk, message, bytes.fromhex(sig_hex)):
|
||||
print(f"FAIL vector {index}: verify rejected", file=sys.stderr)
|
||||
failures += 1
|
||||
tampered = bytearray(message)
|
||||
tampered.append(0)
|
||||
if verify(pk, bytes(tampered), bytes.fromhex(sig_hex)):
|
||||
print(f"FAIL vector {index}: tampered message still verifies", file=sys.stderr)
|
||||
failures += 1
|
||||
# 标记解析：信任表解析器必须在示例上命中一对，且在空表上返回空。
|
||||
sample = f'{PIN_BEGIN}\n PinnedKey {{ key_id: "k1", public_key_hex: "{"ab" * 32}" }},\n{PIN_END}'
|
||||
if pinned_keys(sample) != [("k1", "ab" * 32)]:
|
||||
print("FAIL: pinned_keys() 没解析出示例条目", file=sys.stderr)
|
||||
failures += 1
|
||||
if pinned_keys(f"{PIN_BEGIN}\n{PIN_END}") != []:
|
||||
print("FAIL: pinned_keys() 在空表上应返回空", file=sys.stderr)
|
||||
failures += 1
|
||||
print("self-test:", "ok" if failures == 0 else f"{failures} 处失败")
|
||||
return 0 if failures == 0 else 1
|
||||
|
||||
def main(argv: list[str] | None = None) -> int:
|
||||
parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description="更新清单的 Ed25519 签名/验签与信任表检查（M190）")
|
||||
parser.add_argument("--generate-key", action="store_true", help="生成一把新钥（打印 Secret 与 PinnedKey 片段）")
|
||||
parser.add_argument("--key-id", default="ull-release", help="生成/签名时用的 key_id")
|
||||
parser.add_argument("--sign", metavar="MANIFEST", type=Path, help="签这份清单（产出 <清单>.sig）")
|
||||
parser.add_argument("--out", metavar="SIG", type=Path, help="签名输出路径（默认 <清单>.sig）")
|
||||
parser.add_argument("--key", metavar="FILE", help=f"密钥文件（不给则读环境变量 {KEY_ENV}）")
|
||||
parser.add_argument("--verify", nargs=2, metavar=("MANIFEST", "SIG"), help="手工验一份签名")
|
||||
parser.add_argument("--public-key", metavar="HEX", help="--verify 用的公钥")
|
||||
parser.add_argument("--check-pinned-keyring", action="store_true", help="检查密钥是否已被钉进 trust.rs")
|
||||
parser.add_argument("--self-test", action="store_true", help="跑 RFC 8032 向量与解析器自检")
|
||||
args = parser.parse_args(argv)
|
||||
|
||||
if args.self_test:
|
||||
return do_self_test()
|
||||
if args.generate_key:
|
||||
return do_generate_key(args.key_id)
|
||||
if args.sign:
|
||||
return do_sign(args.sign, args.key, args.out, args.key_id if args.key_id != "ull-release" else None)
|
||||
if args.verify:
|
||||
if not args.public_key:
|
||||
print("error: --verify 需要 --public-key", file=sys.stderr)
|
||||
return 1
|
||||
return do_verify(Path(args.verify[0]), Path(args.verify[1]), args.public_key)
|
||||
if args.check_pinned_keyring:
|
||||
return do_check_pinned(args.key)
|
||||
parser.print_help()
|
||||
return 2
|
||||
|
||||
if __name__ == "__main__":
|
||||
raise SystemExit(main())
|
||||
Reference in new issue
Block a user