release: v0.2.4 里程碑快照（孤儿提交，无父；树 = dev 68362e5）

本批内容见 CHANGELOG.md 的 0.2.4 段。按 D41 用孤儿快照推 main，保留「公开史只有里程碑」的模型。

packaging/sign_manifest.py

@@ -0,0 +1,298 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+"""Sign / verify the update manifest, and check the pinned keyring (M190).
+
+Why Ed25519 + a **detached** `.sig`: the manifest's `sha256` only says "the package matches the
+manifest"; it says nothing about who wrote the manifest. A signature over the manifest's *exact
+bytes* answers that, and a separate file avoids JSON canonicalisation games (any byte change
+breaks the signature).
+
+Key discipline: the **private key** lives only in the repository Secret
+`ULL_MANIFEST_SIGNING_KEY` (never in git, logs or artifacts); the **public key** is pinned
+*inside the binary* — `crates/core/src/update/trust.rs`, between the `>>> PINNED-KEYS >>>` /
+`<<< PINNED-KEYS <<<` markers. `--check-pinned-keyring` fails the release when the secret's key
+is not pinned (a release signed with a key clients do not trust is worse than no release).
+Manual: `packaging/docs/signing.md`.
+
+Usage: `--generate-key [--key-id K]` / `--sign dist/manifest.json`（钥从环境变量
+`ULL_MANIFEST_SIGNING_KEY` 取）/ `--check-pinned-keyring`（钥必须已钉住）/ `--verify-pinned
+dist/manifest.json`（用 trust.rs 里钉的公钥回验产出，复现客户端判据）/ `--self-test`。
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import argparse
+import hashlib
+import json
+import os
+import re
+import sys
+from pathlib import Path
+
+FORMAT = 1
+ALG = "ed25519"
+KEY_ENV = "ULL_MANIFEST_SIGNING_KEY"
+SIG_SUFFIX = ".sig"
+TRUST_RS = Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent / "crates/core/src/update/trust.rs"
+PIN_BEGIN = ">>> PINNED-KEYS >>>"
+PIN_END = "<<< PINNED-KEYS <<<"
+KID_RE = re.compile(r'key_id:\s*"([^"]+)"\s*,\s*public_key_hex:\s*"([0-9a-fA-F]{64})"')
+# Ed25519 的参考实现搬到了 `packaging/ed25519_ref.py`（M190 r1：本文件贴着 400 行红线）。
+# 目的与路径都写在那边的文件头：发布侧签名必须零第三方依赖，而仓里验签用的是 ed25519-dalek ——
+# 两套实现互相独立，`--self-test` 用 RFC 8032 的同一组向量把两边各自钉住。
+sys.path.insert(0, str(Path(__file__).resolve().parent))
+
+from ed25519_ref import ALG, sign, verify, public_key  # noqa: E402
+
+def load_key(text: str) -> tuple[str, bytes]:
+    """Parse the secret JSON (`{"key_id":…,"seed_hex":…}`) or a bare 64-char hex seed."""
+    text = text.strip()
+    try:
+        payload = json.loads(text)
+    except json.JSONDecodeError:
+        payload = None
+    if isinstance(payload, dict):
+        key_id = str(payload.get("key_id", "")).strip()
+        seed_hex = str(payload.get("seed_hex", "")).strip()
+    else:
+        key_id, seed_hex = "", text
+    if not key_id:
+        raise SystemExit("error: 密钥缺少 `key_id`（清单签名要靠它查信任表）")
+    try:
+        seed = bytes.fromhex(seed_hex)
+    except ValueError as error:
+        raise SystemExit(f"error: `seed_hex` 不是十六进制（{error}）") from error
+    if len(seed) != 32:
+        raise SystemExit(f"error: `seed_hex` 必须 32 字节（实际 {len(seed)}）")
+    return key_id, seed
+
+def key_from_env_or_arg(path: str | None) -> tuple[str, bytes]:
+    if path:
+        secret = Path(path).read_text(encoding="utf-8")
+    else:
+        secret = os.environ.get(KEY_ENV, "")
+        if not secret.strip():
+            raise SystemExit(
+                f"error: 没有签名密钥：设环境变量 {KEY_ENV}（内容 = --generate-key 打出来的那一行 JSON），"
+                "或显式给 --key <文件>。**绝不**把私钥写进仓库/日志/产物。"
+            )
+    return load_key(secret)
+
+def pinned_keys(trust_text: str) -> list[tuple[str, str]]:
+    """Extract `(key_id, public_key_hex)` pairs between the PINNED-KEYS markers."""
+    begin = trust_text.find(PIN_BEGIN)
+    end = trust_text.find(PIN_END)
+    if begin < 0 or end < 0 or end < begin:
+        raise SystemExit(f"error: {TRUST_RS} 里找不到 {PIN_BEGIN} / {PIN_END} 标记")
+    return KID_RE.findall(trust_text[begin:end])
+
+
+
+def do_generate_key(key_id: str) -> int:
+    seed = os.urandom(32)
+    pk = public_key(seed)
+    pk_hex = pk.hex()
+    if not verify(pk, b"self-check", sign(seed, b"self-check")):
+        print("error: 自己签自己验不过——不要用这把钥", file=sys.stderr)
+        return 1
+    secret = json.dumps({"key_id": key_id, "seed_hex": seed.hex()}, ensure_ascii=False)
+    print("# ① 私钥（**只**贴进仓库 Secret " + KEY_ENV + "，别写进任何文件/日志/提交）：")
+    print(secret)
+    print("# ② 公钥（贴进 crates/core/src/update/trust.rs 的 PINNED-KEYS 标记之间）：")
+    print(f'    PinnedKey {{ key_id: "{key_id}", public_key_hex: "{pk_hex}" }},')
+    print(f"# 公钥十六进制：{pk_hex}")
+    return 0
+
+def do_sign(manifest: Path, key_path: str | None, out: Path | None, key_id_override: str | None) -> int:
+    if not manifest.is_file():
+        print(f"error: 没有清单文件 {manifest}", file=sys.stderr)
+        return 1
+    raw = manifest.read_bytes()
+    # 签的必须是**能解析**的清单：签一串垃圾只会把事故推迟到用户机器上。
+    try:
+        parsed = json.loads(raw.decode("utf-8"))
+    except (UnicodeDecodeError, json.JSONDecodeError) as error:
+        print(f"error: {manifest} 不是合法 JSON（{error}）", file=sys.stderr)
+        return 1
+    if not isinstance(parsed, dict) or "channel" not in parsed or "releases" not in parsed:
+        print(f"error: {manifest} 不像发布清单（缺 channel/releases）", file=sys.stderr)
+        return 1
+    key_id, seed = key_from_env_or_arg(key_path)
+    if key_id_override:
+        key_id = key_id_override
+    signature = sign(seed, raw)
+    if not verify(public_key(seed), raw, signature):
+        print("error: 签出来的签名自己验不过（实现有问题），拒绝落盘", file=sys.stderr)
+        return 1
+    envelope = {
+        "format": FORMAT,
+        "signatures": [
+            {
+                "alg": ALG,
+                "key_id": key_id,
+                "sig": signature.hex(),
+                "manifest_sha256": hashlib.sha256(raw).hexdigest(),
+            }
+        ],
+    }
+    out = out or manifest.with_name(manifest.name + SIG_SUFFIX)
+    out.write_text(json.dumps(envelope, ensure_ascii=False, indent=2) + "\n", encoding="utf-8", newline="\n")
+    print(f"signed: {manifest} → {out}")
+    print(f"  key_id          = {key_id}")
+    print(f"  public_key      = {public_key(seed).hex()}")
+    print(f"  manifest_sha256 = {envelope['signatures'][0]['manifest_sha256']}")
+    return 0
+
+def do_verify(manifest: Path, sig: Path, public_key_hex: str) -> int:
+    raw = manifest.read_bytes()
+    envelope = json.loads(sig.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
+    pk = bytes.fromhex(public_key_hex)
+    for item in envelope.get("signatures", []):
+        if item.get("alg") != ALG:
+            continue
+        if verify(pk, raw, bytes.fromhex(item.get("sig", ""))):
+            print(f"ok: {sig} 里的签名（key_id={item.get('key_id')}）通过")
+            return 0
+    print("error: 没有任何一条签名能验过", file=sys.stderr)
+    return 1
+
+def do_check_pinned(key_path: str | None) -> int:
+    key_id, seed = key_from_env_or_arg(key_path)
+    pk_hex = public_key(seed).hex()
+    keys = pinned_keys(TRUST_RS.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
+    if not keys:
+        # 「说人话的红」：因为什么、缺什么、怎么补，一行一行写清楚（不涉密，只回显公钥）。
+        print("error: 信任表是空的（fail-closed）：客户端一把公钥都没有，任何清单都验不过，所以拒绝发布。", file=sys.stderr)
+        print(f"error:   本次签名钥 = key_id {key_id} / 公钥 {pk_hex}", file=sys.stderr)
+        print("error:   补法：把这行贴进 crates/core/src/update/trust.rs 的 PINNED-KEYS 标记之间 ——", file=sys.stderr)
+        print(f'error:       PinnedKey {{ key_id: "{key_id}", public_key_hex: "{pk_hex}" }},', file=sys.stderr)
+        print("error:   手册：packaging/docs/signing.md §3", file=sys.stderr)
+        return 1
+    for pinned_id, pinned_hex in keys:
+        if pinned_hex.lower() == pk_hex:
+            print(f"ok: 签名钥 {key_id} 已被钉住（trust.rs 里叫 {pinned_id}）")
+            if pinned_id != key_id:
+                print(
+                    f"warning: 同一个公钥在 trust.rs 里叫 {pinned_id}、密钥文件里叫 {key_id}；"
+                    "清单会带后者，客户端按**公钥字节**验签，所以两种写法都能过（但建议改名对齐）",
+                    file=sys.stderr,
+                )
+            return 0
+    pinned_ids = [k[0] for k in keys]
+    print(
+        f"error: 签名钥（key_id={key_id} / 公钥={pk_hex}）不在信任表里 —— 签出来的清单没有任何客户端会认，所以拒绝发布。",
+        file=sys.stderr,
+    )
+    print(f"error:   trust.rs 现在钉的是：{pinned_ids}", file=sys.stderr)
+    for pinned_id, pinned_hex in keys:
+        print(f"error:     {pinned_id} = {pinned_hex}", file=sys.stderr)
+    print("error:   二选一：", file=sys.stderr)
+    print("error:   ① 用已钉住的那把钥签（换回对应的 Secret）；或", file=sys.stderr)
+    print(
+        "error:   ② 换钥：把上面的公钥按「旧钥签新钥」贴进 crates/core/src/update/trust.rs 的 PINNED-KEYS 之间，"
+        "并让本次清单同时带旧钥签名",
+        file=sys.stderr,
+    )
+    print("error:   手册：packaging/docs/signing.md §3/§5", file=sys.stderr)
+    return 1
+
+def do_verify_pinned(manifest: Path) -> int:
+    """用 trust.rs 里钉住的公钥回验 `<manifest>.sig` —— 复现「客户端会怎么判」，不需要私钥。"""
+    keys = pinned_keys(TRUST_RS.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
+    if not keys:
+        print("error: 信任表是空的，无从回验（先钉公钥，见 --check-pinned-keyring）", file=sys.stderr)
+        return 1
+    sig_path = manifest.with_name(manifest.name + SIG_SUFFIX)
+    if not sig_path.is_file():
+        print(f"error: 没有签名文件 {sig_path}", file=sys.stderr)
+        return 1
+    raw = manifest.read_bytes()
+    envelope = json.loads(sig_path.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
+    for item in envelope.get("signatures", []):
+        if item.get("alg") != ALG:
+            continue
+        try:
+            signature = bytes.fromhex(item.get("sig", ""))
+        except ValueError:
+            continue
+        for pinned_id, pinned_hex in keys:
+            if verify(bytes.fromhex(pinned_hex), raw, signature):
+                print(f"ok: {sig_path.name} 用钉住的公钥 {pinned_id} 能验过（客户端会接受）")
+                return 0
+    print(
+        "error: 拿 trust.rs 里钉住的公钥回验不过 —— 这份 Release 的用户会全部拒装。别发版",
+        file=sys.stderr,
+    )
+    return 1
+
+
+def do_self_test() -> int:
+    vectors = [
+        ("9d61b19deffd5a60ba844af492ec2cc44449c5697b326919703bac031cae7f60", "d75a980182b10ab7d54bfed3c964073a0ee172f3daa62325af021a68f707511a", "",
+         "e5564300c360ac729086e2cc806e828a84877f1eb8e5d974d873e065224901555fb8821590a33bacc61e39701cf9b46bd25bf5f0595bbe24655141438e7a100b"),
+        ("4ccd089b28ff96da9db6c346ec114e0f5b8a319f35aba624da8cf6ed4fb8a6fb", "3d4017c3e843895a92b70aa74d1b7ebc9c982ccf2ec4968cc0cd55f12af4660c", "72",
+         "92a009a9f0d4cab8720e820b5f642540a2b27b5416503f8fb3762223ebdb69da085ac1e43e15996e458f3613d0f11d8c387b2eaeb4302aeeb00d291612bb0c00"),
+        ("c5aa8df43f9f837bedb7442f31dcb7b166d38535076f094b85ce3a2e0b4458f7", "fc51cd8e6218a1a38da47ed00230f0580816ed13ba3303ac5deb911548908025", "af82",
+         "6291d657deec24024827e69c3abe01a30ce548a284743a445e3680d7db5ac3ac18ff9b538d16f290ae67f760984dc6594a7c15e9716ed28dc027beceea1ec40a"),
+    ]
+    failures = 0
+    for index, (seed_hex, pk_hex, message_hex, sig_hex) in enumerate(vectors, 1):
+        seed, pk, message = bytes.fromhex(seed_hex), bytes.fromhex(pk_hex), bytes.fromhex(message_hex)
+        if public_key(seed).hex() != pk_hex:
+            print(f"FAIL vector {index}: public key mismatch", file=sys.stderr)
+            failures += 1
+        if sign(seed, message).hex() != sig_hex:
+            print(f"FAIL vector {index}: signature mismatch", file=sys.stderr)
+            failures += 1
+        if not verify(pk, message, bytes.fromhex(sig_hex)):
+            print(f"FAIL vector {index}: verify rejected", file=sys.stderr)
+            failures += 1
+        tampered = bytearray(message)
+        tampered.append(0)
+        if verify(pk, bytes(tampered), bytes.fromhex(sig_hex)):
+            print(f"FAIL vector {index}: tampered message still verifies", file=sys.stderr)
+            failures += 1
+    # 标记解析：信任表解析器必须在示例上命中一对，且在空表上返回空。
+    sample = f'{PIN_BEGIN}\n    PinnedKey {{ key_id: "k1", public_key_hex: "{"ab" * 32}" }},\n{PIN_END}'
+    if pinned_keys(sample) != [("k1", "ab" * 32)]:
+        print("FAIL: pinned_keys() 没解析出示例条目", file=sys.stderr)
+        failures += 1
+    if pinned_keys(f"{PIN_BEGIN}\n{PIN_END}") != []:
+        print("FAIL: pinned_keys() 在空表上应返回空", file=sys.stderr)
+        failures += 1
+    print("self-test:", "ok" if failures == 0 else f"{failures} 处失败")
+    return 0 if failures == 0 else 1
+
+def main(argv: list[str] | None = None) -> int:
+    parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description="更新清单的 Ed25519 签名/验签与信任表检查（M190）")
+    parser.add_argument("--generate-key", action="store_true", help="生成一把新钥（打印 Secret 与 PinnedKey 片段）")
+    parser.add_argument("--key-id", default="ull-release", help="生成/签名时用的 key_id")
+    parser.add_argument("--sign", metavar="MANIFEST", type=Path, help="签这份清单（产出 <清单>.sig）")
+    parser.add_argument("--out", metavar="SIG", type=Path, help="签名输出路径（默认 <清单>.sig）")
+    parser.add_argument("--key", metavar="FILE", help=f"密钥文件（不给则读环境变量 {KEY_ENV}）")
+    parser.add_argument("--verify", nargs=2, metavar=("MANIFEST", "SIG"), help="手工验一份签名")
+    parser.add_argument("--public-key", metavar="HEX", help="--verify 用的公钥")
+    parser.add_argument("--check-pinned-keyring", action="store_true", help="检查密钥是否已被钉进 trust.rs")
+    parser.add_argument("--verify-pinned", metavar="MANIFEST", type=Path, help="用 trust.rs 里钉的公钥回验产出")
+    parser.add_argument("--self-test", action="store_true", help="跑 RFC 8032 向量与解析器自检")
+    args = parser.parse_args(argv)
+
+    if args.self_test:
+        return do_self_test()
+    if args.generate_key:
+        return do_generate_key(args.key_id)
+    if args.sign:
+        return do_sign(args.sign, args.key, args.out, args.key_id if args.key_id != "ull-release" else None)
+    if args.verify:
+        if not args.public_key:
+            print("error: --verify 需要 --public-key", file=sys.stderr)
+            return 1
+        return do_verify(Path(args.verify[0]), Path(args.verify[1]), args.public_key)
+    if args.check_pinned_keyring:
+        return do_check_pinned(args.key)
+    if args.verify_pinned:
+        return do_verify_pinned(args.verify_pinned)
+    parser.print_help()
+    return 2
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    raise SystemExit(main())