Files
Cyrene_v2/internal/auth/jwt.go
T

145 lines
4.1 KiB
Go

package auth
import (
"crypto/hmac"
"crypto/sha256"
"encoding/base64"
"encoding/json"
"fmt"
"log/slog"
"strings"
"time"
"git.yeij.top/AskaEth/Cyrene_v2/internal/config"
"git.yeij.top/AskaEth/Cyrene_v2/internal/logger"
)
// Claims is the verified JWT payload.
type Claims struct {
Sub string `json:"sub"`
Role Role `json:"role"`
Exp int64 `json:"exp"`
IssuedAt int64 `json:"iat"`
}
// jwtHeader is the JOSE header for the HS256 tokens this package emits.
type jwtHeader struct {
Alg string `json:"alg"`
Typ string `json:"typ"`
}
// JWTService signs and verifies HS256 JWTs using a shared secret.
type JWTService struct {
secret []byte
log *slog.Logger
}
// New validates cfg and returns a JWTService. It panics when JWTSecret is
// shorter than 32 characters so a misconfiguration fails fast at startup.
func New(cfg config.AuthConfig) *JWTService {
if err := Validate(cfg); err != nil {
panic(err)
}
return &JWTService{
secret: []byte(cfg.JWTSecret),
log: logger.WithSource(slog.Default(), source),
}
}
// Validate checks that cfg satisfies the auth package's configuration
// requirements, returning ErrInvalidSecret when JWTSecret is too short.
func Validate(cfg config.AuthConfig) error {
if len(cfg.JWTSecret) < minSecretLen {
return ErrInvalidSecret
}
return nil
}
// Sign issues an HS256 token for sub with the given role and lifetime.
func (s *JWTService) Sign(sub string, role Role, ttl time.Duration) (string, error) {
if !role.Valid() {
return "", fmt.Errorf("%w: %q", ErrInvalidRole, role)
}
now := time.Now().Unix()
claims := Claims{
Sub: sub,
Role: role,
IssuedAt: now,
Exp: now + int64(ttl.Seconds()),
}
headerB64, err := marshalB64(jwtHeader{Alg: "HS256", Typ: "JWT"})
if err != nil {
return "", fmt.Errorf("auth: encode header: %w", err)
}
payloadB64, err := marshalB64(claims)
if err != nil {
return "", fmt.Errorf("auth: encode payload: %w", err)
}
signingInput := headerB64 + "." + payloadB64
sig := hmacSign(s.secret, []byte(signingInput))
return signingInput + "." + base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(sig), nil
}
// Verify validates the token signature, algorithm, role, and expiry, returning
// the parsed Claims on success.
func (s *JWTService) Verify(token string) (*Claims, error) {
parts := strings.Split(token, ".")
if len(parts) != 3 {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: expected 3 segments", ErrMalformedToken)
}
headerB64, payloadB64, sigB64 := parts[0], parts[1], parts[2]
signingInput := headerB64 + "." + payloadB64
provided, err := base64.RawURLEncoding.DecodeString(sigB64)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: decode signature: %v", ErrMalformedToken, err)
}
if !hmac.Equal(provided, hmacSign(s.secret, []byte(signingInput))) {
return nil, ErrInvalidSignature
}
headerJSON, err := base64.RawURLEncoding.DecodeString(headerB64)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: decode header: %v", ErrMalformedToken, err)
}
var hdr jwtHeader
if err := json.Unmarshal(headerJSON, &hdr); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: decode header: %v", ErrMalformedToken, err)
}
if hdr.Alg != "HS256" {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: %q", ErrUnsupportedAlg, hdr.Alg)
}
payloadJSON, err := base64.RawURLEncoding.DecodeString(payloadB64)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: decode payload: %v", ErrMalformedToken, err)
}
var claims Claims
if err := json.Unmarshal(payloadJSON, &claims); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: decode payload: %v", ErrMalformedToken, err)
}
if !claims.Role.Valid() {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: %q", ErrInvalidRole, claims.Role)
}
if claims.Exp > 0 && time.Now().Unix() >= claims.Exp {
return nil, ErrTokenExpired
}
return &claims, nil
}
// marshalB64 JSON-encodes v and base64url-encodes the result without padding.
func marshalB64(v any) (string, error) {
b, err := json.Marshal(v)
if err != nil {
return "", err
}
return base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(b), nil
}
// hmacSign returns the HS256 HMAC of input under secret.
func hmacSign(secret, input []byte) []byte {
h := hmac.New(sha256.New, secret)
h.Write(input)
return h.Sum(nil)
}