Files
Cyrene_v2/internal/runtime/loop/request.go
T
AskaEth 38a403afca
CI / Backend (build / vet / test / cross-compile) (push) Has been cancelled
CI / Frontend (tsc + vite build) (push) Has been cancelled
feat(persona,model,loop): 人格 thinking 配置 + 5 个死字段接线 + 推理旋钮(按 provider 映射)
按 DevDocs/design/01 §2.1/§2.2 与 design/04 §3.2 实现(规格含联网核过的官方依据:思考内容刻意不角色化、不写分步思考指令、思考控制只走参数级)。
- 人格 schema 新增 thinking:budgetTokens / effort / showToUser(*bool,省略=nil=保持现行为,显式 false=只落库) / mode(default|on|off→Enable 三态);非法 mode/负预算 → ErrInvalidThinking(不静默)
- 5 个死字段接上注入:personality→values→speechStyle→catchphrase→background 拼为独立段落(带【】小标题,空值不拼);**全空时输出与旧实现逐字节一致**(有专门测试)
- model.Request 新增 Thinking{ BudgetTokens, Enable } 与 ReasoningEffort;新增 model/reasoning.go:厂商识别(模型名→baseURL 兜底)、取值白名单(OpenAI 系 none…max / DeepSeek low|high|max)、非法值降级+WARN、**不支持一律 WARN 而非静默**;Anthropic 映射 thinking{budget_tokens} 并**保证 budget<max_tokens**(不足时抬高 max_tokens+WARN,正是历史上思考吃光预算→空回复那个坑)
- loop:新增 Options.ThinkingShowToUser(*bool) 仅门控 thinking_* 帧(正文/工具帧不受影响);场景级 mute 语义不变
- 补一处任务清单外但必需的接线:persona→model.Request 的 thinking 映射(否则 budget/effort/mode 会变成新的死字段);showToUser 刻意不产生 Thinking(纯呈现开关)
- 管理端:personaUpsertRequest 补 thinking DTO + 校验(400);PUT 省略时**保留已存块**(防旧客户端抹配置);写侧 yaml round-trip 已验证
- Docs/api-client v0.40→v0.41(可选请求字段)
- 测试:26 个新用例(loader 解析/拼接逐字节/映射、anthropic 非流式+流式预算约束、openai 透传/降级/丢弃、Qwen 诚实 WARN、loop 门控、DTO round-trip);3 次变异验证(省略与 false 混同 / 去掉预算约束 / 短路门控 各自 FAIL)
- 验收:go build/vet/test 全绿(含 57 包)+ linux/darwin 交叉编译 + 前端 build;唯一 FAIL 是既有 flake TestInterruptCancelsTurnAndClearsPending(3/20 新代码 vs 3/20 纯 HEAD,已归因非本次引入)
2026-10-03 19:54:22 +08:00

176 lines
6.1 KiB
Go

package loop
import (
"context"
"git.yeij.top/AskaEth/Cyrene_v2/internal/runtime/agent"
"git.yeij.top/AskaEth/Cyrene_v2/internal/runtime/capacity"
"git.yeij.top/AskaEth/Cyrene_v2/internal/runtime/model"
)
// buildRequest assembles a model.Request from the agent's public surface,
// mirroring agent.buildRequest so the streaming path behaves identically to
// RunStep (leading instruction message, tool schemas, model routing).
func (l *Loop) buildRequest(ctx context.Context, messages []model.Message) model.Request {
req := model.Request{
Model: l.agent.Model(),
Messages: l.assembleMessages(messages),
Temperature: l.temperature(),
MaxTokens: l.agent.MaxTokens(),
Purpose: l.agent.Purpose(),
Tools: l.toolSchemas(ctx, messages),
Thinking: l.thinking,
ReasoningEffort: l.reasoningEffort,
}
if l.agent.Router() != nil {
if m, _ := l.agent.Router().RouteRequest(req); m != "" {
req.Model = m
}
}
return req
}
// assembleMessages prepends the agent's instructions as a leading system message
// when they are non-empty, otherwise returns the input slice unchanged.
func (l *Loop) assembleMessages(messages []model.Message) []model.Message {
instr := l.agent.Instructions()
if instr == "" {
return messages
}
out := make([]model.Message, 0, len(messages)+1)
out = append(out, model.TextMessage(model.RoleSystem, instr))
out = append(out, messages...)
return out
}
// temperature returns a pointer to the configured temperature, mapping zero to
// nil so the provider default applies (matching the agent package).
func (l *Loop) temperature() *float64 {
t := l.agent.Temperature()
if t == 0 {
return nil
}
return &t
}
// toolSchemas advertises the registered tool schemas to the model, or nil when no
// dispatcher is configured. When a capacity decider is wired and enabled, it
// classifies the current round and returns only the allowed set for that state
// (a view over the dispatcher, per design/14 §4): the model sees/invokes only
// the allowed tools, while Invoke itself stays unblocked. A nil or disabled
// decider keeps the pre-existing behavior (every tool advertised).
//
// The design/11 §3 security gate runs last over whatever the capacity view left:
// in a group/stranger environment only tools whose editable marker allows that
// environment are advertised (default closed), and the owner environment keeps
// the full set. Security is a hard red line, not a convenience hint, so it can
// only shrink the surface — it never re-admits a tool capacity excluded.
func (l *Loop) toolSchemas(ctx context.Context, messages []model.Message) []model.ToolSpec {
d := l.dispatcher()
if d == nil {
return nil
}
schemas := d.ToolSchemas()
if l.capacity == nil || !l.capacity.Enabled() {
return l.restrictSchemas(ctx, d, schemas)
}
names := make([]string, 0, len(schemas))
for _, s := range schemas {
names = append(names, s.Name)
}
acc := capState(ctx)
dec := l.capacity.Decide(ctx, capacity.Input{
Messages: capacityTexts(messages),
CurrentState: acc.state,
AllToolNames: names,
Recall: l.capacityRecall(ctx, messages),
})
acc.state = dec.State
if l.onCapacity != nil && !isMutedBroadcast(ctx) {
sessionID := loopSession(ctx)
for _, ev := range dec.Events {
ev.SessionID = sessionID
l.onCapacity(ev)
}
}
allowed := make(map[string]bool, len(dec.AllowedTools))
for _, n := range dec.AllowedTools {
allowed[n] = true
}
out := make([]model.ToolSpec, 0, len(dec.AllowedTools))
for _, s := range schemas {
if allowed[s.Name] {
out = append(out, s)
}
}
return l.restrictSchemas(ctx, d, out)
}
// capacityTexts extracts the recent conversation text for the capacity decider:
// the last few non-system/non-tool turns, in chronological order (oldest first),
// so the decider's current-turn window sees the latest user message last.
func capacityTexts(messages []model.Message) []string {
texts := make([]string, 0, 6)
for i := len(messages) - 1; i >= 0 && len(texts) < 6; i-- {
m := messages[i]
if m.Role == model.RoleSystem || m.Role == model.RoleTool {
continue
}
if t := messageText(m); t != "" {
texts = append(texts, t)
}
}
for i, j := 0, len(texts)-1; i < j; i, j = i+1, j-1 {
texts[i], texts[j] = texts[j], texts[i]
}
return texts
}
// capacityRecallTopK bounds how many recalled habit memories the capacity L4 layer
// considers per round.
const capacityRecallTopK = 5
// capacityRecall retrieves the owner's relevant long-term memories for the capacity
// L4 habit-alignment layer (design §2.2 L4), the memory feed that lets the decider
// learn the user's task-expression habits. It returns nil (keeping L4 silent) when
// no retriever/persona is configured — backward compatible — or in a restricted
// (group chat / stranger) context, per the isolation red line: L4 learns the owner's
// habits and must never read owner-sensitive memory into a group or stranger intent
// decision (design §2.2 红线: 不读陌生人敏感).
func (l *Loop) capacityRecall(ctx context.Context, messages []model.Message) []capacity.RecallItem {
if l.retriever == nil || l.personaID == "" {
return nil
}
env := sessionEnvFrom(ctx)
if env.Restricted() {
return nil
}
results, err := l.retriever.Retrieve(ctx, l.personaID, queryFromMessages(messages), capacityRecallTopK)
if err != nil {
l.log.Warn("capacity recall", "error", err, "env", env.ActorEnv)
return nil
}
items := make([]capacity.RecallItem, 0, len(results))
for _, r := range results {
items = append(items, capacity.RecallItem{
Content: r.Item.Content,
Scope: string(r.Item.Scope),
Kind: string(r.Item.Kind),
Tags: r.Item.Tags,
Score: r.Score,
})
}
return items
}
// decodeToolCalls decodes tool calls from a model.Response via the agent's shared
// decoder, so the streaming and non-streaming paths agree on the provider-native
// tool calls the adapters emit (Anthropic tool_use / OpenAI tool_calls) as well
// as the legacy JSON-envelope convention. It reports ok=true (with a non-empty
// slice) when a call is decoded.
func decodeToolCalls(resp model.Response) ([]agent.ToolCall, bool) {
return agent.ExtractToolCalls(resp)
}