#1 工具布尔标记生效(agent-106, 安全红线): loop toolSchemas/runToolCalls 加 allow-set 安全门 restrictSchemas/applyToolSecurityGate——群聊/陌生人只暴露允许工具(默认关), 被拒not_allowed软提示+AuditEvent, owner全工具不变; 身份靠 ActorEnv(非提示词) #2 checkpoint 恢复(agent-109): run.go LoadLatest + resumableStopReason门控(只恢复in-flight工具循环,不出答案不续跑), 幂等不重放副作用, 新会话不误恢复; resume_test 4用例 #3 tool_result(agent-108, 协议层): Anthropic 原生tool_result块(tool_use_id/is_error)非user纯文本 + OpenAI tool消息补tool_call_id; Content加ToolCallID/IsError等; (loop接线层2处留待,见备注) #6 capacity_awaken推送(agent-107): onCapacity从只Debug改推WS hub(BroadcastCapacityAwaken, sessionId定向+payload对齐前端AwakenPayload) 管理面板移动端(agent-110): AdminApp 汉堡菜单+抽屉侧栏+标题truncate防换行, RBAC守卫不受影响 全仓 build/vet/test绿 + 前端build绿; 前端无涉差异已对齐 备注: #3 loop接线层2处(assistant工具轮append历史 + Message.ToolCallID/IsError)留给后续; #4代审/#5子代理触发/#7拆文件后置(主人说后三不急)
245 lines
9.1 KiB
Go
245 lines
9.1 KiB
Go
package loop
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import (
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"context"
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"strings"
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"sync"
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"testing"
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"git.yeij.top/AskaEth/Cyrene_v2/internal/capability/registry"
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"git.yeij.top/AskaEth/Cyrene_v2/internal/capability/restrict"
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"git.yeij.top/AskaEth/Cyrene_v2/internal/runtime/model"
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"git.yeij.top/AskaEth/Cyrene_v2/internal/runtime/tool"
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)
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// newPolicyDispatcher builds a fresh registry + dispatcher and registers one
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// mock tool per name, returning both so a test can set the group/stranger
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// markers on the registry before exercising the design/11 §3 security gate.
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func newPolicyDispatcher(t *testing.T, names []string) (*registry.Registry, *tool.Dispatcher) {
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t.Helper()
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reg := registry.New()
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d, err := tool.New(reg)
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("tool.New: %v", err)
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}
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for _, name := range names {
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if err := d.Register(&mockTool{name: name}); err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("Register %q: %v", name, err)
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}
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}
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return reg, d
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}
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// expectToolNames asserts got carries exactly the tool names in want, any order.
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// The registry List iterates a map, so registration order is not preserved;
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// a set comparison keeps these assertions order-independent.
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func expectToolNames(t *testing.T, got []model.ToolSpec, want ...string) {
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t.Helper()
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if len(got) != len(want) {
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t.Fatalf("tool schema count = %d, want %d (%v)", len(got), len(want), want)
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}
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wantSet := make(map[string]bool, len(want))
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for _, n := range want {
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wantSet[n] = true
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}
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for _, s := range got {
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if !wantSet[s.Name] {
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t.Fatalf("unexpected tool %q in schemas %v", s.Name, toolNames(got))
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}
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}
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}
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// TestToolSchemas_RestrictedEnv_FiltersByMarkers proves a group/stranger session
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// is only shown the tools whose editable marker allows that environment, while
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// the owner session keeps the full set (design/11 §3).
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func TestToolSchemas_RestrictedEnv_FiltersByMarkers(t *testing.T) {
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t.Parallel()
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reg, d := newPolicyDispatcher(t, []string{"groupOnly", "strangerOnly", "both", "ownerOnly"})
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mustSetPolicy(t, reg, "groupOnly", registry.ToolPolicy{AllowInGroup: true})
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mustSetPolicy(t, reg, "strangerOnly", registry.ToolPolicy{AllowInStranger: true})
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mustSetPolicy(t, reg, "both", registry.ToolPolicy{AllowInGroup: true, AllowInStranger: true})
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// ownerOnly stays default-closed (zero marker).
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l := New(Options{Tools: d})
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group := l.toolSchemas(WithSessionEnv(context.Background(),
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SessionEnv{ActorEnv: restrict.ActorGroupMember, MemWritable: false}), nil)
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expectToolNames(t, group, "groupOnly", "both")
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stranger := l.toolSchemas(WithSessionEnv(context.Background(),
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SessionEnv{ActorEnv: restrict.ActorStranger, MemWritable: false}), nil)
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expectToolNames(t, stranger, "strangerOnly", "both")
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owner := l.toolSchemas(WithSessionEnv(context.Background(), OwnerEnv()), nil)
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expectToolNames(t, owner, "groupOnly", "strangerOnly", "both", "ownerOnly")
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}
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// TestToolSchemas_DefaultClosed_UnmarkedToolHidden proves the defaulted-closed
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// marker: an unmarked tool is not advertised to a group/stranger session, so a
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// session cannot even see (let alone call) an owner-only capability.
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func TestToolSchemas_DefaultClosed_UnmarkedToolHidden(t *testing.T) {
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t.Parallel()
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reg, d := newPolicyDispatcher(t, []string{"secret", "shared"})
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// Only shared is opened to groups; secret is default-closed.
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mustSetPolicy(t, reg, "shared", registry.ToolPolicy{AllowInGroup: true})
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l := New(Options{Tools: d})
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ctx := WithSessionEnv(context.Background(),
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SessionEnv{ActorEnv: restrict.ActorGroupMember, MemWritable: false})
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expectToolNames(t, l.toolSchemas(ctx, nil), "shared")
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}
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// TestRun_Restricted_NotAllowed_BlockedAndAudited proves a group session calling
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// an owner-only tool never executes it: the call is fed back as a soft
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// not_allowed result (no panic/crash) and an AuditEvent is recorded for the
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// rejection.
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func TestRun_Restricted_NotAllowed_BlockedAndAudited(t *testing.T) {
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t.Parallel()
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call := `{"tool_calls":[{"name":"ownerOnly","args":{}}]}`
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ad := &mockAdapter{chat: []mgResp{
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{resp: model.Response{Content: call}},
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{resp: model.Response{Content: "done"}},
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}}
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reg, d := newPolicyDispatcher(t, []string{"ownerOnly", "shared"})
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mustSetPolicy(t, reg, "shared", registry.ToolPolicy{AllowInGroup: true})
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a := newTestAgent(t, ad, d)
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var mu sync.Mutex
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var audited []AuditEvent
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l := New(Options{Agent: a, MaxRounds: 8, OnAudit: func(ev AuditEvent) {
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mu.Lock()
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audited = append(audited, ev)
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mu.Unlock()
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}})
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ctx := WithSessionEnv(context.Background(),
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SessionEnv{ActorEnv: restrict.ActorGroupMember, MemWritable: false})
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res, err := l.Run(ctx, "sess", []model.Message{model.TextMessage(model.RoleUser, "go")})
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("Run: %v", err)
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}
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if res.Text != "done" {
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t.Fatalf("Text = %q, want done", res.Text)
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}
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if res.ToolCallsExecuted != 0 {
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t.Fatalf("ToolCallsExecuted = %d, want 0 (ownerOnly blocked in group)", res.ToolCallsExecuted)
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}
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last := ad.reqs[len(ad.reqs)-1].Messages
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lastMsg := last[len(last)-1]
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if !strings.Contains(lastMsg.Content[0].Text, "not_allowed") ||
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!strings.Contains(lastMsg.Content[0].Text, "ownerOnly") {
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t.Fatalf("expected not_allowed soft result, got %q", lastMsg.Content[0].Text)
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}
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mu.Lock()
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defer mu.Unlock()
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if len(audited) != 1 {
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t.Fatalf("audit events = %d, want 1", len(audited))
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}
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if audited[0].What != auditToolRejectNotAllowed {
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t.Fatalf("audit what = %q, want %q", audited[0].What, auditToolRejectNotAllowed)
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}
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if audited[0].Who != string(restrict.ActorGroupMember) {
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t.Fatalf("audit who = %q, want %q", audited[0].Who, restrict.ActorGroupMember)
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}
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if !strings.Contains(audited[0].Result, "ownerOnly") {
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t.Fatalf("audit result = %q, want to name ownerOnly", audited[0].Result)
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}
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}
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// TestRun_Restricted_AllowedTool_Executes proves a group session may invoke a
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// tool whose AllowInGroup marker is set, and that it runs normally.
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func TestRun_Restricted_AllowedTool_Executes(t *testing.T) {
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t.Parallel()
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call := `{"tool_calls":[{"name":"shared","args":{"q":"hi"}}]}`
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ad := &mockAdapter{chat: []mgResp{
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{resp: model.Response{Content: call}},
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{resp: model.Response{Content: "done"}},
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}}
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reg, d := newPolicyDispatcher(t, []string{"shared", "ownerOnly"})
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mustSetPolicy(t, reg, "shared", registry.ToolPolicy{AllowInGroup: true})
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a := newTestAgent(t, ad, d)
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l := New(Options{Agent: a, MaxRounds: 8})
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ctx := WithSessionEnv(context.Background(),
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SessionEnv{ActorEnv: restrict.ActorGroupMember, MemWritable: false})
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res, err := l.Run(ctx, "sess", []model.Message{model.TextMessage(model.RoleUser, "go")})
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("Run: %v", err)
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}
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if res.ToolCallsExecuted != 1 {
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t.Fatalf("ToolCallsExecuted = %d, want 1 (shared allowed in group)", res.ToolCallsExecuted)
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}
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if res.Text != "done" {
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t.Fatalf("Text = %q, want done", res.Text)
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}
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}
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// TestRun_Owner_AllToolsExecute proves the owner environment is unaffected by the
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// default-closed marker: the owner may invoke an owner-only (unmarked) tool.
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func TestRun_Owner_AllToolsExecute(t *testing.T) {
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t.Parallel()
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call := `{"tool_calls":[{"name":"ownerOnly","args":{}}]}`
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ad := &mockAdapter{chat: []mgResp{
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{resp: model.Response{Content: call}},
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{resp: model.Response{Content: "done"}},
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}}
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_, d := newPolicyDispatcher(t, []string{"ownerOnly"})
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// Default-closed marker (never opened): owner must still be able to call it.
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a := newTestAgent(t, ad, d)
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l := New(Options{Agent: a, MaxRounds: 8})
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res, err := l.Run(WithSessionEnv(context.Background(), OwnerEnv()), "sess",
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[]model.Message{model.TextMessage(model.RoleUser, "go")})
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("Run: %v", err)
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}
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if res.ToolCallsExecuted != 1 {
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t.Fatalf("ToolCallsExecuted = %d, want 1 (owner unaffected by default-closed)", res.ToolCallsExecuted)
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}
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if res.Text != "done" {
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t.Fatalf("Text = %q, want done", res.Text)
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}
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}
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// TestRun_Stranger_NotAllowed_Blocked proves the gate also applies to the
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// stranger private-chat environment, and that a group-only tool is denied there.
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func TestRun_Stranger_NotAllowed_Blocked(t *testing.T) {
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t.Parallel()
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call := `{"tool_calls":[{"name":"groupOnly","args":{}}]}`
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ad := &mockAdapter{chat: []mgResp{
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{resp: model.Response{Content: call}},
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{resp: model.Response{Content: "done"}},
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}}
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reg, d := newPolicyDispatcher(t, []string{"groupOnly", "strangerOk"})
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mustSetPolicy(t, reg, "groupOnly", registry.ToolPolicy{AllowInGroup: true})
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mustSetPolicy(t, reg, "strangerOk", registry.ToolPolicy{AllowInStranger: true})
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a := newTestAgent(t, ad, d)
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l := New(Options{Agent: a, MaxRounds: 8})
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ctx := WithSessionEnv(context.Background(),
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SessionEnv{ActorEnv: restrict.ActorStranger, MemWritable: false})
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res, err := l.Run(ctx, "sess", []model.Message{model.TextMessage(model.RoleUser, "go")})
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("Run: %v", err)
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}
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if res.ToolCallsExecuted != 0 {
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t.Fatalf("ToolCallsExecuted = %d, want 0 (groupOnly denied to stranger)", res.ToolCallsExecuted)
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}
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last := ad.reqs[len(ad.reqs)-1].Messages
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if !strings.Contains(last[len(last)-1].Content[0].Text, "not_allowed") {
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t.Fatalf("expected not_allowed soft result, got %q", last[len(last)-1].Content[0].Text)
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}
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}
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// mustSetPolicy applies a ToolPolicy to the named tool, failing the test on error.
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func mustSetPolicy(t *testing.T, reg *registry.Registry, name string, pol registry.ToolPolicy) {
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t.Helper()
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if err := reg.SetPolicy(name, pol); err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("SetPolicy %q: %v", name, err)
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}
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}
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