package loop import ( "context" "git.yeij.top/AskaEth/Cyrene_v2/internal/runtime/agent" "git.yeij.top/AskaEth/Cyrene_v2/internal/runtime/capacity" "git.yeij.top/AskaEth/Cyrene_v2/internal/runtime/model" ) // buildRequest assembles a model.Request from the agent's public surface, // mirroring agent.buildRequest so the streaming path behaves identically to // RunStep (leading instruction message, tool schemas, model routing). func (l *Loop) buildRequest(ctx context.Context, messages []model.Message) model.Request { req := model.Request{ Model: l.agent.Model(), Messages: l.assembleMessages(messages), Temperature: l.temperature(), MaxTokens: l.agent.MaxTokens(), Purpose: l.agent.Purpose(), Tools: l.toolSchemas(ctx, messages), Thinking: l.thinking, ReasoningEffort: l.reasoningEffort, } if l.agent.Router() != nil { if m, _ := l.agent.Router().RouteRequest(req); m != "" { req.Model = m } } return req } // assembleMessages prepends the agent's instructions as a leading system message // when they are non-empty, otherwise returns the input slice unchanged. func (l *Loop) assembleMessages(messages []model.Message) []model.Message { instr := l.agent.Instructions() if instr == "" { return messages } out := make([]model.Message, 0, len(messages)+1) out = append(out, model.TextMessage(model.RoleSystem, instr)) out = append(out, messages...) return out } // temperature returns a pointer to the configured temperature, mapping zero to // nil so the provider default applies (matching the agent package). func (l *Loop) temperature() *float64 { t := l.agent.Temperature() if t == 0 { return nil } return &t } // toolSchemas advertises the registered tool schemas to the model, or nil when no // dispatcher is configured. When a capacity decider is wired and enabled, it // classifies the current round and returns only the allowed set for that state // (a view over the dispatcher, per design/14 §4): the model sees/invokes only // the allowed tools, while Invoke itself stays unblocked. A nil or disabled // decider keeps the pre-existing behavior (every tool advertised). // // The design/11 §3 security gate runs last over whatever the capacity view left: // in a group/stranger environment only tools whose editable marker allows that // environment are advertised (default closed), and the owner environment keeps // the full set. Security is a hard red line, not a convenience hint, so it can // only shrink the surface — it never re-admits a tool capacity excluded. func (l *Loop) toolSchemas(ctx context.Context, messages []model.Message) []model.ToolSpec { d := l.dispatcher() if d == nil { return nil } schemas := d.ToolSchemas() if l.capacity == nil || !l.capacity.Enabled() { return l.restrictSchemas(ctx, d, schemas) } names := make([]string, 0, len(schemas)) for _, s := range schemas { names = append(names, s.Name) } acc := capState(ctx) dec := l.capacity.Decide(ctx, capacity.Input{ Messages: capacityTexts(messages), CurrentState: acc.state, AllToolNames: names, Recall: l.capacityRecall(ctx, messages), }) acc.state = dec.State if l.onCapacity != nil && !isMutedBroadcast(ctx) { sessionID := loopSession(ctx) for _, ev := range dec.Events { ev.SessionID = sessionID l.onCapacity(ev) } } allowed := make(map[string]bool, len(dec.AllowedTools)) for _, n := range dec.AllowedTools { allowed[n] = true } out := make([]model.ToolSpec, 0, len(dec.AllowedTools)) for _, s := range schemas { if allowed[s.Name] { out = append(out, s) } } return l.restrictSchemas(ctx, d, out) } // capacityTexts extracts the recent conversation text for the capacity decider: // the last few non-system/non-tool turns, in chronological order (oldest first), // so the decider's current-turn window sees the latest user message last. func capacityTexts(messages []model.Message) []string { texts := make([]string, 0, 6) for i := len(messages) - 1; i >= 0 && len(texts) < 6; i-- { m := messages[i] if m.Role == model.RoleSystem || m.Role == model.RoleTool { continue } if t := messageText(m); t != "" { texts = append(texts, t) } } for i, j := 0, len(texts)-1; i < j; i, j = i+1, j-1 { texts[i], texts[j] = texts[j], texts[i] } return texts } // capacityRecallTopK bounds how many recalled habit memories the capacity L4 layer // considers per round. const capacityRecallTopK = 5 // capacityRecall retrieves the owner's relevant long-term memories for the capacity // L4 habit-alignment layer (design §2.2 L4), the memory feed that lets the decider // learn the user's task-expression habits. It returns nil (keeping L4 silent) when // no retriever/persona is configured — backward compatible — or in a restricted // (group chat / stranger) context, per the isolation red line: L4 learns the owner's // habits and must never read owner-sensitive memory into a group or stranger intent // decision (design §2.2 红线: 不读陌生人敏感). func (l *Loop) capacityRecall(ctx context.Context, messages []model.Message) []capacity.RecallItem { if l.retriever == nil || l.personaID == "" { return nil } env := sessionEnvFrom(ctx) if env.Restricted() { return nil } results, err := l.retriever.Retrieve(ctx, l.personaID, queryFromMessages(messages), capacityRecallTopK) if err != nil { l.log.Warn("capacity recall", "error", err, "env", env.ActorEnv) return nil } items := make([]capacity.RecallItem, 0, len(results)) for _, r := range results { items = append(items, capacity.RecallItem{ Content: r.Item.Content, Scope: string(r.Item.Scope), Kind: string(r.Item.Kind), Tags: r.Item.Tags, Score: r.Score, }) } return items } // decodeToolCalls decodes tool calls from a model.Response via the agent's shared // decoder, so the streaming and non-streaming paths agree on the provider-native // tool calls the adapters emit (Anthropic tool_use / OpenAI tool_calls) as well // as the legacy JSON-envelope convention. It reports ok=true (with a non-empty // slice) when a call is decoded. func decodeToolCalls(resp model.Response) ([]agent.ToolCall, bool) { return agent.ExtractToolCalls(resp) }