feat(iot): IoT 插件化(Provider/Manager/mock 8设备/能力约束/bus 事件);feat(capability/restrict): 工具级布尔标记(群聊/陌生人可用,默认关,策略引擎雏形)+ registry ToolPolicy

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Aska committed 2026-09-06 06:26:21 +08:00
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// Package restrict provides the tool-level security policy engine prototype
// (DevDocs/design/11 §3). It decides whether a tool/capability may be invoked in
// a given actor environment by reading the capability's editable Boolean markers
// AllowInGroup / AllowInStranger, which default to false so a capability is
// owner-only until explicitly allowed.
//
// M5 delivers the marker data structure (the ToolPolicy on
// internal/capability/registry.Capability) and the decision function. The
// authoritative actor tagging happens in the channel/session layer in M6 — here
// an ActorEnv is supplied directly, and the engine reads the registry's markers
// to allow or deny. The engine is fail-closed: an unknown tool, an unknown
// environment, or a nil registry all deny.
package restrict
import (
"io"
"log/slog"
"git.yeij.top/AskaEth/Cyrene_v2/internal/capability/registry"
"git.yeij.top/AskaEth/Cyrene_v2/internal/logger"
)
// ActorEnv is the environment in which a tool may be invoked, derived by the
// channel/session layer from protocol-confirmed sender identity plus the owner's
// whitelist — never from prompt inference.
type ActorEnv string
const (
// ActorOwner is the primary owner's private session.
ActorOwner ActorEnv = "owner"
// ActorGroupMember is a chat group where the owner is present.
ActorGroupMember ActorEnv = "group_member"
// ActorStranger is a direct message from an unrecognized sender.
ActorStranger ActorEnv = "stranger"
)
// Valid reports whether e is one of the known actor environments.
func (e ActorEnv) Valid() bool {
switch e {
case ActorOwner, ActorGroupMember, ActorStranger:
return true
default:
return false
}
}
// Matcher is the subset of a capability registry the policy engine reads. It is
// implemented by *registry.Registry.
type Matcher interface {
// Policy returns the editable reachability markers for the named capability.
Policy(name string) (registry.ToolPolicy, error)
}
// Compile-time assertion that the registry satisfies Matcher, expressed here so
// a breaking registry change fails at the restrict build.
var _ Matcher = (*registry.Registry)(nil)
// Policy is an actor-environment decision engine. It is immutable after it is
// built, so it is safe for concurrent use.
type Policy struct {
reg Matcher
env ActorEnv
log *slog.Logger
}
// SetContext builds a Policy scoped to env, reading tool/capability markers from
// reg. The runtime (M6) binds an actor environment to an engine through this
// entry point. A nil reg yields a fail-closed policy that denies every tool.
func SetContext(reg Matcher, env ActorEnv) *Policy {
return &Policy{
reg: reg,
env: env,
log: slog.New(slog.NewTextHandler(io.Discard, nil)),
}
}
// WithLogger returns a copy of p that logs denials through l with the
// capability/restrict source tag. It does not mutate p, so it is safe to call
// alongside concurrent Allow calls on p.
func (p *Policy) WithLogger(l *slog.Logger) *Policy {
if p == nil || l == nil {
return p
}
cp := *p
cp.log = logger.WithSource(l, "capability/restrict")
return &cp
}
// Env returns the actor environment the policy was built for.
func (p *Policy) Env() ActorEnv {
if p == nil {
return ""
}
return p.env
}
// Allow reports whether the tool/capability named name may be invoked in p's
// environment. It reads the capability's editable markers. The owner environment
// always allows; a nil registry, an unknown tool, an unknown environment, or a
// false marker all deny (fail closed).
func (p *Policy) Allow(name string) bool {
if p == nil {
return false
}
if p.env == ActorOwner {
return true
}
if p.reg == nil {
p.logDeny(name, "nil registry", "")
return false
}
pol, err := p.reg.Policy(name)
if err != nil {
p.logDeny(name, "policy error", err.Error())
return false
}
switch p.env {
case ActorGroupMember:
if !pol.AllowInGroup {
p.logDeny(name, "denied in group", "allow_in_group=false")
return false
}
return true
case ActorStranger:
if !pol.AllowInStranger {
p.logDeny(name, "denied to stranger", "allow_in_stranger=false")
return false
}
return true
default:
p.logDeny(name, "unknown env", string(p.env))
return false
}
}
// Deny is the inverse of Allow.
func (p *Policy) Deny(name string) bool { return !p.Allow(name) }
func (p *Policy) logDeny(name, reason, detail string) {
if p == nil || p.log == nil {
return
}
args := []any{"tool", name, "reason", reason}
if detail != "" {
args = append(args, "detail", detail)
}
p.log.Warn("tool invocation denied by policy", args...)
}
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package restrict
import (
"context"
"testing"
"git.yeij.top/AskaEth/Cyrene_v2/internal/capability/registry"
)
// toolStub is a mock Tool used only to register a capability by name.
type toolStub struct{ name string }
func (t toolStub) Name() string { return t.name }
func (t toolStub) Description() string { return "desc " + t.name }
func (t toolStub) Parameters() (map[string]any, error) { return map[string]any{}, nil }
func (t toolStub) Execute(_ context.Context, _ any) (any, error) { return nil, nil }
func mustRegTool(t *testing.T, r *registry.Registry, name string) {
t.Helper()
if err := r.RegisterTool(toolStub{name: name}); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("RegisterTool(%s): %v", name, err)
}
}
func TestSetContext_OwnerAllowsAll(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
r := registry.New()
mustRegTool(t, r, "calc")
p := SetContext(r, ActorOwner)
if !p.Allow("calc") {
t.Fatal("owner should allow an owner-only tool")
}
if !p.Allow("missing") {
t.Fatal("owner should allow a tool that is not registered")
}
}
func TestAllow_GroupAndStrangerMarkers(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
r := registry.New()
mustRegTool(t, r, "groupOnly")
mustRegTool(t, r, "strangerOnly")
mustRegTool(t, r, "both")
mustRegTool(t, r, "ownerOnly")
if err := r.SetPolicy("groupOnly", registry.ToolPolicy{AllowInGroup: true}); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("SetPolicy groupOnly: %v", err)
}
if err := r.SetPolicy("strangerOnly", registry.ToolPolicy{AllowInStranger: true}); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("SetPolicy strangerOnly: %v", err)
}
if err := r.SetPolicy("both", registry.ToolPolicy{AllowInGroup: true, AllowInStranger: true}); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("SetPolicy both: %v", err)
}
group := SetContext(r, ActorGroupMember)
stranger := SetContext(r, ActorStranger)
if !group.Allow("groupOnly") || !group.Allow("both") {
t.Fatal("group member should be allowed groupOnly and both")
}
if group.Allow("strangerOnly") {
t.Fatal("group member should be denied strangerOnly")
}
if group.Allow("ownerOnly") {
t.Fatal("group member should be denied ownerOnly")
}
if !stranger.Allow("strangerOnly") || !stranger.Allow("both") {
t.Fatal("stranger should be allowed strangerOnly and both")
}
if stranger.Allow("groupOnly") {
t.Fatal("stranger should be denied groupOnly")
}
if stranger.Allow("ownerOnly") {
t.Fatal("stranger should be denied ownerOnly")
}
}
func TestAllow_FailClosed(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
// A nil registry denies every tool in a non-owner environment.
if p := SetContext(nil, ActorStranger); p.Allow("x") {
t.Fatal("nil reg should deny in stranger env")
}
if p := SetContext(nil, ActorGroupMember); p.Allow("x") {
t.Fatal("nil reg should deny in group env")
}
r := registry.New()
mustRegTool(t, r, "t")
// An unknown environment denies even a registered tool.
if p := SetContext(r, ActorEnv("bogus")); p.Allow("t") {
t.Fatal("unknown env should deny")
}
// An unregistered tool denies.
if p := SetContext(r, ActorGroupMember); p.Allow("unknown") {
t.Fatal("unknown tool should deny")
}
// A nil Policy receiver denies.
var nilPolicy *Policy
if nilPolicy.Allow("t") {
t.Fatal("nil Policy receiver should deny")
}
}
func TestDeny_IsInverse(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
r := registry.New()
mustRegTool(t, r, "yes")
if err := r.SetAllowInGroup("yes", true); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("SetAllowInGroup: %v", err)
}
mustRegTool(t, r, "no")
p := SetContext(r, ActorGroupMember)
if p.Allow("yes") != !p.Deny("yes") {
t.Fatal("Allow and Deny are not inverses for an allowed tool")
}
if !p.Deny("no") {
t.Fatal("Deny(no) should be true because no is owner-only")
}
}
func TestActorEnv_Valid(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
for _, env := range []ActorEnv{ActorOwner, ActorGroupMember, ActorStranger} {
if !env.Valid() {
t.Fatalf("%q should be valid", env)
}
}
if ActorEnv("bogus").Valid() {
t.Fatal("bogus env should be invalid")
}
}
func TestPolicy_EnvAndWithLogger(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
r := registry.New()
mustRegTool(t, r, "t")
p := SetContext(r, ActorStranger)
if p.Env() != ActorStranger {
t.Fatalf("Env() = %q, want stranger", p.Env())
}
// WithLogger returns a copy and leaves the original unflagged, so the
// original's discarding logger still admits no output.
cp := p.WithLogger(nil)
if cp == nil {
t.Fatal("WithLogger(nil) returned nil")
}
if cp.Env() != ActorStranger {
t.Fatalf("copy Env() = %q, want stranger", cp.Env())
}
// The copy still denies and reports the same decision.
if cp.Allow("t") {
t.Fatal("stranger t should be denied without allow_in_stranger")
}
}