feat: 管理面板补齐(RAG导入/记忆添加/会话接history/诚实表述) + design/16 §4.6 IM多会话隔离+第三方身份+黑白名单

agent-98 面板批次:
- 会话管理面板改接 history.ListSessions(主web+次级) + 新建次级会话按钮
- 记忆面板手动添加入口 POST /admin/memories(owner)
- 知识库真正实现 IndexDocument(分块+落projectindex) + POST /admin/rag 导入端点
- 三面板空态诚实表述(去除'后端M10+提供')
- RAG嵌入降级到keyword/line(无直属embedder,不伪造语义,符合红线)

agent-99 design/16 §4.6:
- model.Message.SenderName + 迁移0006 sender_name 列
- 第三方身份边界: session.ResolveActor判定(非LLM猜) + [第三方·昵称]前缀(不改源content)
- 群聊/陌生人落独立sess-xxx(persistIsolated),不写主会话,不广播
- 黑/白名单(allowGroups/denyGroups/allowUsers/denyUsers)最前拦截,不进LLM
- 多账号 CHANNELS_JSON 配置 + 每平台多实例
- 管理只读 GET /admin/channels/{platform}/messages(该平台非主人消息流)

实机验证(JWT): 会话管理返回主会话web / 记忆添加成功 / RAG导入documents非空+Cyrene命中; 后端build/vet/test全绿 + 前端build绿

internal/services/channelbridge/channelbridge.go

@@ -86,6 +86,11 @@ type Options struct {
 	Owner       *user.OwnerProfile
 	History     history.HistoryStore
 	OnPersisted func(history.Message)
+	// OnRejected, when non-nil, is called after a message is dropped by the
+	// allow/deny black-or-white lists (design/16 §4.6 §6), so the composition root
+	// can route it into an audit trail. It is invoked with the rejected message and
+	// a short reason token ("group_denied", "user_not_allowed", ...). Nil = log only.
+	OnRejected func(adapter.UnifiedMessage, string)
 }
 
 // Bridge owns the channel adapter lifecycle and the inbound message pipeline. It
@@ -97,6 +102,7 @@ type Bridge struct {
 	owner       *user.OwnerProfile
 	history     history.HistoryStore
 	onPersisted func(history.Message)
+	onRejected  func(adapter.UnifiedMessage, string)
 
 	mu        sync.RWMutex
 	adapters  map[string]adapter.PlatformAdapter
@@ -130,6 +136,7 @@ func New(opts Options) (*Bridge, error) {
 		owner:       opts.Owner,
 		history:     opts.History,
 		onPersisted: opts.OnPersisted,
+		onRejected:  opts.OnRejected,
 		adapters:    make(map[string]adapter.PlatformAdapter),
 		connected:   make(map[string]bool),
 		cancel:      func() {},
@@ -205,7 +212,12 @@ func (b *Bridge) Start() {
 		b.connected[a.Name()] = true
 		b.mu.Unlock()
 
-		a.SetMessageHandler(b.onMessage)
+		// Close over the adapter so the inbound callback knows which account
+		// received the message — required for multi-account reply routing and for
+		// reading that account's allow/deny lists (design/16 §4.6 §5).
+		a.SetMessageHandler(func(ctx context.Context, msg adapter.UnifiedMessage) {
+			b.onMessage(ctx, msg, a)
+		})
 		b.wg.Add(1)
 		go b.readLoop(a)
 		b.log.Info("channel connected", "channel", a.Name())
@@ -274,7 +286,7 @@ func (b *Bridge) snapshot() []adapter.PlatformAdapter {
 // when no bot token is present.
 func (b *Bridge) configured(a adapter.PlatformAdapter) bool {
 	cfg := a.Config()
-	switch a.Name() {
+	switch basePlatform(a.Name()) {
 	case "telegram", "weixin-ilink":
 		return cfgStr(cfg, "bot_token") != ""
 	case "qq-obv11":
@@ -290,6 +302,16 @@ func (b *Bridge) configured(a adapter.PlatformAdapter) bool {
 	}
 }
 
+// basePlatform returns the bare platform name of a (possibly multi-account)
+// adapter name like "telegram:conf0" → "telegram", so the credential gate and the
+// reply-routing fallback treat every account of a platform identically.
+func basePlatform(name string) string {
+	if base, _, ok := strings.Cut(name, ":"); ok {
+		return base
+	}
+	return name
+}
+
 // readLoop runs an adapter's blocking read path until the bridge stops. The emit
 // sink is wired to onMessage so poll-style adapters (Telegram getUpdates, weixin
 // long poll) deliver through the same pipeline as push-style adapters.
@@ -297,13 +319,16 @@ func (b *Bridge) readLoop(a adapter.PlatformAdapter) {
 	defer b.wg.Done()
 	ctx := b.ctx
 	a.ReadMessages(ctx, func(msg adapter.UnifiedMessage) {
-		b.onMessage(ctx, msg)
+		b.onMessage(ctx, msg, a)
 	})
 }
 
 // onMessage is the adapter-facing inbound callback. It runs the pipeline in a
 // bounded goroutine so the adapter's read loop never blocks on a slow agent turn.
-func (b *Bridge) onMessage(ctx context.Context, msg adapter.UnifiedMessage) {
+// The adapter is carried explicitly so the pipeline knows which account received
+// the message (multi-account reply routing + per-account allow/deny, design/16
+// §4.6 §5).
+func (b *Bridge) onMessage(ctx context.Context, msg adapter.UnifiedMessage, a adapter.PlatformAdapter) {
 	b.mu.Lock()
 	if b.closed {
 		b.mu.Unlock()
@@ -337,15 +362,24 @@ func (b *Bridge) onMessage(ctx context.Context, msg adapter.UnifiedMessage) {
 	go func() {
 		defer b.wg.Done()
 		defer func() { <-b.sem }()
-		b.process(ctx, msg)
+		b.processFrom(ctx, msg, a)
 	}()
 }
 
-// process runs the full inbound pipeline: resolve the session/actor, drive the
-// agent loop with the chat text, and send the loop's reply back through the
-// channel. Identity is resolved structurally by the session layer; the bridge
-// never reads message content to decide who the sender is.
+// process runs the inbound pipeline using the adapter whose platform matches the
+// message (single-account convenience path; the adapter may be a bare
+// platform-named registration).
 func (b *Bridge) process(ctx context.Context, msg adapter.UnifiedMessage) {
+	b.processFrom(ctx, msg, b.adapter(msg.Platform))
+}
+
+// processFrom runs the full inbound pipeline against the named account adapter:
+// resolve the session/actor, apply the allow/deny black-or-white lists, drive the
+// agent loop with the chat text, and send the loop's reply back through the same
+// adapter that received the message. Identity is resolved structurally by the
+// session layer; the bridge never reads message content to decide who the sender
+// is (a project red line).
+func (b *Bridge) processFrom(ctx context.Context, msg adapter.UnifiedMessage, a adapter.PlatformAdapter) {
 	text := strings.TrimSpace(msg.Content)
 	if text == "" {
 		b.log.Debug("inbound message has no chat text, skipped",
@@ -353,6 +387,22 @@ func (b *Bridge) process(ctx context.Context, msg adapter.UnifiedMessage) {
 		return
 	}
 
+	// design/16 §4.6 §6: the black-or-white lists are enforced at the very head of
+	// the pipeline, before a session is resolved or the loop is driven, so a
+	// blacklisted/non-whitelisted group or user message never reaches the LLM. The
+	// owner is always allowed (structural, via the resolved actor).
+	actor := session.ResolveActor(msg, b.owner)
+	if actor.IsOwner() {
+		// fall through: owner messages are never blacklisted
+	} else if denied, reason := b.blacklisted(msg, a); denied {
+		b.log.Warn("inbound message blacklisted, dropped",
+			"platform", msg.Platform, "channel", msg.ChannelID, "reason", reason)
+		if b.onRejected != nil {
+			b.onRejected(msg, reason)
+		}
+		return
+	}
+
 	sess, err := b.sessions.GetOrCreate(ctx, msg, b.owner)
 	if err != nil {
 		b.log.Warn("session resolve failed", "platform", msg.Platform,
@@ -368,7 +418,7 @@ func (b *Bridge) process(ctx context.Context, msg adapter.UnifiedMessage) {
 	// design/16 §4.4 + design/02 §3: an owner private chat is routed INTO the single
 	// main web session (shared across platforms) and persisted to chat_messages with
 	// the channel platform, so the Web client mirrors it; group chats and strangers
-	// keep their isolated sess-xxx context and are NOT persisted to the main session.
+	// keep their isolated sess-xxx context and their own platform log.
 	sessID := sess.SessionID
 	isOwnerPrivate := !sess.IsGroup && sess.Owner
 	platform := ""
@@ -377,19 +427,26 @@ func (b *Bridge) process(ctx context.Context, msg adapter.UnifiedMessage) {
 		platform = msg.Platform
 	}
 
-	// Persist the inbound user message into the main web session before the turn, so
-	// the Web client sees it even if the channel reply fails (design/16 §4.4).
+	// The third-party boundary only applies in a restricted (group/stranger)
+	// context: memory is read-only (MemWritable=false), and the sender name is
+	// carried so the agent can see who is speaking (design/16 §4.6 §1-2). The
+	// resolved actor decides who is the owner vs a third party structurally — never
+	// from prompt text.
+	runEnv := loop.SessionEnv{ActorEnv: sess.Env(), MemWritable: sess.MemWritable}
+	senderName := senderDisplayName(msg, actor)
+	loopMsgs := b.buildLoopMessages(ctx, text, runEnv, actor, senderName)
+
+	// Persist the inbound user message before the turn so it is durable even if the
+	// channel reply fails. Owner-private messages land in the main web session and
+	// are broadcast to the Web client; restricted messages land in their isolated
+	// session (the adapter log page) and are NOT broadcast to the main session.
 	if isOwnerPrivate {
 		b.persistToMain(ctx, history.RoleUser, text, platform, deviceIDFor(msg))
+	} else {
+		b.persistIsolated(ctx, history.RoleUser, text, deviceIDFor(msg), sess, msg.Platform, senderName)
 	}
 
-	// Thread the resolved isolation boundary into the loop's memory gates: the
-	// owner's private conversation reads+writes memory, group chats and strangers
-	// are read-only isolation (design/02 §3, design/11 §2).
-	runEnv := loop.SessionEnv{ActorEnv: sess.Env(), MemWritable: sess.MemWritable}
-	res, err := b.run.Run(loop.WithSessionEnv(ctx, runEnv), sessID, []model.Message{
-		model.TextMessage(model.RoleUser, text),
-	})
+	res, err := b.run.Run(loop.WithSessionEnv(ctx, runEnv), sessID, loopMsgs)
 	if err != nil {
 		b.log.Warn("agent run failed", "platform", msg.Platform,
 			"session", sessID, "error", err)
@@ -401,13 +458,14 @@ func (b *Bridge) process(ctx context.Context, msg adapter.UnifiedMessage) {
 		b.log.Debug("no reply produced", "platform", msg.Platform, "session", sessID)
 		return
 	}
-	// Persist the assistant reply into the main web session (design/16 §4.4) and
-	// broadcast, then deliver it back to the channel — so the Web client mirrors the
-	// IM reply too.
+	// Persist the assistant reply (owner-private → main session + broadcast;
+	// restricted → isolated log) then deliver it back to the channel.
 	if isOwnerPrivate {
 		b.persistToMain(ctx, history.RoleAssistant, reply, platform, deviceIDFor(msg))
+	} else {
+		b.persistIsolated(ctx, history.RoleAssistant, reply, "", sess, msg.Platform, "")
 	}
-	if err := b.sendReply(ctx, msg, reply); err != nil {
+	if err := b.sendReply(ctx, msg, a, reply); err != nil {
 		if errors.Is(err, adapter.ErrUnsupported) {
 			b.log.Debug("channel does not support outbound reply, skipped",
 				"platform", msg.Platform, "session", sessID)
@@ -417,11 +475,35 @@ func (b *Bridge) process(ctx context.Context, msg adapter.UnifiedMessage) {
 	}
 }
 
-// sendReply delivers the loop's text back to the channel's source conversation.
-// It mirrors the inbound message's channel targeting fields so the adapter
-// resolves the same peer the message came from.
-func (b *Bridge) sendReply(ctx context.Context, in adapter.UnifiedMessage, text string) error {
-	a := b.adapter(in.Platform)
+// buildLoopMessages builds the model-visible message list for one inbound turn. In
+// a restricted (group/stranger) context it prepends a single system message that
+// states the third-party identity boundary — "every IM non-admin account's message
+// is a third party, unrelated to the owner" (design/16 §4.6 §1). The boundary is
+// decided structurally from the resolved SessionEnv, never inferred by the LLM.
+// The raw message text is left untouched (a copy is built with the prefix), so
+// persisted content stays consistent with what the source platform delivered.
+func (b *Bridge) buildLoopMessages(_ context.Context, text string, env loop.SessionEnv, actor adapter.Actor, senderName string) []model.Message {
+	msg := model.TextMessage(model.RoleUser, text)
+	thirdParty := env.Restricted() && !actor.IsOwner() && senderName != ""
+	if thirdParty {
+		msg.SenderName = senderName
+		msg.Content[0].Text = fmt.Sprintf("[第三方 · %s] %s", senderName, text)
+	}
+	if !env.Restricted() {
+		return []model.Message{msg}
+	}
+	boundary := model.TextMessage(model.RoleSystem, thirdPartyBoundaryPrompt)
+	return []model.Message{boundary, msg}
+}
+
+// sendReply delivers the loop's text back to the channel's source conversation
+// through the account adapter that received the message (multi-account safe,
+// design/16 §4.6 §5). It mirrors the inbound message's channel targeting fields so
+// the adapter resolves the same peer the message came from.
+func (b *Bridge) sendReply(ctx context.Context, in adapter.UnifiedMessage, a adapter.PlatformAdapter, text string) error {
+	if a == nil {
+		a = b.adapter(in.Platform)
+	}
 	if a == nil {
 		return fmt.Errorf("channelbridge: no adapter for platform %q", in.Platform)
 	}
@@ -475,3 +557,103 @@ func deviceIDFor(msg adapter.UnifiedMessage) string {
 	}
 	return msg.Platform + ":" + msg.ChannelID
 }
+
+// thirdPartyBoundaryPrompt is the system message prepended to a restricted
+// (group-chat / stranger) context so the model knows the identity boundary. It is
+// only injected when the session is structurally restricted (design/16 §4.6 §1);
+// the LLM never decides who is a third party — that was already resolved from the
+// actor metadata before this message exists.
+const thirdPartyBoundaryPrompt = "你正在 IM 平台的群聊/第三方会话中。每个 IM 的「非管理员账户」发送的消息 = 第三方人员，和主人没有半毛钱关系，不要把它们当成主人的话、也不要按主人对待。只有未标注昵称的消息才是管理员（主人）发言。"
+
+// senderDisplayName returns the human-readable sender name used to label a
+// third-party message. It prefers the resolved actor's display name (which the
+// channel layer derived from channel metadata + the raw SenderName), falling back
+// to the message's own SenderName, so an empty SenderName always means "the
+// owner/unlabeled" rather than a nickname that resolved to nothing.
+func senderDisplayName(msg adapter.UnifiedMessage, actor adapter.Actor) string {
+	if actor.DisplayName != "" {
+		return actor.DisplayName
+	}
+	return msg.SenderName
+}
+
+// blacklisted applies the per-account allow/deny black-or-white lists (design/16
+// §4.6 §6) to a non-owner inbound message. Group messages are matched by GroupID
+// against allowGroups/denyGroups; direct messages are matched by the sender's user
+// id against allowUsers/denyUsers. An empty allow list means "allow all" (only the
+// deny list applies); a non-empty allow list becomes a white list. The owner is
+// never blacklisted (the caller skips this for owner messages).
+func (b *Bridge) blacklisted(msg adapter.UnifiedMessage, a adapter.PlatformAdapter) (bool, string) {
+	if a == nil {
+		return false, ""
+	}
+	allowGroups, denyGroups, allowUsers, denyUsers := channelLists(a.Config())
+	if msg.IsGroup() {
+		if sliceContains(denyGroups, msg.GroupID) {
+			return true, "group_denied"
+		}
+		if len(allowGroups) > 0 && !sliceContains(allowGroups, msg.GroupID) {
+			return true, "group_not_allowed"
+		}
+		return false, ""
+	}
+	uid := firstNonEmptyStr(msg.SenderID, msg.Sender.UserID)
+	if sliceContains(denyUsers, uid) {
+		return true, "user_denied"
+	}
+	if len(allowUsers) > 0 && !sliceContains(allowUsers, uid) {
+		return true, "user_not_allowed"
+	}
+	return false, ""
+}
+
+// channelLists reads the allow/deny string lists off an adapter's Config snapshot.
+// The lists are stored as plain []string values (set by the multi-account wiring);
+// an absent key yields an empty list.
+func channelLists(cfg map[string]any) (allowGroups, denyGroups, allowUsers, denyUsers []string) {
+	if cfg == nil {
+		return nil, nil, nil, nil
+	}
+	return cfgStrings(cfg, "allowGroups"), cfgStrings(cfg, "denyGroups"),
+		cfgStrings(cfg, "allowUsers"), cfgStrings(cfg, "denyUsers")
+}
+
+// cfgStrings reads a []string field from an adapter config map, returning nil when
+// absent or of a different type.
+func cfgStrings(m map[string]any, key string) []string {
+	if m == nil {
+		return nil
+	}
+	switch v := m[key].(type) {
+	case []string:
+		return v
+	case []any:
+		out := make([]string, 0, len(v))
+		for _, e := range v {
+			if s, ok := e.(string); ok {
+				out = append(out, s)
+			}
+		}
+		return out
+	default:
+		return nil
+	}
+}
+
+// sliceContains reports whether s is present in list.
+func sliceContains(list []string, s string) bool {
+	for _, v := range list {
+		if v == s {
+			return true
+		}
+	}
+	return false
+}
+
+// firstNonEmptyStr returns a when non-empty, otherwise b.
+func firstNonEmptyStr(a, b string) string {
+	if a != "" {
+		return a
+	}
+	return b
+}

internal/services/channelbridge/channelbridge_test.go

@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ package channelbridge
 
 import (
 	"context"
+	"strings"
 	"sync"
 	"testing"
 
@@ -18,6 +19,7 @@ import (
 type fakeAdapter struct {
 	name      string
 	connected bool
+	cfg       map[string]any
 	sends     []adapter.UnifiedMessage
 	handler   adapter.MessageHandler
 	sendErr   error
@@ -25,6 +27,9 @@ type fakeAdapter struct {
 
 func (f *fakeAdapter) Name() string { return f.name }
 func (f *fakeAdapter) Config() map[string]any {
+	if f.cfg != nil {
+		return f.cfg
+	}
 	return map[string]any{"bot_token": "configured"}
 }
 func (f *fakeAdapter) Connect(context.Context) error { f.connected = true; return nil }
@@ -236,6 +241,9 @@ func (c *captureHistory) List(context.Context, string, int64, int, string) ([]hi
 func (c *captureHistory) Recent(context.Context, string, int) ([]history.Message, error) {
 	return nil, nil
 }
+func (c *captureHistory) ListPlatformLog(context.Context, string, int64, int) ([]history.Message, error) {
+	return nil, nil
+}
 func (c *captureHistory) DeleteSession(context.Context, string) error { return nil }
 func (c *captureHistory) NewSubSession(context.Context, string) (string, error) {
 	return "", nil
@@ -350,16 +358,177 @@ func TestGroupMessageNotPersistedToMainSession(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 	b.process(context.Background(), msg)
 
-	// Group chat stays isolated: nothing is written to the main web session and the
-	// loop runs against the isolated session id.
-	if recs := hist.records(); len(recs) != 0 {
-		t.Fatalf("group appends = %+v, want none persisted", recs)
+	// design/16 §4.6: a group/stranger conversation stays isolated — it is NOT
+	// persisted into the main web session, and the loop runs against the isolated
+	// session id. Messages land only in the isolated session's own platform log
+	// (the adapter log page), so nothing reaches the Web main session.
+	recs := hist.records()
+	if len(recs) != 2 {
+		t.Fatalf("group appends = %d, want 2 (isolated user + assistant)", len(recs))
+	}
+	for i, rec := range recs {
+		if rec.SessionID != "sess-g" {
+			t.Fatalf("record[%d] SessionID = %q, want isolated sess-g (not web)", i, rec.SessionID)
+		}
+		if rec.Platform != "telegram" {
+			t.Fatalf("record[%d] Platform = %q, want telegram", i, rec.Platform)
+		}
 	}
 	if chat.sessionID != "sess-g" {
 		t.Fatalf("group loop session id = %q, want sess-g", chat.sessionID)
 	}
 }
 
+func TestBlacklistGroupMessageDroppedBeforeLoop(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	chat := &stubChatter{res: &loop.Result{Text: "不该回复"}}
+	// A stranger's group session that would otherwise be processed.
+	sess := &stubSessions{sess: session.Session{SessionID: "sess-g", IsGroup: true, Owner: false, MemWritable: false}}
+	ad := &fakeAdapter{name: "telegram", cfg: map[string]any{
+		"bot_token": "configured",
+		"denyGroups": []string{"-100"},
+	}}
+	var rejected []string
+	b, err := New(Options{
+		Loop: chat, Sessions: sess, Owner: &user.OwnerProfile{}, History: &captureHistory{},
+		OnRejected: func(_ adapter.UnifiedMessage, reason string) { rejected = append(rejected, reason) },
+	})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("New: %v", err)
+	}
+	b.Add(ad)
+
+	msg := adapter.UnifiedMessage{
+		Platform: "telegram", ChannelID: "-100", ChannelType: adapter.ChannelGroup,
+		GroupID: "-100", SenderID: "9", SenderName: "张三",
+		Sender: adapter.Actor{Role: adapter.RoleMember}, Content: "spam",
+		ContentType: adapter.ContentText,
+	}
+	b.process(context.Background(), msg)
+
+	// The blacklisted group message never reaches the agent loop and never sends a
+	// reply; the rejection reason is surfaced for the audit trail.
+	if chat.sessionID != "" || len(chat.messages) != 0 {
+		t.Fatalf("loop ran for blacklisted message: session=%q messages=%+v", chat.sessionID, chat.messages)
+	}
+	if len(ad.sends) != 0 {
+		t.Fatalf("blacklisted message sent %d replies, want 0", len(ad.sends))
+	}
+	if len(rejected) != 1 || rejected[0] != "group_denied" {
+		t.Fatalf("rejection reasons = %v, want [group_denied]", rejected)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestBlacklistUserMessageDroppedBeforeLoop(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	chat := &stubChatter{res: &loop.Result{Text: "不该回复"}}
+	sess := &stubSessions{sess: session.Session{SessionID: "sess-s", IsGroup: false, Owner: false, MemWritable: false}}
+	ad := &fakeAdapter{name: "telegram", cfg: map[string]any{
+		"bot_token": "configured",
+		"allowUsers": []string{"111"},
+	}}
+	b, err := New(Options{Loop: chat, Sessions: sess, Owner: &user.OwnerProfile{}, History: &captureHistory{}})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("New: %v", err)
+	}
+	b.Add(ad)
+
+	msg := adapter.UnifiedMessage{
+		Platform: "telegram", ChannelID: "200", ChannelType: adapter.ChannelDirect,
+		SenderID: "200", Sender: adapter.Actor{Role: adapter.RoleMember}, Content: "hi",
+		ContentType: adapter.ContentText,
+	}
+	b.process(context.Background(), msg)
+
+	// A direct message from a user NOT in the allow whitelist is dropped; the owner
+	// is never affected (this is a stranger).
+	if chat.sessionID != "" || len(chat.messages) != 0 {
+		t.Fatalf("loop ran for non-whitelisted user: session=%q messages=%+v", chat.sessionID, chat.messages)
+	}
+	if len(ad.sends) != 0 {
+		t.Fatalf("non-whitelisted user sent %d replies, want 0", len(ad.sends))
+	}
+}
+
+func TestGroupMessageThirdPartySenderNameAndBoundary(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	chat := &stubChatter{res: &loop.Result{Text: "收到"}}
+	sess := &stubSessions{sess: session.Session{SessionID: "sess-g", IsGroup: true, Owner: false, MemWritable: false}}
+	hist := &captureHistory{}
+	b, err := New(Options{Loop: chat, Sessions: sess, Owner: &user.OwnerProfile{}, History: hist})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("New: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	msg := adapter.UnifiedMessage{
+		Platform: "telegram", ChannelID: "-20", ChannelType: adapter.ChannelGroup,
+		GroupID: "-20", GroupName: "Gang", SenderID: "9", SenderName: "张三",
+		Sender: adapter.Actor{Role: adapter.RoleMember}, Content: "hello all",
+		ContentType: adapter.ContentText,
+	}
+	b.process(context.Background(), msg)
+
+	// The loop sees a leading third-party boundary system message plus the user
+	// message already prefixed with [第三方 · 张三] (the raw content is preserved in
+	// history, so no source data is lost).
+	if len(chat.messages) != 2 {
+		t.Fatalf("loop messages = %d, want 2 (boundary + user)", len(chat.messages))
+	}
+	if chat.messages[0].Role != model.RoleSystem || !strings.Contains(chat.messages[0].Content[0].Text, "非管理员账户") {
+		t.Fatalf("expected third-party boundary system message, got %+v", chat.messages[0])
+	}
+	user := chat.messages[1]
+	if user.SenderName != "张三" || user.Content[0].Text != "[第三方 · 张三] hello all" {
+		t.Fatalf("loop user message = %+v, want SenderName 张三 and [第三方 · 张三] prefix", user)
+	}
+	// History keeps the RAW content and carries the sender name so the adapter log
+	// page can label the stream without altering the source message.
+	recs := hist.records()
+	if len(recs) != 2 || recs[0].Content != "hello all" || recs[0].SenderName != "张三" {
+		t.Fatalf("isolated records = %+v, want raw content with SenderName 张三", recs)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestOwnerInGroupIsIsolatedButNotLabeledThirdParty(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	chat := &stubChatter{res: &loop.Result{Text: "收到"}}
+	// Owner speaking inside a group: the session stays restricted (mem read-only),
+	// but the owner is never labeled as a third party (design/16 §4.6 §1-2).
+	sess := &stubSessions{sess: session.Session{SessionID: "sess-g", IsGroup: true, Owner: true, MemWritable: false}}
+	hist := &captureHistory{}
+	b, err := New(Options{Loop: chat, Sessions: sess, Owner: &user.OwnerProfile{}, History: hist})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("New: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	msg := adapter.UnifiedMessage{
+		Platform: "telegram", ChannelID: "-20", ChannelType: adapter.ChannelGroup,
+		GroupID: "-20", SenderID: "owner_uid", SenderName: "主人",
+		Sender: adapter.Actor{Role: adapter.RoleOwner}, Content: "我在群里",
+		ContentType: adapter.ContentText,
+	}
+	b.process(context.Background(), msg)
+
+	// Restricted context → a third-party boundary system message is still injected.
+	if len(chat.messages) != 2 || chat.messages[0].Role != model.RoleSystem {
+		t.Fatalf("loop messages = %d, want 2 (boundary + user)", len(chat.messages))
+	}
+	// Owner's message is NOT prefixed as third-party and carries no SenderName.
+	user := chat.messages[1]
+	if user.SenderName != "" || user.Content[0].Text != "我在群里" {
+		t.Fatalf("owner group message = %+v, want no SenderName and no [第三方] prefix", user)
+	}
+	// Owner group speech still lands in the isolated session (not the main web session).
+	recs := hist.records()
+	if len(recs) != 2 || recs[0].SessionID != "sess-g" {
+		t.Fatalf("owner group records = %+v, want isolated sess-g, not web", recs)
+	}
+}
+
 func TestNoHistoryStoreKeepsBridgeUnchanged(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	// A bridge built without a history store persists nothing but still runs/replies.

internal/services/channelbridge/persist.go

@@ -3,6 +3,8 @@ package channelbridge
 import (
 	"context"
 
+	"git.yeij.top/AskaEth/Cyrene_v2/internal/channel/adapter"
+	"git.yeij.top/AskaEth/Cyrene_v2/internal/channel/session"
 	"git.yeij.top/AskaEth/Cyrene_v2/internal/runtime/history"
 )
 
@@ -23,6 +25,16 @@ func (b *Bridge) SetOnPersisted(fn func(history.Message)) {
 	b.onPersisted = fn
 }
 
+// SetOnRejected wires (or replaces) the hook called after a message is dropped by
+// the allow/deny black-or-white lists (design/16 §4.6 §6). The composition root
+// routes it into the gateway audit trail. It is a no-op-safe call and is safe for
+// concurrent use with in-flight processing.
+func (b *Bridge) SetOnRejected(fn func(adapter.UnifiedMessage, string)) {
+	b.mu.Lock()
+	defer b.mu.Unlock()
+	b.onRejected = fn
+}
+
 // notifyPersisted hands a just-persisted message to the transport hook when one is
 // wired, so the gateway can broadcast `message_persisted` for cross-end sync.
 func (b *Bridge) notifyPersisted(msg history.Message) {
@@ -53,3 +65,27 @@ func (b *Bridge) persistToMain(ctx context.Context, role, content, platform, dev
 	}
 	b.notifyPersisted(full)
 }
+
+// persistIsolated writes one message into a restricted (group / stranger) session's
+// own platform log (design/16 §4.6 §4): the message lands in the isolated sess-xxx
+// session (NOT the main web session) and carries the channel platform, the client
+// deviceID and the sender's display name, so the IM adapter log page can render the
+// non-owner message stream. It is deliberately NOT broadcast to the Web main session
+// (only owner-private messages mirror to the Web). It is a no-op when no history
+// store is wired, so the bridge runs unchanged without storage.
+func (b *Bridge) persistIsolated(ctx context.Context, role, content, deviceID string, sess session.Session, platform, senderName string) {
+	if b.history == nil {
+		return
+	}
+	full, err := b.history.AppendFull(ctx, history.Message{
+		SessionID: sess.SessionID, Role: role, Content: content, Platform: platform,
+		DeviceID: deviceID, SenderName: senderName,
+	})
+	if err != nil {
+		b.log.Warn("persist isolated session", "err", err, "role", role,
+			"session", sess.SessionID, "platform", platform, "sender_name", senderName)
+		return
+	}
+	// No broadcast: third-party messages must not reach the Web main session (design/16 §4.6 §3).
+	_ = full
+}