feat: 修复审计落差 #1/#2/#3/#6 + 管理面板移动端适配

#1 工具布尔标记生效(agent-106, 安全红线): loop toolSchemas/runToolCalls 加 allow-set 安全门 restrictSchemas/applyToolSecurityGate——群聊/陌生人只暴露允许工具(默认关), 被拒not_allowed软提示+AuditEvent, owner全工具不变; 身份靠 ActorEnv(非提示词)
#2 checkpoint 恢复(agent-109): run.go LoadLatest + resumableStopReason门控(只恢复in-flight工具循环,不出答案不续跑), 幂等不重放副作用, 新会话不误恢复; resume_test 4用例
#3 tool_result(agent-108, 协议层): Anthropic 原生tool_result块(tool_use_id/is_error)非user纯文本 + OpenAI tool消息补tool_call_id; Content加ToolCallID/IsError等; (loop接线层2处留待,见备注)
#6 capacity_awaken推送(agent-107): onCapacity从只Debug改推WS hub(BroadcastCapacityAwaken, sessionId定向+payload对齐前端AwakenPayload)
管理面板移动端(agent-110): AdminApp 汉堡菜单+抽屉侧栏+标题truncate防换行, RBAC守卫不受影响
全仓 build/vet/test绿 + 前端build绿; 前端无涉差异已对齐

备注: #3 loop接线层2处(assistant工具轮append历史 + Message.ToolCallID/IsError)留给后续; #4代审/#5子代理触发/#7拆文件后置(主人说后三不急)

internal/runtime/loop/tool_policy.go

@@ -0,0 +1,86 @@
+package loop
+
+import (
+	"context"
+
+	"git.yeij.top/AskaEth/Cyrene_v2/internal/runtime/agent"
+	"git.yeij.top/AskaEth/Cyrene_v2/internal/runtime/model"
+	"git.yeij.top/AskaEth/Cyrene_v2/internal/runtime/tool"
+)
+
+// auditToolRejectNotAllowed is the audit "what" for a tool call denied by the
+// design/11 §3 security gate in a group/stranger environment.
+const auditToolRejectNotAllowed = "tool.reject.not_allowed"
+
+// AuditEvent reports a security-gated tool rejection to the audit sink
+// (design/11 §3 §8). The loop emits one when it denies a tool call in a
+// restricted (group/stranger) environment, so the rejection is auditable and the
+// frontend can render the small "xx 工具在群聊被拒" note. It is wired to the
+// gateway audit trail via Options.OnAudit.
+type AuditEvent struct {
+	// Who is the acting actor environment label ("group_member"/"stranger").
+	Who string
+	// What is the operation, e.g. "tool.reject.not_allowed".
+	What string
+	// Result is the outcome detail — the not_allowed hint naming the denied tool.
+	Result string
+}
+
+// restrictSchemas returns only the tool schemas the session env on ctx may
+// invoke, per the design/11 §3 security gate: a group/stranger session may
+// invoke only tools whose editable marker allows that environment (default
+// closed), while the owner environment keeps the full set. It is the final word
+// over the capacity allowed-set view — a security red line, not a convenience
+// hint — so it runs last and can only shrink the surface.
+func (l *Loop) restrictSchemas(ctx context.Context, d *tool.Dispatcher, schemas []model.ToolSpec) []model.ToolSpec {
+	policy := d.PolicyEngine(sessionEnvFrom(ctx).ActorEnv)
+	kept := make([]model.ToolSpec, 0, len(schemas))
+	for _, s := range schemas {
+		if policy.Allow(s.Name) {
+			kept = append(kept, s)
+		}
+	}
+	return kept
+}
+
+// applyToolSecurityGate blocks every call whose tool is not allowed in the
+// session env on ctx (design/11 §3). It mutates actions in place, overriding
+// each runnable call to a skip carrying the not_allowed hint and emitting an
+// AuditEvent for the rejection. A nil receiver or nil dispatcher is a no-op.
+func (l *Loop) applyToolSecurityGate(ctx context.Context, d *tool.Dispatcher, calls []agent.ToolCall, actions []toolCallAction) {
+	env := sessionEnvFrom(ctx)
+	policy := d.PolicyEngine(env.ActorEnv)
+	for i := range calls {
+		if !actions[i].run {
+			continue
+		}
+		if policy.Allow(calls[i].Name) {
+			continue
+		}
+		reason := notAllowedReason(calls[i].Name)
+		actions[i] = toolCallAction{run: false, reason: reason}
+		l.emitAudit(AuditEvent{
+			Who:    string(env.ActorEnv),
+			What:   auditToolRejectNotAllowed,
+			Result: reason,
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+// notAllowedReason is the soft hint fed back to the model when a restricted
+// (group/stranger) session invokes a tool whose editable marker denies that
+// environment (design/11 §3). It is a soft result — injected into the
+// conversation, never a panic or hard crash — so the model can reassess.
+func notAllowedReason(name string) string {
+	return "not_allowed: tool " + name + " is not allowed in a group/stranger conversation"
+}
+
+// emitAudit forwards an AuditEvent to the configured OnAudit sink. It is a no-op
+// when no sink is wired, so the security gate still works (soft not_allowed
+// result) in leaf tests that do not attach an audit sink.
+func (l *Loop) emitAudit(ev AuditEvent) {
+	if l.onAudit == nil {
+		return
+	}
+	l.onAudit(ev)
+}